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THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

A METAPHYSICAL ESSAY

BY

G. N. LAWANDE
WILSON COLLEGE, BOMBAY

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To

THE REV. JOHN McKENZIE, M.A.,D.D.

**As a Mark of Deep Gratitude
and Profound Respect**

FOREWORD

THE problem of universals, in spite of its great metaphysical importance, has not figured so largely in modern philosophy as it did in the philosophy of the Middle Ages. In recent years, however, it has received a certain amount of attention, mostly from philosophers of the realistic, or rather non-idealistic, school. Dr. G. N. Lawande's work, written from the point of view of an idealist, is therefore opportune and will be welcomed by all lovers of philosophy. He shows acquaintance with almost all the important theories about the subject from ancient times to modern, and though one may not always agree with his criticism, or perhaps even with his interpretation, of the theories he rejects, there is no doubt that his discussion will be found by all both stimulating and instructive. His own theory is expounded with great ability and, I think, on the whole with success.

Dr. Lawande's view of universals is the same as that of Plato, whom he defends against Aristotle's misunderstanding, and as that of modern idealists like Bosanquet. Universals are not generalised abstractions but concrete individuals, and particulars are partial expressions, or manifestations, of universals. To put the distinction more bluntly, but also, I hope, more effectively, universals are wholes and particulars are parts. But particulars are parts that *imply* their wholes and therefore not merely mechanical parts, and universals are wholes that include and *transcend* their parts and therefore not mere totalities. The distinction between recurrent identity (similarity) and continuant identity (synthetic unity) made by some philosophers is not final, all identity being in the end continuant and similarity being not ultimate but grounded in identity. No similarity without identity—this is as much Dr. Lawande's principle as it is Bradley's. And I think he would say in Bradley's terminology that parti-

culars are adjectives of universals and not universals adjectives of particulars; for particulars, contrary to what is generally believed, are *in* universals and not universals *in* particulars. In fine the relation of a universal to its particulars is not that of something identically repeated in several instances to the instances in which it is repeated, but that of a substance to its attributes. This thesis is defended with a wealth of argument and learning which makes the book a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject.

J. C. P. D'ANDRADE

Chowpatty, Bombay,
2nd October, 1943.

PREFACE

IN this essay I have attempted to restate the traditional problem of universals in the light of its discussion in contemporary thought. Even in this modest undertaking I have barely attempted an examination of the main points at issue, without endeavouring to go into details. It is hoped, however, that even in this imperfect form I have succeeded in conveying my meaning to the reader on a subject difficult enough to tax the energies of a philosopher much abler than myself.

In the course of writing the book I was fortunate enough to receive constant help and guidance from the Rev Dr. John McKenzie, Principal of my College. Dr. McKenzie has read the book both in manuscript and when it was passing through the press. It is superfluous formally to acknowledge my debt to Dr. McKenzie whose kindness and encouragement helped me to conceive the plan of the book, and whose very sympathetic guidance enabled me to execute it. He has further laid me under very great obligation by kindly allowing me to dedicate it to him.

I am scarcely less indebted to Professor J. C. P. d'Andrade, who also read the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. But for his acute criticism, the defects of the book would have been far more serious than they actually are. I am further indebted to him for kindly agreeing to write a foreword. Indeed, it may safely be said that whatever merits my book may have, belong to these two teachers of mine. I alone am responsible for the shortcomings, of which none is more conscious than myself.

A word must be said about the polemical nature of the method I have adopted in the development of my thesis. I believe that in philosophy it is not possible to prove one's theory without, implicitly or explicitly, disproving those of other philosophers with whom one is not in agree-

ment. In other words, every philosophical judgment is positive and negative at once. This is not the defect of the philosophical judgment, but is its very essence. Philosophy is dialectics. Thesis can develop into synthesis only through antithesis.

This, therefore, explains why I have dared to criticise certain eminent philosophers. It is obvious that in criticising these philosophers I am using them as a means to make my meaning clear. Surely, this is not showing disrespect to them. On the contrary, it is an indication of the magnitude of my obligation to them. In philosophy one criticises most those from whom one learns most. My criticism must not, therefore, be interpreted as an attitude of hostility, but an act of public acknowledgment of my heavy debt. It is a confession of gratitude, not an expression of disrespect.

This book would not have seen the light of day without the generosity of the late Mr. Kaikhushroo F. D. Taraporewalla of the New Book Co., Bombay, who agreed to publish it even in these abnormal times. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the University of Bombay for the grant-in-aid received by him from the University towards the cost of the publication of the book. Lastly, I have to thank my brother, Mr. Gowind N. Lawande, for preparing the index.

Wilson College,
4th October, 1943.

G. N. LAWANDE

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CORRIGENDA

A few typographical errors have crept in too late for correction. The reader's attention is particularly invited to the following:

p. 26, l. 8, read ' cannot ' for ' can '

p. 217, l. 83, delete ' no '

p. 223, l. 7, read 'moral' for 'mere'.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE history of philosophy is a record of the attempts to solve the problem raised by universals. Indeed it can even be said that philosophy itself is ultimately the attempt to solve satisfactorily the problem of universals, which otherwise stated, is the problem of 'the one and the many.' As an enquiry into the nature of Reality philosophy seeks to reconcile the claims of the many, the particulars, with the claims of the one, the universal. The world wears the appearance of a many somehow integrated as one. In art, science, morality, religion, and in all other departments of life, we find these two aspects indissolubly wedded together. It is impossible to take the one and leave the other. Take the case of science. There was a time when scientists urged that their investigations were independent of philosophy and had nothing to do with it. In a sense this was true. But, fundamentally, this divorce of science from philosophy was a mistake. If philosophy is an attempt to reconcile the two aspects of unity and plurality, then the scientist is as much a philosopher in his own way as any other man is. His discovery of laws of nature is a work similar to that which a social reformer may undertake when he sweeps away the existing code of morality and seeks to substitute a different system of moral values in virtue of the demand of a different set of conditions prevalent in society; or, similar to the attempt of an artist who seeks to embody a novel concept of beauty in response to his aesthetic apprehension of facts that demand integration into a unity. Everywhere, that is to say, the problem of universals is insistent. Even common-sense, which is generally supposed to be unreflective, has its own ways of meeting the demands of the one and the many, of particulars and universals. The common-sense solution of the

problem may not be satisfactory, and indeed, in the nature of the case, it cannot be. But the point is that the problem of universals is so pervasive that none can escape it. Even to reflect is to recognise the presence of the problem and to attempt a solution. To think is to judge. But to judge is to refer one's ideas to the one Reality which reconciles the claims of the many in one harmonious unity.

We may, provisionally, define universals as identities that characterise particulars. Traditionally these identities are either qualities or relations. Redness, for instance, is a universal because it is an identity that characterises different objects that are red. These different objects are particulars, whilst redness is a universal that characterises them and in virtue of which they are said to be red. The same may be said of relations. "On" is said to be a universal because the same relation may be present where different situations of an identical nature present themselves.

The important problem raised by universals is whether such identities exist or whether they are only fictions. The history of philosophy is an alternation of the views that deny existence to universals and those that maintain that they exist. The controversies which have immortalised themselves in philosophy as nominalism, realism and conceptualism, and the influence that they have exerted on the course of civilisation, testify to the seriousness with which the problem whether universals exist or not has been prosecuted both by ancients and by moderns. And even in modern philosophy, which, to avoid confusion, may be termed contemporary, the seriousness is only heightened by the ingenuity of thinkers and their novel theories with their very attractive labels. We have, besides idealism and realism, neo-realism, critical realism, neo-idealism, logical positivism, logical atomism, and, in addition to these, many others such as physicalism, etc. Some of these attempts are even more rigorous than those of the

traditional theories and are pursued with a vigour and determination undreamt of even by the Sophists against whom Socrates and Plato waged relentless warfare. Many of the answers proposed and solutions offered are fantastic and absurd; but it cannot be doubted that thinkers have realised that they can ignore the problem of universals only on pain of forfeiting their right to philosophise.

The existence of universals was the theme that Plato pursued with all the resources that he could command, and his dialogues bear ample testimony to the importance of the problem in any system that can be called philosophical. Another question is whether universals are so distinct from particulars as to demand a bifurcation of the universe into two parts, the one where universals are and the other where particulars exist at ease. The relation between particulars and universals is an issue that springs directly from the proof that universals exist, and it cannot be raised prior to that. The first problem is whether universals exist, and it is only when this issue is satisfactorily decided that the second problem can be entertained. The problem of universals thus gives rise to two specific problems, namely, whether universals exist, and, if they do, how they are related to particulars.

The reason why Plato was more concerned with the first and Aristotle with the second is that in the times when Socrates and Plato lived this problem demanded urgent solution in view of the attack of the Sophists, who had declared that man was the measure of all things and that there were no independent criteria to judge the right from the wrong, the true from the false. To deny a criterion was to negate the very values that make life worth living. To a Greek such a prospect was certainly intolerable. Such a denial involved for him the exaltation of the individual over the state, in the service of which he realised the best in his life. The Sophistic teaching, therefore, tended to undermine all that the Greek mind prized most and

to substitute anarchy and disorder, which, of all the things in the world, it abhorred most¹

The insistence on the existence of universals therefore was the only method by which such a disaster could be averted. And this explains why Plato in some of his dialogues even went the length of making them the only realities and reducing particulars to mere copies. It is true that this was not the best thought of Plato, and for a Greek to reduce the world in which he lived, moved and had his being, to a copy, was almost inconceivable. But circumstances demanded such an extreme theory if the challenge of the Sophists, who denied existence to universals and thus exploded the very basis of the city-state and of life, was to be met. Plato met the Sophists on their own ground and proved to them that the existence of universals was a fact beyond doubt, and that universals alone gave to particulars whatever reality they had, their subjectivism and humanism being not only dangerous in practice but quite false in theory.

The reason why Aristotle did not press the problem of the existence of universals was that in his time that problem was already solved and had lost its challenging features. It was the second problem that he viewed as of chief importance, because, Greek that he was, he could not view with equanimity the dangerous consequences that would follow to the city-state from a separation between the world of particulars and the world of universals. The strain on the city-state as a result of wars and other causes was already great. The process of disintegration had already set in and was only accelerated by the Sophists. The rise of the sophistic teaching was not the cause but at least a part-effect of the crisis that Greek civilisation was passing through as a result of a clash of values. The very foundations of the city-state were being questioned, an attempt not dissimilar to the one we discover in modern

¹ Compare "From one point of view, indeed, the chief aim of Plato's philosophy may be regarded as the attempt to reestablish standards of thought and conduct for civilisation that seemed on the verge of dissolution"—G C Field, "Plato & his Contemporaries" ch. VII, p. 91.

times where the state is described as an instrument for the perpetuation of the interests of the bourgeoisie against those of the proletariat. Greek civilisation was like a lyric that is beautiful but not great. It was not like an epic where one finds the clash of hostile elements on a grand scale.

The Platonic teaching, though it counteracted the crude individualism of the Sophists, only expanded the horizon of the Greek mind towards the abstract universal. The idea of the Good that was the source of all universals was certainly not the Greek City-State but the whole universe. The Greek mind, that had so far maintained its allegiance only to the city-state, sought to expand to the farthest bounds of the universe. This was later emphasised in the teaching of the Stoics and the Neo-Platonists. Man was concerned with the 'nous,' the universal reason, and could not be bound within the limited field of the city-state. Both Socrates and Plato had indirectly provided instruments by which the validity of the city-state was questioned. Man became a citizen of the universe and not a member of the city-state.

Aristotle saw the danger of abstract universalism that had no definite content. He rightly realised that abstract universals were as much fictions as abstract particulars. If Sophism exalted the particular over the universal, Platonism exalted the universal by denying the particular. Both were abstractions and had to be reconciled with each other. This explains his attack on his master, who, according to the pupil, was responsible for such dangerous consequences. Aristotle did not deny the existence of universals. On the contrary he insisted upon their existence. In this he was one with Plato. But he violently reacted against him in that he thought that the latter, in his attempt to counteract abstract individualism, had gone over to the other extreme, that is, abstract universalism. He clearly saw that if particulars are shadows without the participation of universals, universals are no less shadows without the inclusion of particulars. The problem of phi-

losophy can be solved only when universals are seen to be concrete and not abstract.

Whether Aristotle finally solved the problem of the concrete universal may be doubted. I believe that he did not, in view of the fact that he was loath to make the particular an adjective of the concrete universal or the universe. In certain passages he even tends to deny the claims of universals in favour of particulars, which, according to him, have 'primary substance.' But this does not mean that reconciliation was not possible on his theory, if we take into account some other statements that point in another direction. His view that God thinks only thoughts that have no matter, and that in God's thinking thoughts and objects of thought are the same, may be compared to Spinoza's teaching that Substance is that which unites essence and existence in indissoluble unity. But this hardly squares with the distinction between 'primary' and the 'secondary' substance which he maintains to the last. If God is the universe where the distinction between essence and existence is illegitimate, then all particulars become secondary substances because they are asserted of the universe. But this is not what Aristotle says. Till the last Aristotle did not succeed in reconciling the claims of the particular and the universal in the unity of the concrete universal.

The notion of the concrete universal towards which the philosophical speculations of both Plato and Aristotle tended was completely ignored by subsequent thinkers. This was mainly due to Stoicism and Neo-Platonism, which greatly influenced subsequent thinking. The transcendentalism of these schools of thought had roots in the supposed other world which was contrasted with this. The distinction between matter and form that was the basis of both the Platonic and the Aristotelian teaching was pressed into the service of such false transcendentalism. Matter now came to be regarded as something alien to spirit, which latter could be apprehended by a kind of beatific vision.

The character of non-being that belonged to matter was now understood as lack of being, and being was wholly transferred to universals, which alone were considered as existent entities grasped by intuition. According to both Plato and Aristotle matter was only potentiality and in that sense non-being. Matter was not the negation of form but its limitation. Religious influences were also working towards this metamorphosis. Christianity, for example, teaches that this world is only a pilgrimage and that the eternality lies somewhere beyond this world. The same may be said to be true of other religions also. But Christianity never unambiguously taught that the Kingdom of God could not be realised on earth. On the contrary it has always insisted that in the person of the Christ such a realisation was possible. But it was unfortunate that the influence of Christianity on subsequent thinking was in the direction of transcendentalism of the crudest type. Universals came to be looked upon as denizens of the other world which could be apprehended by the soul without being in the least affected by the body. The distinction between body and soul that was sharply drawn in the interests of religion reflected itself in their being given separate domains, that of the soul having commerce with universals and that of the body being concerned with mean particulars.

So another distinction was made crossing the first one with which we are familiar in Greek philosophy. It is true that in Plato especially we find the distinction drawn between body and soul, and in the "Phaedo" the immortality of the soul is the main point at issue. But it is questionable whether this distinction had any serious motive behind it. However that may be, the fact that it was never seriously argued again, except in the "Timaeus" and "The Laws," indicates that it was drawn in the interests of epistemology and not of religion. The Greek mind, that had such a great regard for beauty and sensuous objects, could have hardly understood the sharp distinction

between soul and body that played such a fundamental part in the speculations of the Middle Ages and even farther in the beginning of modern philosophy.

So far as our problem is concerned, universals came to be distinguished from particulars not only existentially but also epistemologically. Not only were they held to exist unaffected by particulars, but also to be apprehended without being contaminated by particulars. So nominalism which denied the existence of universals was ranged against both realism which asserted their separate existence and against conceptualism which now insisted upon a distinct mode of apprehending them. The scholastic controversies centred round these points. To take only the controversy between Porphyry and Ockham: Porphyry had reduced all universals to predicates of subjects that were indeterminate substances. To this Ockham replied that universals were not predicates because all predicates were signs of 'second intention.' He urged that universals existed only in the mind, that, being acts of the understanding, they were incorporeal and since the understanding was not a material thing they were not in sensible things but had a distinct habitat.¹

These consequences were far from satisfactory, and enveloped the problem of universals in a thick, mystifying fog. It is therefore not surprising that modern philosophy started its career on the wrong track as a result of ontological as well as epistemological dualism between universals and particulars. Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, excluded mind from matter and vice-versa. The essence of mind lay in its thinking and mind could only think innate ideas. Ockham's 'natural signs' now became innate ideas, the private property of the mind. The results were most disastrous. On the one hand they gave rise to the theory of representationism, on the other hand they introduced a vein of blind mysticism. Both these tendencies are evident in Descartes and he could succeed in meeting the difficulties that followed from these only by appealing to God.

-- 1 Vide, E. A. Moody, "Logic of William of Ockham," especially Ch. III.

The sharpwitted Englishman, Locke, was not slow to attack on both these fronts. He pertinently asked whether it was legitimate to posit the existence of innate ideas, and concluded that it was a piece of rank anthropocentrism. There was nothing in the understanding, he declared, that was not already in the senses. The human mind was a 'tabula rasa' with the capacity to receive impressions from sensible things. Knowledge neither meant the apprehension of innate ideas or universals independently of particulars, nor was it their discovery in them. Knowledge was "nothing but the perception of the connection of an agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas," and "the mind, in all its thoughts, and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate"¹ The ultimate furniture of knowledge was simple ideas that were acquired by the senses as a result of their being impressed by things outside. Thus, according to Locke, nothing existed except particulars or simple ideas

The abstract universal is thus faced with the abstract particular. If universals are innate because they are independent of particulars, particulars are, in a sense, ready-made because they are independent of universals. The circle is now complete. One abstraction is met by another abstraction without any prospect of reconciliation. Under these circumstances the advent of Hume was inevitable. It is not quite true to hold that Hume was a sceptic. If Hume was a sceptic, then it is a question whether Locke and Berkeley also were not. The scepticism of the latter two is not obtrusive because they, in spite of their avowed theories, clung to their deep seated convictions which could hardly be reconciled with their professed theories. Locke's belief in matter, Berkeley's belief in soul are cases in point. Hume only drew logical conclusions from the premises supplied both by Locke and Berkeley. If universals are non-existent entities because what exists are sensations,

1 J. Locke, "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" Bk IV, ch 1, Secs. 1, 2

then matter and mind are no less non-existent than universals. Locke's empiricism meets the same fate as the rationalism which he had so vehemently criticised. If no universals, then no particulars, that is, no sensible objects. If what exists are sensations, they are neither mental nor physical, because there are neither minds nor objects. They are born from the dark and to the dark they go.

The only way to extricate philosophy from this prospect of self-annihilation was to bring both these abstractions together and to make them concrete. This was the task that was undertaken by Kant. He saw that percepts without concepts are blind and that concepts without percepts are empty. These two must form a concrete unity. He put the right question, namely, how judgments can be *synthetic* as well as *a priori*. But it is doubtful whether Kant succeeded in his enterprise. He was still haunted by the Aristotelian categories which provided him with his architectonic, from which he never freed himself. The Aristotelian categories are 'a list of the widest predicates which are essentially predicable of the various namable entities, *i.e.*, which tell us what kinds of entity at bottom they are.' But the pressing difficulty in this account lies in the very clear statement of Aristotle that "Being is not a genus"¹ Being, therefore, is not a predicable, and hence a predicable and a category, at least in so far as 'being' is concerned, seem to fall apart. The difficulty is reinforced by his distinction between 'primary substance' and 'secondary substance,' the first being 'neither asserted of the subject nor present in the subject,' the second being 'asserted of the subject but not present in the subject.' The difficulty is due to the fact that Aristotle was never clear about the status of the particular. The same was the case with Kant. Aristotle believed that a particular had a 'substance' and that the relation between the particular and the universal was different from the relation of the species and the genus. A species was a universal

1. Cf Met 998b22, 1058b23, 1050b30

but a particular was never a universal and was always a primary substance. Kant was similarly haunted by this substantial nature of the particular, which he appears to have described as 'thing-in-itself.' A species was a 'differentiation' of the universal, as Cook Wilson used to say, but a particular was a 'particularisation.' And these two relations were not identical.

The result of such a line of reasoning was disastrous as is clearly evident in both Aristotle and Kant. Neither could free himself from the abstractness of universals from which life had departed. The categories in both are static formulas and not self-developing. Identities were considered to be mere repetitions and not creative. They degenerated into classes or kinds with their essences from which accidents were rigorously extruded. In Kant the difficulty was aggravated by his conviction that the sense-manifold is 'given' because it comes from a different source, whilst the categories are provided by the mind. His transcendental deduction of the categories is an attempt to prove their mutual relationship, in spite of their emanating from different sources, whilst in the metaphysical deduction a similar attempt is made to elucidate their logical implication. Both these deductions are important as giving us an insight into the difficulties which Kant had to face in virtue of his belief that a particular is a particular, because as sense-manifold it has a different source from which it emanates, and also because it is always a proper name, and thus that about which categories are predicted whilst it is never itself a predicate. A particular is different from a universal not only because the first is always a subject and never a predicate, but also because it has its source in the thing-in-itself, whilst the second has its source in the mind. Aristotle had at least admitted that as the subject in a sentence a particular was already a universal and as such a secondary substance. But in Kant, in spite of his insistence that categories are the pervasive features of experience, the particular never becomes a secondary

substance and remains an insistent particular. Till the last the dualism between the particular and the universal was not overcome by Kant.

The difficulty in both Aristotle and Kant is mainly due to their sharp distinction between epistemology and ontology. They forgot that there are no mere particulars which are not differentiations of the universal, and that these are not individuals in the sense that they are always subjects and never predicates. They did not take into account the fact that mere 'matter' or 'sense-matter' never exists and that every particular is a predicate of Being, and that Being is the genus of which every particular is a species, that as a species every particular is already a universal, and that, further, only as a universal can a particular be an object of thought. Kant's heroic attempts in his two deductions excite more sympathy than admiration. If Kant had only realised the nature of the concrete universal which as a creative unity realises itself in particulars which are its particularisations or differentiations, and in this sense already universals! If only Aristotle had carried his thought further and seen that the only primary substance is God or Being which is the highest genus, everything in it being secondary substance and that there are no two primary substances! It was Spinoza who, with Hegel and Plato, had the insight to maintain that there are no two Substances and that Substance exists by itself and can be conceived through itself. Where both Aristotle and Kant failed, Spinoza and Hegel succeeded. Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel,—these are the only three philosophers that clearly saw that 'Substance' transcends both the categories of mere particularity and of mere universality, and that the Universe is a concrete individual, the source of both knowledge and existence. In contemporary philosophy Bradley¹ alone had the courage to urge that the Absolute is an individual or a concrete universal inasmuch as it transcends both the 'that' and the 'what,' essence and existence.

¹ Not less, perhaps more, true of Bosanquet

This brief review of the main features of the problem that we have to discuss in the succeeding pages brings out prominently certain points of great importance. There we shall see that universals exist and that they are not mere fictions, that universals are not entities that have a separate world of their own, but that they also participate in the life of particulars; that they are not mere abstractions but that they are concrete unities which determine the existence of particulars as well as include their essence. In other words, we shall develop the theory of 'the concrete universal.' This is not accepted by certain schools in contemporary philosophy. The lessons of the Aristotelian and Kantian philosophies, and the formidable difficulties into which they fell owing to their faulty notion of universals, have been lost upon them. Some present-day writers still believe that a particular is an individual in the Aristotelian sense, that is, that it is an individual because it has substance that keeps it insistently particular and exclusive of universality. There are others who maintain that universals are always abstract and that the notion of the concrete universal is a contradiction in terms. There are yet others who deny that there are universals at all, who believe that all universals are meaningless tautologies.

It is a pity that contemporary philosophy has not learnt anything from the great tradition that may be said to have taken its rise from Socrates. I do not want to make it a secret that my attempt to discuss the problem of universals in the pages that follow will be in that great tradition. We moderns have yet to learn from this great tradition, the great representatives of which were Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza and Kant and Hegel. Modern theories are novel without being true. I shall, in my own humble way, try to follow these great leaders of thought, even though thereby I may cease to be a modern.

CHAPTER II

EXISTENCE OF UNIVERSALS

(1) NOMINALISM

THE cardinal issue raised in all discussion concerning universals is whether universals exist. We see that there is a natural metaphysic of the human mind which interprets existence in terms of data of sense. It is this natural metaphysic that conversely involves the view that universals do not exist, because universals are not data apprehended by the senses but are concepts of the mind. No one doubts that there are reds in flowers and in many other objects. But we do not feel that there is a 'redness' as distinguished from these red sensa. All of us believe that there are human beings with whom we have dealings of different sorts almost everyday. But if it were asked whether there is 'humanity' as distinguished from human beings one would only stare with great surprise. We say that 'redness' is a concept, and therefore a universal. We also maintain that 'humanity' is another concept, and also a universal. These universals are not apprehended by the senses but only conceived by the mind. We can mentally form the concept of 'humanity', but we cannot therefore say that this concept has any existence in the sense that 'this man' or 'that man' has existence. To say that humanity 'exists' is metaphorical, if not misleading. Universals do not exist. what exists are particulars or sense-data.

Assuming that universals do not exist, let us see what consequences follow. Let us assume that redness does not 'exist', when I assert that 'this is red' and 'that is red.' In this case what do I exactly mean when I say that 'this is red' and 'another sensum is also red', or in other words that 'two patches of sensa are both red'? Common-sense might analyse the situation by pointing out that 'redness'

is present in both the patches and that it is this universal (redness) that makes both the patches 'red'. But this cannot help us because in this case common-sense, *ex hypothesi*, accepts the existence of the universal, redness, which is the point at issue.

It may be suggested that our difficulty can be explained better without the admission of the existence of universals than with it. Resemblance between particulars may be deemed sufficient to meet the issue. Let A1 and A2 stand for two patches of red *sensa*. It is not assumed that both these are instances of redness, A. A1 is a particular, and therefore independent of A2. The two are mutually exclusive. To maintain that there is an identical element in both A1 and A2 which renders them instances of the universal A is to give away the whole case and accept the existence of universals.

It is urged that when I see the first patch, A1, I am aware of it as 'this red patch', and that corresponding to this patch there is the mental state, X1, call it an image or an idea. When I see the second patch, A2, there is also another mental state, X2, corresponding to 'this second red patch'. But the second mental state is not merely a copy of the second *sensum*, it also recognises itself as belonging to the same group as the earlier mental state, X1. Now this recognition on the part of the latter mental state is what enables us to say that both the mental states are red, and, therefore, that both the *sensa* are red. Here it is resemblance between the mental states that is taken to be operative, and not identity, as would be the case if universals were admitted to exist.

This point requires a little elucidation. The reason why it is insisted that resemblance operates in place of identity is that, as said above, in the case of resemblance the mental resembling states can remain independent of each other in spite of the resemblance between them, while, if it is identity that is operative, both the mental states will have an identical element, and to that extent both will become 'one'. The element will be a universal because according

to our definition of a universal it is an identity that characterises different particulars. Further, X , the identity that operates between X_1 and X_2 , will be taken to exist when, as a matter of fact, what exists is X_1 and X_2 . Resemblance avoids the unnecessary postulation of the *tertium quid*, X , which does not, it is urged, exist over and above X_1 and X_2 . Resemblance is a psychological relation and not a logical one. An attempt, therefore, is made to explain, or explain away, the difficulty in terms of psychological processes. The notion of identity is *a priori* and therefore logical. Resemblance is not *a priori*. a r

With the motives of those who feel that the relation of resemblance will solve the difficulty because it does not unnecessarily introduce *a priori* principles everyone will have the greatest sympathy. What we have to see is whether these motives, however laudable they are, can bring us nearer to the solution of the difficulty without the introduction of an identity, a universal, whose existence is denied on the theory of resemblance.

First of all, it is not at all clear how the second mental state, X_2 , can recognise the first mental state, X_1 , if both of them are independent of each other. Suppose I see the first red today and the second red tomorrow. How the mental state of tomorrow can recognise the mental state of today passes my understanding. I shall not raise the question whether there is any sense in talking of one mental state recognising another mental state. William James used such language when he said that one pulse of thought recognised another pulse of thought and called it 'mine.' But, waiving this point, it is not at all clear what could make one mental state recognise another mental state if the first state was past and over and there was nothing common between the two.

I shall put this point in another way. Either there was resemblance in the first mental state or it arose when the second mental state occurred. It is nonsense to say that there was resemblance in the first mental state. Resem-

blance must at least be a dyadic relation. So the two mental states could resemble each other only when both of them were together or when both had 'occurred'. Now on this theory, the feeling of resemblance is asked to do a miracle. It is asked to cause X1 and X2 to resemble each other and at the same time to be the effect of their resemblance. What I mean is that the fact that X1 and X2 resemble each other can be known only when X2 which is later in time has occurred. X1 and X2 must be compared and then alone whether they resemble each other or not can be discovered. In other words, the knowledge of resemblance must be the product of the comparison between the terms compared. But here the resemblance itself is made to do the duty of causing the awareness of resemblance. Either the resemblance is something like a *tertium quid* that causes the resemblance between the two sensa, or the resemblance must be both the cause and the effect at the same time. Resemblance must be the cause, otherwise the two mental states cannot be brought together. You may appeal to the psychological mechanism or the cerebral paths, according to your taste. But these devices are worse than useless if resemblance is postulated in order to make these devices work. What hope is there that these cerebral paths will work correctly? For example, instead of recognising X2, X1 may embrace another, say Y1. When I say that 'this is red' and 'that also is red' and 'that green' the relation between one red and another red is not the same as between the red and the green. There is no such resemblance between red and green as between one red and another red. If resemblance is to work, there must be something more assumed in the cerebral paths than mere physiological processes. The paths must themselves resemble one another, and so there must be resemblance postulated as the cause to bring out the feeling of resemblance which is the effect. That resemblance should be its own cause and its own effect may pass for 'advanced' psychology but it does not appear to be sound logic. This strange theory must be made more consistent before it can be assured of easy acceptance.

So the theory of resemblance must break down. It was burdened with the task of performing two contradictory functions simultaneously. Resemblance must either be the cause or the effect. But whether the cause or the effect it must be assumed to be something different from the terms that resemble, since the terms are independent of each other, and in this case must be another name for identity. In other words it must be a universal. It must be the X that causes both X1 and X2 to resemble each other, and these therefore must be instances or particulars of X. In this case, the universal must be accorded full existence. What, in this case, the theory will amount to is that two things resemble each other because there is identity between them. What the exact nature of this identity is will be discussed later. But what has to be borne in mind is that the theory of resemblance that was formulated so ably by Hume¹ and later by William James² cannot explain as a matter of fact why I call 'this sensum red' and 'that sensum red' also."

If this red is complete by itself and that red is also complete by itself, no miracle can ever bring me nearer to understanding the situation and removing the difficulty. There must be something more in the first experience of the red to make an easy transition to the second statement that 'this also is red.'³ When I see the first red there is the experience of the sensum no doubt. But there is more than a mere sensum. This more is not empirical but metempirical. This is identity. This metempirical element can-

1 "When we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the degrees in their quantity and quality and whatever other differences may appear among them" Hume, *Treatise*, Pt. I, Sec. VII

2 "Again, when we use a common noun, such as 'man,' in a universal sense, as signifying all possible men, we are fully aware of this intention on our part, and distinguish it carefully from our intention when we mean a certain group of men or a solitary individual before us. "And what is it exactly that is in our mind when we have such an intention? It is not an image, but a feeling" *Psychology*, Vol. I.

3 Mr. Knight, however, says, "If anyone were to ask me what do you mean by 'red' I should point to a number of different shades and say, "you see that these all resemble each other, some more and some less. I mean by red any shade which resembles these at least as closely as the least similar of them resemble each other." *Mind*, 1936, p. 59

⁴ Compare Bradley's remark "Association mingles universals," *Collected Essays*, Vol. I, p. 209

not be located as the sensum can be. It must exist and its existence must be postulated and cannot be denied.

The theory of resemblance thus is based on sensationalism. It is forgotten that mere *sensa* cannot explain the rich texture of human experience. The theory can work only when non-sensational elements are tacitly assumed or inadvertently introduced. This is what Hume did under the garb of 'natural instincts'.¹ This is what James also did with his 'psychic fringes,' but at the cost of making his theory a variant of hylozoism. In the attempt to dispense with the self, the identity that characterises all thoughts, he made each thought undertake the function which the individual thought could not undertake. They refused to move unless identity in one form or another was introduced. Mere resemblance is blind. To explain the development of our knowledge the existence of identities or universals must be postulated.² To deny the existence of universals in the interest of a wrong psychological theory is to destroy the very fabric of experience.

It might be argued that even with the rejection of the theory of resemblance the existence of universals cannot be proved. So far what I have succeeded in proving is that universals must be postulated and not that universals exist. To confuse postulates with existences is to believe that because ideas exist therefore things corresponding to these ideas must also exist. If universals really existed then they could be sensed as the reds and greens can be sensed.³ It might be urged that when the existence of universals is doubted, what it amounts to is that they do not exist as the *sensa* exist. They are mere names.⁴ There are many names that we use in our language, but no one feels

1 "To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls." Hume, "Treatise" pt III, Sec. 10

2 "On the other hand resemblance is always based on partial sameness, and without this partial sameness, which in its own undistinguishing way it perceives, there is no experience of resemblance, and without it to speak of resemblance is meaningless"—Bradley "Appearance and Reality" p 538

3 "The existence of universals is often denied; men are apt to imagine that if they exist one should be able to find them as one finds instances of them. Hence the remark of Antisthenes 'I see a horse, but not horseness,' to which Plato replied, that it was because, though he had eyes he had no intelligence"—Joseph, *Logic*, 27

4 "There is nothing universal but names," Hobbes.

that to all of these there are objects corresponding King Arthur is a name but no one believes that King Arthur existed as he is described in the legends. Universals may exist, if you please; but they do not exist as objects of senses exist. If it is insisted that as a name redness has existence, there should be no difficulty. But redness cannot exist in the true sense of existence. The only true sense of existence is that which is applied to *sensa*. Universals exist as mere linguistic signs or symbols but it is hardly intelligible to call them existent.

This is the traditional theory of Nominalism according to which universals are mere names. This theory is so pervasive that it has appeared in one form or another in almost all periods of the history of philosophy. In Greece the Sophists were supporters of this theory, and it was against them that Plato used his dialectic, and proved that universals are not mere names but are existents.

In modern philosophy the so-called empiricists are supposed to have held some type of nominalism, though it is doubtful whether when Berkley doubted the existence of abstract ideas he thereby denied existence to universals.¹ Hume certainly was more dogmatic than Berkeley on this point in that he never distinguished a 'notion' or a 'universal' from an 'idea,' but argued that 'the image in the mind is only that of a particular object, though the application of it in our reasoning be the same as if it were universal.'² Mill, of course, was a nominalist but it is again doubtful whether he was throughout consistent in his contention that universals are mere names.³ To find this theory held with rare pertinacity and insight one has to go to the modern supporters of this theory, the logical positivists. According to these last, all metaphysics is nonsense because it deals with metempirical concepts. What is real is empirical. Universals are mere symbols, linguistic signs, and

¹ See the following passage, sec. 142, 'Principles of Human Knowledge': "It is also to be remarked that of all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot properly be said to have an idea but rather a notion of the relation or habitude between things."

² Hume, *Treatise*, Bk. I, Sec. 7

³ What Mill seems to have doubted is the 'constitutive' validity rather than 'epistemic.'

since they do not point to anything empirical they are nonsense. According to them all the confusion in philosophy is due to the fact that philosophers started from the wrong end. Instead of examining language which is responsible for this confusion, they assumed that language represented reality correctly and started on this assumption. It is a wrong assumption. When this error is removed as is believed to have been done by Wittgenstein and his follower, Carnap, universals will have received their death blow.¹

Such, in brief, is the history of the theory popularly called nominalism, of which it can be said that, like the proverbial bird the more it dies, the more vigorously it lives. We must therefore examine this theory carefully. According to this theory what exists are sense-data. We saw above that it was this belief that was responsible for the resemblance theory. But we also saw that this belief broke down because this 'resemblance' theory contradicted itself. Resemblance was made to work as cause and as effect. We there saw that unless the individual sensum implies more than what is given by the senses, the recognition of the fact that 'this is also a red sensum' cannot be explained.² That is, in other words, unless we assume a metempirical element in the sensum, the resemblance theory cannot work. We called this metempirical element 'identity' and derived resemblance from it. This is exactly what Kant showed in his deduction of the categories. A mere manifold of sensa cannot give you the object unless there is synthesis and recognition, which is the work of the synthetic unity of apperception.

1 Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" Also, Carnap, "Logical Syntax of Language"

Also, Ayer, "Language, Truth and Logic"
Mr. Ramsey, "Foundations of Mathematics," p. 117, puts this point quite dogmatically. "I shall argue that nearly all philosophers, including Mr. Russell himself, have been misled by language in a far more far-reaching way than that, that the whole theory of particulars and universals is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely characteristic of language"

2. "Most books (of psychology)", says James, "start with sensations as the simplest mental facts, and proceed synthetically, constructing each higher stage from those below it. But this is abandoning the empirical method of investigation. No one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple sensations are results of discriminative attention, pushed often to a very high degree."—"The Principles of Psychology," Vol. I, ch. IX
p. 224

Even the recognition of the sensum as 'this is red' for the first time, let alone subsequently, means that in this assertion other objects are implicitly distinguished. The 'this' always implies the 'that.' A sensum is never an isolated unit of experience. The unit of cognition is not a sensum but something much richer. Sensa are discovered as elements in larger wholes, and these are perceptions or objective presentations. Sensa, as Bradley has said, have ragged edges. But out of this raggedness a neat picture is possible only on the assumption that universals exist. Nominalists do not admit the last. According to them universals do not exist if they are taken to be in any sense distinct either from sensa or from names. They may be said to exist but only as names, which, they are careful enough to insist, really do not exist at all¹.

Nominalism is based upon two fundamental positions, firstly, that what exists is sensational, and, secondly, that names of universals are signs without anything to signify. The second point raises the fundamental problem of language and of the nature and significance of symbols.

In a sense we all believe that what is pre-eminently real are the objects of sense. The table on which I write is real, and therefore it exists, and an imaginary table does not. Much of the belief in the validity of sensationalism is due to the fact that what is real for us, at least in the beginning of our experience, is almost entirely restricted to the objects of sense. But when this naive common-sense attitude is exalted to the status of a theory, it emerges into something that common-sense does not believe at all. What common-sense believes is that the objects of sense are real. It does not deny that there may be other objects which are real. It is the surreptitious inference of the second clause from the first that elevates a sound common-sense belief into a dogmatic theory.

¹ Russell in the following passage puts the point very graphically "If I say 'I met a man' the proposition is not about a 'man' this is a concept which does not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of the logic books. What I met was a thing, not a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public-house and a drunken wife."—"The Principles of Mathematics," p. 53

Let us examine this theory by an illustration. I see a brown table before me. Commonsense does not make any clear distinction between the brown patch of sensum that I see and the table. It naively believes that there is the table and that the brown patch 'belongs' to the table. The sensationalist is not entitled to be aware of the table when he sees the brown patch for the first time. If sensationalism is true then the sensationalist cannot be aware of the table but only of the brown 'sensus'. First of all, let us examine what he considers to be a sensum as a unit. Since, on his theory, the table is a group of sensa he must regard the group as made up of individual isolated units of sensa. But is it possible to find the limits of the isolated sensum? The brown patch before me is a sensum. But why it should be regarded as an isolated unit is not at all clear. The sensum that I see does occupy a certain space and endures through a period of time. Now it is clear that a portion of space can be divided indefinitely. The same is true of time. If this is true, then it is impossible to assure ourselves that we have got individual units of sensa capable of supporting a theory. On the contrary it is proved by recent psychology that a patch of any sensum is a Gestalt, that is, it has a configuration which is not of the nature of a sensum. Now it is upon the impossible search after the isolated units of sensa that sensationalism is based. The Democritean theory of atoms and the modern theories of protons and electrons are not data of sense and cannot support sensationalism. As a matter of fact, the pride of the modern physicists is that the further they go the more do they transcend sensationalism. Sensationalism is doomed to failure because it pursues a chimera, the isolated units of sensa that do not exist and cannot exist.

If, therefore, universals do not exist and are mere names, then it may be urged that sensa do not exist as sensa unless associated with elements that are non-sensational. There is no unit of sensum, however much you may try to find it. So the non-existence of universals cannot be inferred from the existence of pure sensa because the latter

also do not exist. The famous Kantian saying that percepts without concepts are blind is to the point here. What Kant insisted upon was that in every *sensum a priori* elements are involved. But we might prove the falsity of sensationalism from another point of view. I may grant for the sake of argument that there are isolated individual units of *sensa* and that this brown patch before me is composed of such units. But in this case another difficulty of serious importance arises, namely, how these isolated units can group themselves together. This patch of *sensum* has a structure of its own. But how the isolated units can introduce this structure which, *ex hypothesi*, is not given to sense, is a mystery. I shall not raise the question whether there can be any *sensum* without some mind to sense it. I shall allow that a *sensum* is objective in the sense that it is unaffected by the presence or absence of a mind. But even with this concession, that the individual units should come together to form a patch and, further, that they should belong to the object 'table', is not only incomprehensible but seems to be utterly impossible on the premises from which sensationalism starts. According to Russell an object is a 'logical construction.'¹ But the difficulty is, who constructs?² If it is argued that every *sensum* unites itself with the rest, and, if it is suggested that this explanation should be taken seriously, as is done by Russell himself, then the whole procedure becomes not only mysterious but also mystifying.³ We are reduced to the same position to which James was reduced when he declared that every pulse of thought recognises its fellow-thoughts and immediately runs to embrace them. This is another name for hylozoism. I do not suggest that hylozoism is necessarily false. But what I want to maintain

1 "All the aspects of a thing are real, whereas the thing is a mere logical construction"—Russell, "Our Knowledge of the External World," p. 80.

2 Compare, Bradley: "Mr Bain collects that the mind is a collection. Has he ever thought who collects Mr Bain?" *Ethical Studies*, p. 39, note. It is obvious that these remarks are relevant here.

3 "Continuity may be allowed to be a necessary condition if two appearances are to be classed as appearances of the same thing" Russell, "Our Knowledge of the External World," *ibid.*, 199. But it is very difficult to understand whether continuity can square well with atomic perspectives.

is that with its acceptance in one form or another the original theory has committed suicide.

Hence, sensationalism, the theory that holds that *sensa* alone are real and existent, cannot succeed in proving that universals do not exist. That will have to be proved on independent grounds. Moreover, it is now abundantly clear that sensationalism itself is far from being a consistent theory. But an attempt is sometimes made to affirm the non-existence of universals on ground not very dissimilar to those we have examined above. It is pointed out that though the theory we have just examined lacks consistency when it is reared on the existence of units of *sensa*, it can be made intelligible if it is stated more in accordance with common-sense.¹ It is argued that sensationalism need not be based on the reality of units of *sensa*. An attempt of this kind is foredoomed to failure. But can we not take a more common-sense view in regard to the object of sense?

What, in other words, is urged is that common-sense though not sensationalist in the sense criticised above, is in one important sense sensationalist because it accords existence to the ordinary objects of sense and distinguishes them from imaginary and fictitious objects. It is a matter of common experience that we regard such objects as the table I am writing on, the chair I am sitting on, as more real than similar objects seen in a dream. We say that dream objects are not real, while the objects seen in waking life are real. I never believe that I am king even though in a dream I might believe that I am. The borderline between sanity and insanity is drawn exactly at the point where some things are distinguished as real and others as unreal or imaginary. Similarly we draw a distinction between characters in fiction and real living persons. No one believes that Othello was real in the same way as the Duke of Wellington was real. We maintain that Othello is a mere fictitious person while the Duke of Wellington was no fiction but a real existent personality.

¹ Moore is the modern champion of common-sense. See his article, "A defence of common-sense" *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. II

It is therefore argued that it is this 'robust sense of reality'¹ that is the basis of sensationalism, and it is in this sense that common-sense is sensationalist. It is not possible for any metaphysical theory to rob us of this sense because it is upon this that life and social solidarity depend. If sensationalism is presumed to be false because it cannot offer a consistent theory based on units of sense, it cannot be maintained without serious contradiction that it can be considered to be acceptable if a more common-sense view reinforces it.

So what is substituted in place of units of sense² are the ordinary objects of common-sense, the awareness of which is so self-evident that it can hardly be questioned. There is nothing more self-evident than this. Even Berkeley who is presumed to have dissolved objects into subjective phenomena had to admit in one way or another the reality of these objects outside. Every philosopher must ~~start~~ on pain of dissolving his theory into most patent contradictions, from this self-evident acceptance of the reality of objects of sense. It is also further self-evident that dream-objects and fictitious objects lack the very 'sense of reality' which the objects of the former kind have. A real table is, after all, a real, existent table, and nothing can induce us to believe that it can be compared with an imaginary table in respect of reality and existence.

There is no doubt that all that is said above in favour of the reality of the objects of sense is most valuable and true, and must be insisted upon. But the question before us is whether this knowledge is sufficient to prove the point at issue, namely, that universals do not exist. I do not believe that in philosophical discussions common-sense should be presumed to be the final authority. Truth is autonomous and whether any theory is ~~true~~ or not must be decided on the basis³ of this autonomy rather than by considering whether it agrees with common-sense or not.

¹ "The sense of reality is vital in logic, and whoever juggles with it by pretending that Hamlet is another kind of reality is doing a disservice to thought. A robust sense of reality is very necessary in framing a correct analysis of propositions about unicorns, golden mountains, round squares and other such pseudo-objects." Russell, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" p. 170

It is true that common-sense regards all objects of sense to be real and objects in a dream to be unreal. But this does not entitle us to draw the conclusion that universals are unreal (whatever this phrase may mean) unless universals are previously proved to be of the same status as the objects of dreams or characters in fiction. So what we have first of all to prove is that objects in a dream are unreal and non-existent and that too on logical grounds and not because common-sense is willing so to regard them. Further, we have to prove that universals are just such dream-objects and that therefore they are also unreal. Unless this much is proved the question whether universals exist or not cannot be decided in a summary fashion.

The main point is whether dreams and other fictitious entities are unreal¹ First of all it must be pointed out that such phrases as "this is unreal," "this is nothing" are mere contradictions in terms. Unreality as the lack of reality of any kind is inconceivable. Mere absence is not possible nor conceivable. When I say "this is nothing" what I mean is "this is not what I refer to." It does not mean absence of everything. The notion of unreality must be made clearly intelligible before the issue whether dreams and characters in fiction or any other objects popularly called unreal are unreal.

Now if there is nothing unreal, then dream-objects cannot be said to be unreal. And this is quite obvious. I shall not refer to modern psychological researches, according to which our waking life is powerfully influenced by dreams. But even without recourse to these researches is it not self-evident that dreams are real when they are actually dreamed? It is a fact that when I dream a dream what prominently occupies my consciousness in the process is the dream and nothing else. The waking life sinks into irrelevance when dream-objects are perceived. To a dreamer the obtrusiveness of dreams is as

¹ "Supposals may be either veridical or not, if they are not, they involve illusion or unreality, but they remain apprehensions of reality in the same sense as ideas which also may be verified or may be mere ideas"—Alexander, "Space, Time and Deity", Vol II, p 223. Also, Bradley, 'Floating Ideas', in 'Essays on Truth and Reality'.

great as that of objects of sense during his waking life. There are dream *sensa* 'out there' just as much as there are similar *sensa* during his waking life. There is as much awareness of objects during a dream as there is during his perception of objects. It is impossible in the face of these facts to maintain that dreams are unreal while waking life is real. If the awareness of *sensa* is the only criterion that is decisive in determining the reality or unreality of anything, then there is nothing lacking in dream-objects which is enjoyed by the objects of ordinary perception.

Sensationalism, therefore, cannot decide the issue whether dreams are real or unreal. *Sensa* by themselves are neither real nor unreal. They simply are. The reason why objects of ordinary life are contrasted with dream-objects and believed to be real is not that the former objects are given to sense whilst the latter are not. The objects of waking life have more permanence and more adaptability to pragmatic interests. As James put it "imaginary fire doesn't burn." Moreover the objects of ordinary perceptions are open to public view. They are public objects and not private. Dream-objects are private in a sense. And being private they lack the important character of 'communicability'. The reality of objects is not only based on psychological and logical reasons but also on social considerations. This much truth must be accorded to Pragmatism and Humanism when they assert that the world is a social creation. The ordinary objects admirably satisfy all these standards. These standards are extra-psychological, and hence sensationalism, however modified it may be, is doomed to failure if it accepts these standards. That objects of sense are more real than objects in a dream can be established only if sensationalism is given up.

So universals, even though their existence is proved to be similar to the existence and reality of dreams, must be accorded full status of existence, because dreams are real. The same must be said about fictitious characters like

Othello It may be due to the illusion created by the dramatist, but it is an important fact that in witnessing a drama the audience takes them to be real persons. None can enjoy the witnessing of a drama if he does not forget that the characters in front of him are not real figures. It is true that we do not talk the same language when we describe the reality of the Duke of Wellington and the reality of Othello. The one is an historical person whilst the other a fictitious character. The distinction is valid, but its validity is not based on the validity of sensationalism. The distinction would be intelligible even though sensationalism were false. The reason why the Duke of Wellington is believed to have existed and Othello not is that the former was a public object and therefore could touch life at infinitely numerous points whilst Othello in a sense does not. There is a profound difference in the fact that ~~the one~~ one is an historical entity while the other is not. But the point is that all these considerations are irrelevant to the thesis that sensationalism desires to establish. History is not a mere flux of sensa, and historical persons are not mere eddies in that flux. But if history is to be appealed to, it is better to bear in mind that history should not be called in to support sensationalism. The Duke of Wellington is an historical figure not because he is a bundle of sensa but because he is not. If he were, then the moment he died he would have been stamped out of existence. The fact that there is history which deals with the past is an argument with which sensationalism of whatever type can be conclusively refuted. If history is true, then sensationalism is false.

But it may further be contended that if history and fiction were not kept distinct it would create great confusion in the world. The robustness of what I call 'my world' depends upon this distinction. My world is clearly different from mythology because my world is the world of history whilst the world of mythology has no history. There is something indescribably unique in regard to 'my world' which cannot be explained away. Othello does


not fall in my world nor in any other human being's world. He is a pure creature of fiction, a myth. Even if sensualism is false this uniqueness of my world remains. No theory can destroy it. How can Othello be treated in the same manner as the ordinary objects of sense? This objection has a plausibility which is readily recognised. It is true that there is something unique in the objects of sense that fictional characters lack. Common-sense says that objects of sense are real whilst the latter type of objects are merely 'ideal.' But the plausibility of the argument does not disprove the existence of universals. It may be objected that this unique quality is merely due to our hardened prejudice. Mere habit can engender in us a feeling which is utterly indefensible. In childhood we do not make a hard and fast distinction of this kind. To a child everything appears to have this quality, which, it is urged, is the privilege of objects of sense. To a child the characters in a story appear to be figures of flesh and blood. It is only in later life that the distinction between the real and the imaginary dawns upon him. How can this be taken to support the fundamental thesis that there are objects unreal and non-existent?

But I shall not appeal to this argument. I believe that the argument that anything is existent because it falls in 'my world' moves in a circle. What constitutes 'my world' is the product of the relationship that exists between my body and the objects of sense.¹ The objects of sense are real because they fall in my world, whilst my world is real because there are such objects around me. My world after all, is the extension of my body. The table exists because that object somehow affects my body, with which it is intimately related. The characters in a work of fiction are non-existent because they have not established a similar relationship between my body and themselves. Ultimately whatever affects me is 'my world,' and in the

¹ Compare Bradley, "Essays on Truth and Reality" ch. XVI, pp. 460-469. Also compare, Spinoza, "Ethics", II 13, and II 19, where he maintains that the mind knows only the body, or rather that it knows only the modifications of the body as they are produced by things acting upon it.

early stages of my life my body is the centre around which the notion of 'my world' is woven. Whatever falls within that radius is given the privilege of being a member of 'my world,' whilst the rest is treated as merely 'imaginary' Existence or non-existence from the point of view of 'my world' only means inclusion or non-inclusion within the sphere of influence of my body. In this sense the question 'does this exist' amounts to 'is this in any way related to my body?' But, on the other hand, my body is hardly distinguished from other objects in the early stages of life. The notion of 'my body' is not an innate idea but is the product of the interplay of the human organism with other objects of sense. It is these objects that make it possible for me to make the distinction between my body and other objects. I am not concerned with the details of the psychological processes which underlie this awareness of my body. The point at issue is whether the notion of 'my body' is so innate that upon it the distinction between existence and non-existence can be raised. We now see that it cannot, because the notion of 'my world' is intimately connected with the notion of 'my body,' which in turn is the product of the objects of sense. So the circle is complete. The objects of sense are real because my world is real. My world is real because my body is real. And my body is real because the objects of sense are real. It is, therefore, impossible to say which is the cause and which is the effect. The reality and existence of my world, if it is to serve as the basis of the argument, must be proved on independent grounds.

The point I wish to maintain is that there is nothing logically defensible in the argument that 'my world' is real and is therefore existent, and all the rest is non-existent. The 'robust' sense of reality that Russell and others talk of is based on the weakest foundations. My world may be robust but not because the objects of sense are presumed to be robust. The argument of the uniqueness of the actual space-time context also cannot solve the riddle. The problem of the exact nature of space and time will engage

us later. But space and time tell you nothing about the existence of my world and they can be disposed of by an argument similar to that by which the notion of 'my world' is disposed of. Ultimately my time and my space are both intimately connected with my self. They are, as Kant said, forms of intuition, the objects of intuition being those objects that are related to the self. There is neither space nor time independent of my consciousness. The 'here' and the 'now' are relative to the index which is the body. But my consciousness, my self, is impossible without there being both. So here also the circle is apparent. If space and time were independent of me, they could not be mine, but, on the other hand, if they are mine it is because they extend beyond me and are independent of me. Nothing is decided on the basis of the robustness of my world when that very robustness, when properly analysed, seems to lead us beyond into the regions of the unknown. 

Attempts are however made to support the theory on more positive grounds. It is urged that universals are abstractions and as such do not imply existence. "A fact whose terms are universal," says Mr. Eaton, "is not the same kind of fact as one whose terms are individual. The latter is concrete; the former, abstract; but both are nevertheless facts. An abstract fact is an aspect of a concrete fact; or rather, it is an aspect of many such facts. But in perception, facts come to us as individualized, and not as abstract"¹. Redness, for instance, will, according to Mr. Eaton, be an abstraction, while 'this red' will be a concrete individual fact.

Let us, therefore, see whether universals are abstractions². This can be proved only when particulars are proved concrete. But unless this is proved the argument will amount to a serious case of begging the question. It is not admitted by certain eminent philosophers that ordinary objects of sense are more concrete than corresponding universals.

1 "Symbolism and Truth" p. 82

2 Mr. Aaron, however, in *Mind*, April 1939, attempts to prove that all universals are not abstractions. According to him universals of sense are not abstractions. A similar view was held by Russell in his "The Problems of Philosophy."

Plato, for example, is believed to have held that they are mere copies of the 'ideas' Leibniz also maintained that perceptions are confused conceptions. It is not suggested that these arguments are valid as disproving the concreteness of physical objects, but it is to be borne in mind that unless the concreteness of physical objects is proved the abstractness of universals cannot be proved.

Reverting to our previous example, let us assume that 'this red' is concrete and that compared with it, 'redness' is abstract. It is true that in the development of our knowledge we know the red first and come to know redness afterwards. It is equally true that 'this red' is something that strikes our minds more than mere redness. This red can be pointed out whilst in many cases redness can hardly be visualised. No clear image can be framed of redness whilst this red can be apprehended with our eyes. On all these points it is easily intelligible that it is not untenable to call the red concrete and redness abstract. But all these considerations are beside the point and they give no support to the theory that universals are mere abstractions. There may be persons who can visualise things that they have not seen before, and if this is true then mere power of visualising cannot decide the issue in favour of the concreteness of the objects of sense.

But it may be pointed out that the proof that universals are abstractions is based neither on this nor on the fact that children cannot know what redness is. The main argument is that universals are abstractions because they are abstracted from particulars. Let us take by way of illustration three reds and call them A1, A2, A3. These three patches are not and cannot be exactly similar. They must be surrounded by some other colours and this will make a considerable difference in their similarity. Let us further assume that these are arranged on a scale.¹

1. Mr. Aaron, in the article quoted above, makes use of the notion of 'scale' in his attempt to prove that universals of sense are not 'fibrifications'. "What then is the identical element present, supposing such an element to exist?" I know of no satisfactory answer. The only suggestion I can make—and I make it with some hesitation—is that a scale of colours may exist. I hesitate to put the suggestion forward both because of the vagueness of this concept of a scale and also because of a certain artificiality which pertains to it. For where does the scale begin and where does it end?" p. 173.

The difference between A1 and A3 will be greater than that between A1 and A2. Correspondingly, the similarity in the first case will be less than in the latter case. And if such instances are multiplied, then the similarity will grow so much less that it will tend to approach an ideal limit. And this ideal limit will be called 'redness' as contrasted with the perceptible reds. Redness as a universal will only mean the minimum perceptible similarity in all the particulars actual and possible.¹

Now it is doubtful whether this description is really true. There is nothing to disprove it or prove it except introspection. If my introspective analysis differs from yours it must at least be conceded that this theory is to that extent not tenable. First of all my introspection does not tell me that when I mean redness what I mean is the minimum perceptible similarity between actual or possible perceptible particulars. Whatever else I^{may} mean by redness at least I do not mean this. Similarly when someone talks about beauty he does not have in mind such a minimum perception of the beautiful things that he has seen. Though the theory cannot be disproved, there is yet sufficient evidence against it.

It might be argued that though we do not find any evidence for this minimum similarity yet it cannot be assumed that it does not exist. No one should doubt that ether exists on the ground that common-sense does not recognise its existence. This objection has some plausibility. Nothing can be proved or disproved because I do not *find* its existence. Moreover it might be urged that the existence of this minimum is in the unconscious. The recent psychology of the unconscious has revealed to us facts whose existence we till then did not suspect. Why cannot the same be said about the existence of this element of minimum similarity? For all we know, it may exist and hence the assumption that universals exist is gratuitous.

¹ Broad, in his "Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy," Vol I, p 88, says that "X is red—X resembles in hue any of the sensibilia which I was to call 'red' at least as closely, as the least similar of these resemble each other"

I do recognise the force of these and similar arguments, and accept the limitations of introspective analysis. But this does not establish anything either for or against the existence of universals. What was sought to be proved was that universals do not exist. But this thesis cannot be proved by introspection alone. Introspection is a purely subjective affair and thus cannot be expected to decide in favour of any theory or against it.

This theory might, however, invoke the help of the laws of blending and obliviscence. When I see the first patch of red sensum there arises in my mind an image corresponding to this perception. When similar mental images arise in future these images blend together, and out of these with the help of obliviscence there emerges a mental image to which for want of a corresponding perceptual sensum we give the name 'redness.' This latter image is only a mental phenomenon. It is also an abstraction because it emerges after all the differences of the particular images have been removed.¹ I see first A1 which is, say, equivalent to xpq. Then I see A2: this is equal to xrs. When these are blended there emerges xn which is an almost exact similarity without any elements of difference. Now this xn has no counterpart in the perceptual world and therefore it is a mere universal. It is not a universal if by that term we mean something distinct from particulars. As a matter of fact it is a particular, and since it is an abstraction from the perceived particulars it cannot exist in the perceptual world apart from them. When, on the contrary, universals are said to exist, what is implied is that they somehow exist distinct from particulars. This is not true. To maintain that they

1. Huxley, "Hume," p. 111 writes, "This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what takes place in the formation of compound photographs—when the images of the faces of six sitters, for example, are each received on the same photographic plate, for a sixth of the time required to take one portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the six faces agree are brought out strongly, while all those in which they differ are left vague, and thus what may be termed a generic portrait of the six, in contradistinction to a specific portrait of any one, is produced."

Also, Russell, "Analysis of Mind," p. 229. "In addition to external observable habits (including the habit of words) there is also the genuine image, produced by superposition or in Semon's phrase, homophony, of a number of similar perceptions. This image is vague so long as the multiplicity of its prototypes is not recognised, but becomes universal, when it exists alongside of the more specific images of its instances and is knowingly contrasted with them."

exist independently of particulars is to go counter to the genesis of universals, which are mere abstractions, as suggested above, and cannot be anything else

It is surely useless to examine this theory after what we have said about the resemblance theory above. The problem how the images of particulars blend is still a mystery and cannot be solved by psychological laws. In this connection it must be noted that laws in psychology are mere descriptions and they cannot tell you why anything happens.¹ There are no laws that cause blending and obliscence. To maintain that such laws cause anything, is to hypostatise them. These laws do not explain anything, if by explanation is meant giving us an insight into the nature of the things they are supposed to explain. In this sense the word 'cause' as used in logic is different from the same term as used in the empirical sciences. The laws of blending and obliscence do not explain why the mental copies or images blend together. Psychology only accepts these facts and their blending, and does not pursue the question any further. What on the other hand we are concerned with is something different. When the laws of blending and obliscence are supposed to cause blending the use of this term is different from the use of the term when the humanity of Socrates is called the cause of his mortality. It is this confusion in the use of the notion of cause that is mainly responsible for the common belief that universals are abstractions because they can be generated by psychological laws. Psychology cannot explain the generation of anything without assuming something that is not psychological. The supporters of the laws of psychology as the ultimate explanation have to assume that there is identity between particulars before these laws can give its explanation. If this identity is not assumed and is supposed to be generated by these processes, then the very operation of these laws becomes a mystery. We have discussed this point before and need not repeat it.

¹ Bradley, in his article, "A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology," in 'Collected Essays,' Vol II, 378, says that a science like psychology is asked "to observe facts and classify them, and then to seek to explain them—to explain, that is, not their ultimate nature: but their origin and course they take." Whether this pure phenomenalism is consistent with the 'marriage with universals' is important but not relevant here

But it may further be asked,—Is it really true that I can know what redness means only after going through the process of seeing many or at least two particulars? I do not believe that experience testifies to this. If this theory were true, then it would mean that I cannot know what redness is unless I see at least two red sensa. This consequence is very serious. It would go to the very root of language and would raise the question whether one can understand that this is 'red' even on the first occasion. To say that 'this is red' is even on the first occasion to universalise it. If language is possible, the first experience of a red sensum must somehow be universalised before it can be formulated in language. But apart from the validity or otherwise of linguistic theories, recent psychological investigations have proved that even in the case of animals the first perceptual event implies the presence of a universal element without which the very process of learning is impossible. This is the most important contribution of the Gestalt theory in psychology, which insists that even the first sense-experience involves the presence of universals. In the famous example of the chick pecking at the cinnabar worm and refusing to do so on the second occasion, Stout pertinently asks the question, what could have made the chick hesitate on the second occasion if it did not have the vague feeling of the universal 'pecking-followed-by-bitterness' occasioned by the first pecking? ¹ It is true that such facts of psychology were sought to be explained by the sensationalist psychologist on the principle of mental chemistry and more recently by conditioned reflexes. But the main question all these theories fail to answer is,—How can mental states attract one another for the purposes of chemistry or how can conditioning be possible unless some type of identity is established? All such attempts only involve a hysteron-proteron. In their attempts to explain universals as mere abstractions they fail to understand that it is only on the strength of universals that such processes

1. Also, "it is not true that among lower animals universal ideas are never used. What is never used is a particular idea." Bradley, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 34

look plausible. Apart from other grounds these attempts are rendered useless by psychology itself.

The utter untenability of the theory which attempts to make universals only psychological abstractions has been conclusively proved by Hume himself in whose writing this theory finds its classic expression. According to Hume all ideas are copies of impressions received through the senses. If universals are mere abstractions from these copies, surely, they must be the faintest of copies. The mind will only be a storehouse of these copies, some of which have realities outside corresponding to them and others not. The latter are universals. But the problem that worried Hume was whether on such a theory the creativeness of the mind could, in any way, be explained. The copies, whatever be their nature, are mere static entities. Their business is to reflect the things outside as faithfully as they can. Surely universals cannot do so because they are mere abstractions. But the question is whether on such a theory future experiences can in any way be anticipated and at times avoided, or whether a human being should only wait for the bitter experiences to happen before any measures can be taken to avoid them? When, for example, a child burns his finger twice, will he avoid fire on the third occasion or will he wait for the bitter experience to take place? Before the experience of fire for the third time what the child has in his mind are two copies representing two impressions of fire on earlier occasions. But these two cannot prevent future disasters unless the child not only stores these two copies but with their help attempts to avoid similar experiences in future. If universals are mere abstractions then such a possibility will be out of the question. If the child's mind were not creative, the force of the past experience would only impel him to put his finger once more in the fire, and to do so indefinitely. What the child, however, does is to strike out a new line of action directly contrary to that suggested by the copies received on former occasions.

Hume, as is said above, dealt with the difficulty when he asked the question whether a man born blind who had not seen a particular shade of blue was able "to raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses. I believe that there are few but will be of opinion that he can."¹ Hume, however, adds that this instance "is scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that, for it alone, we should alter our general maxim."² It is a pity that Hume should have felt that this instance was so insignificant as to keep the main structure of his system intact, while, it must be emphasised, it is facts such as these that make the most serious inroads on the plausibility of the theory that universals are mere otiose abstractions. Every item of human experience gives the lie to the theory that Hume so fondly believed to be true, namely, that universals are mere faint copies abstracted from original objects. This theory could be made plausible only by ignoring the importance of such facts as these. But this is hardly the right procedure to solve the difficulty. A theory that seeks to gain assent only by ignoring facts likely to disprove it cannot demand serious consideration and forfeits the right to be a philosophical theory.

It is, therefore, sufficiently clear how utterly untenable the theory is that attempts to derive universals out of mental phenomena and to explain them as mental abstractions by psychological laws. It must, however, be pointed out that my objections in no way invalidate the psychological laws as such. I admit that laws in psychology have their importance but their limitations are serious when they transgress their phenomenological limits and come out as metaphysical explanations.

It is this confusion that is mainly responsible for the famous theory in text-books on logic that denotation and connotation vary inversely.³ The abstractness of universals is sought to be established on the poverty of meaning

1. Hume, *Treatise*, Bk I, pt 1, sec I

2. *Ibid*

3. cf Keynes, *Formal Logic*, pp. 36-41.

rather than on the faintness and vagueness of images as on the previous theory. It is maintained that when a term becomes universal it becomes poorer in meaning. The universality of a term is bought at the high cost of poverty of meaning or connotation. A round table for example means an object that is both a table and round. The term 'round table' applies only to a limited number of objects whilst the term 'table' applies to all sorts of tables whether round or square or oblong. But though the extension of the term 'table' as applied to the number of objects is very large, its meaning is poorer than 'round table,' at least by the fact that it is diminished by 'roundness.' 'Round table' has both roundness and tableness whilst 'table' has only tableness. And tableness is certainly poorer than the combination of both roundness and tableness. It is therefore pointed out that the term 'table,' which is universal compared with the other term, has less meaning. The obvious conclusion drawn is that universals are poor in meaning and therefore abstractions.

The apparent plausibility of this theory is mainly due to the confusion between an image and a true universal. If the distinction between an image, which is a psychological phenomenon, and a universal, which is not a psychological phenomenon, is kept in view, the confusion disappears and with it the plausibility of this theory. The question is,—Do I have more meaning when I know the term 'table' than when I know 'round table' or is my meaning less? The question is about the 'meaning' and not about the clearness and distinctness of the corresponding images. The question is so important that a few more remarks will not be out of place here.

Suppose, for example, that a boy is told that a particular round object is called 'a table.' It is then possible that whenever in future the word 'table' is suggested the image of the table will be revived. Suppose further that later he comes to know that the word 'table' is not applied to round objects only but that it can be applied to objects that differ in shape. As a result of this he now applies

the term 'table' to all such objects irrespective of their shapes. It is true that in this extension of the field of applicability the boy cannot revive any definite image before him as he could do when he saw the table for the first time. If the image could be revived at all it is so vague that it is hardly distinguishable. In other words his image is now more abstract than the image of the first impression of the object. The point, therefore is,—Has his meaning grown correspondingly poorer or richer?

It will be readily seen that the boy now can be said to have grown in knowledge because he can now mean by the term 'table' not only a round table but any table, round, square or of any other shape.¹ It is, therefore, simply not true that instead of advancing in knowledge the boy's knowledge has become less, as the theory under consideration would have us believe. On the contrary psychologists tell us that mental development consists in the emergence of ideas that are free and not sense-bound and sense-sustained. On the first occasion the idea or the meaning of the table was sense-bound, that is, it was tied down to the particular percept of the table. As he grew in knowledge he got himself free from this bondage and the idea of the table could be applied to any object of the class. In thus becoming free from the bondage to sense the idea became universal. It was not tied down to any space-time context. If this is the true account of the development of human knowledge, then it consists in our images becoming more vague rather than less. As a matter of fact, it can be safely said that the real advance in knowledge consists in having ideas that have no counterpart in the perceptual field or in the realm of imagination. If it were otherwise, then a Newton and an Einstein would have been less advanced in the knowledge of mathematics than a rustic who counts his coins on the fingers of his hand. The truth is that the more a science advances the less does it use images. It makes more use of symbols which do not revive any images at all. What image can

1 Compare, Bosanquet "It is obvious that in every concept, the intention dictates extension" *Logic*, Vol I, p. 52.

be revived when one utters the term 'ether' or 'electron' or 'proton'? Physics, for instance, is becoming more and more notational and symbolic instead of image-bound and image-sustained.¹ It is by such abstractions that the advancement of any science is gauged. But if the theory under consideration were true, then these sciences instead of advancing would have moved on the path of retrogression and the world would have become by now a menagerie of stupid animals.

The abstractness of the image, therefore, instead of being a defect in meaning, really marks its advance. The boy's knowledge of 'table' or the connotation of 'table' becomes more by being universalised and not less. It is the impossibility of reviving any image that to some extent makes this process of universalisation possible. The boy understands what is meant by 'table' but is not necessarily called upon to have any image at all. His thought of table now is imageless. The relation between denotation and connotation is exactly the reverse of what was suggested by the theory that denotation and connotation vary inversely. On the contrary, we now find that it varies directly, that is, the wider the field to which we can apply the term 'table' the more does our meaning grow. By 'table' we mean more now than what we could have meant when we first encountered the experience of a table. The reason why this theory was formulated and accepted was that it was based on the assumption that an idea or meaning was identical with an image, and that consequently when the image grew less clear and distinct with the growth of knowledge, the meaning also grew correspondingly less.² Once this confusion is cleared up and it is found that meaning and image are not identical but distinct categories, this fantastic theory, that goes counter

1 "Science aims at constructing a world which shall be symbols of the world of commonplace experience. It is not at all necessary that every individual symbol that is used should represent something in common experience or ever something explicable in terms of common experience. The man in the street is always making this demand for concrete explanation of the things referred to in science but of necessity he must be disappointed" Sir Arthur Eddington, "The Nature of the Physical World" p. 9.

2 "So because in the term of wider, as compared with that of narrower extension, there is often little definite we are apt to suppose instead that there is definite little."—Joseph, *Logic*, 134

to the natural development of knowledge, simply disappears. Meaning is not an image, though in some cases images may be revived.¹ There is no point-to-point correspondence between the two at all. It is the forgetfulness of this fact and the attempts to derive logic from psychology which is mainly responsible for the absurd thesis that universals are non-existent because they are abstractions.

The upshot of my argument is that universals are not psychological abstractions nor can their non-existence be proved on such grounds. That universals do not exist can be proved only on grounds that are not psychological. Modern theories of nominalism fully understand why the arguments in favour of nominalism based on psychological grounds are untenable. In this sense they are a clear advance on the traditional theories of nominalism that I have so far examined. According to them nominalism that is based on the assumption of units of *sensa* or that which is based on the exclusiveness of objects of perception is fatal to itself and does not succeed in proving the thesis that universals do not exist. There are no ultimate units of *sensa* nor, according to them, is it clear how out of these units of *sensa* objects of perception can be generated. If what is real and existent are units of *sensa*, then the assumption that objects of perception exist is at best an untenable assumption. And, further, sensationalism that is based on psychology cannot prove that universals do not exist. That can be proved only on grounds that are extra-psychological. It is these considerations that have led modern nominalism to revise its own assumptions and methods before the task of disproving the existence of universals is undertaken. But this demands another chapter.

1. "Meaning transmisses over psychical image,"—Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 68

CHAPTER III

EXISTENCE OF UNIVERSALS—(*Continued*)

(2) NEO-NOMINALISM

NEO-NOMINALISM¹ is a wide designation meant to cover such theories as the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein, commonly called logical positivism, as well as those theories that go under the name of the philosophy of the Viennese Circle, which include the linguistic theory of Carnap and others called Physicalism. It is not suggested, however, that all these theories agree on all fundamentals. But they all agree in certain points, namely, that only the empirical is real and that all the rest is non-existent. They all urge that universals are non-empirical entities and that therefore they are also non-existent. We shall examine this new point of view in so far as it is relevant to the problem in hand.

I shall mainly examine the theories of Russell and Wittgenstein, as they are the source of all the later developments. According to Russell all universals are logical constructions or incomplete symbols. According to him universals give knowledge by description while the knowledge of particulars is knowledge by acquaintance. Universals have meaning only in use but they do not exist at all. What exists are empirical particulars.

It must, however, be pointed out that these phrases are ambiguous and it would have been better if Russell had been careful to distinguish them from each other. For example, even a particular like 'this table' is according to Russell a 'logical construction'. But the difference between this and a universal described as a logical construction is important. This is suggested by him when he maintains that particulars though logical constructions are complete objects while universals are incomplete

1 I am indebted to Prof Urban for this term. See his "Language and Reality"

symbols. You know 'this table' as a datum of sense, whose existence is self-evident. This sense datum can be denoted, while in the case of universal 'tableness' such an act of 'denoting' is impossible.¹ As such, universals are descriptions. It is this that ultimately determines the existence or non-existence of universals. The main question as understood by Russell is,—Do universals mean directly any sense datum? If yes, then universals exist; if not, they do not exist.

But it is a mere prejudice that makes Russell and others say that only that which is given empirically should be taken to be existent. There are no logical reasons offered why this should be so. The modern nominalists do not tell us anywhere why that which is given in *sensa* should alone be called existent. We have already seen that my world is a construction which I make starting from my own body. There is no world ready-made which I inherit. The sense data occupy a peculiar position with reference to my body, but that does not in any way mean that the privilege of existence only belongs to them. It is only pragmatic considerations that decide what shall be real and existent for me and what non-existent. To maintain that empirical objects are the only real objects and all the rest unreal and non-existent is the product of hardened prejudice and illogical dogmatism.

The main argument against the existence of universals is that they are incomplete symbols. Wittgenstein does not even accord meaning to these symbols. According to him all such symbols are mere nonsense. What is meaningful according to Wittgenstein is empirical and since universals are not empirical therefore they are without meaning and existence. Wittgenstein's theory has the merit of being quite simple, provided a few initial premises, which cannot be proved on empirical grounds, are granted. The simplicity lies in the fact that according to him meaning and existence are correlated and one cannot exist without

¹ "Mysticism and Logic" chap. X. See also "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" ch. 16, p. 167 ff

the other. For him to exist is ultimately to have meaning and *vice versa*. This is exactly what I am trying to maintain, though I am not persuaded that universals do not exist and that they do not have meaning. Russell's position is more complicated because according to him universals are entities which may have meaning in use but do not exist. It is much easier to demonstrate the fallacy in Wittgenstein but the difficulty of Russell's position touches the very roots of language. I shall therefore examine Russell's position more fully in order to demonstrate the fallacies in the reasoning of the modern successors of traditional nominalism.

Both Russell and Wittgenstein thus start from the initial premise that all that exists is empirical. In this they faithfully follow the lead given by Hume and later by Mill. But neo-nominalism goes further. The old nominalism believed in the self and also in objects outside. Even Hume had to believe in these in virtue of his 'natural instincts'. But this new variety neither believes in the self nor in objects outside. The latter are constructions out of logical simples whilst the former is merely a myth.

Thus neo-nominalism is a variety of behaviourism. Wittgenstein is very dogmatic on this. He says, "The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing. If I wrote a book 'The World as I Found It,' I should have to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or, rather, of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made. The subject does not belong to the world but is a limit of the world."¹ Further, "Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The 'I' in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it."²

1 Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" 5.631-32

2 Ibid, 5.64

This insistence on the part played by the human body would have reduced neo-nominalism to a mere derivative of behaviourism had it not been for the fact that besides their doctrine that only entities having existential attributes have an exclusively empirical reference they also urge that this empirical reference can be shown by logical analysis. The empiristic doctrine is thus proved by a logical method. This marks a clear advance upon the traditional nominalism which attempted to derive logic from psychology. Neo-nominalism, however, allows independent status to logic on a par with the empirical reality.

The plausibility of this modern nominalism thus depends upon two assumptions, first, that, there are atomic facts or logical simples, and second, that there are atomic propositions that picture these facts. This is logical positivism as contrasted with psychological positivism of the traditional type. Let us examine it a little more closely.

It is assumed that every atomic proposition pictures an atomic fact and that a complex fact can ultimately be analysed into a finite but unbounded number of constituents which are empirical. This, therefore, means that since universal propositions are infinite in nature they can never picture facts and therefore they have no meaning. From this it also follows, according to Wittgenstein, that logic is only a science of tautology and that mathematical equations are expressions of different form to the expressions of the same form. He also denies the theory of number which was enunciated by Frege and Cantor and accepted by Russell. According to Wittgenstein there are no transfinite numbers as urged by Cantor and the whole mathematical theory about numbers and infinities has an air of unreality about it.

First of all, it is not clear whether these assumptions on which logical positivism is based are free from fallacies. Wittgenstein maintains that there are atomic facts because unless they existed there could not be true propositions. These must be atomic. But on the other hand the necessity of atomic propositions is based upon the prior assump-

tion that there are atomic facts. For instance, a proposition cannot be said to be true or false, it is argued, unless propositions are atomic. But the truth or falsehood of these propositions is guaranteed by the sense which atomic propositions express in picturing atomic facts. It is clear that this involves a vicious circle.

It is this viciousness that is responsible for the denial that universals exist and for their being reduced to nonsense. It is a dogmatic assumption that a complex can be divided into a finite but unbounded number of atomic facts. It is logically possible that they are divisible into facts *ad infinitum*. Hence there may never be logical simples.¹ Now these simples imply a structure in the facts which propositions copy. But the existence of such structure depends upon the knowledge that there are simple propositions, the simple relationship between which guarantees it. This is again a vicious circle. Finally, to say that there should be only one sense in which propositions can be true or false and that that sense should be univocal is to beg the question. It is, therefore, quite evident that the thesis that the ultimate reference of any significant discourse is the realm of empirical facts cannot simply be demonstrated. Wittgenstein's logical atomism cannot demonstrate that existence is only empirical. "The ideas of logical simples and the atomic facts composed of them are thus the first serious flaws in Wittgenstein's logical theory."²

This theory Russell accepts without much further analysis. He also believes in atomic propositions, but he differs from Wittgenstein in that, according to him universals have meaning though they do not exist. Russell is primarily a mathematician and, as such, has to admit the notion of infinity. According to Wittgenstein, mathematical equations are mere tautologies and, secondly, he denies the notion of infinity. The universe for Wittgenstein is a

1 Russell, however, is aware of this. "When I speak of 'simples' I ought to explain that I am speaking of something not experienced as such, but known only inferentially as the unit of analysis" *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. I. 375.

2 Weinberg, "An Examination of Logical Positivism" p. 56.

mere collection of a finite but unbounded number of facts.¹ To Russell, on the other hand, mathematics is not merely a science of tautologies, nor is the notion of infinity merely nonsense. A series is not infinite because it is a totality. In that case it would be finite' Nor is it infinite because it is endless. The definition of infinity as mere endlessness lands one in contradiction. Infinity is a function and as such has meaning and cannot be nonsense.

Universals are functions that are involved in facts, and in this sense they have meaning though they cannot be said to have existence separate from actual facts. There is no 'humanity' distinct from actual individuals. There are no functions distinct from the actual series in which numbers take definite values. To maintain that they exist apart from the particulars in which they are involved is to hypostatise them. Russell, however, argues that we do usually hypostatise them, and that language is responsible for this mischief. Once language is reformed and the actual analysis of these universals is undertaken it will be found that they are mere incomplete symbols. There are no actual facts corresponding to these symbols. The reason why universals were taken to be existent was that they were taken on a par with particulars, and hence much mischief was caused in philosophy.

We shall see whether this analysis of universals in terms of incomplete symbols can prove that universals are non-existent. First of all, it is not at all clear whether an individual is independent and therefore complete. To Whitehead² an individual is a group of events with spatial and temporal relations. Ramsey³ also denied completeness and independence to the individual and pointed out that the difference between an individual and a universal is that whilst the former involves only one type of propositions, the latter involves two types of propositions. Accordingly the difference is only of degree and not of kind. They are both

¹ In 4.2211 "Tractatus", Wittgenstein admits the possibility of "infinite number of objects" but it is difficult to know how this can be reconciled with 1.1, where the world is described as totality of facts. Is infinite actual?

² "Concept of Nature" p. 18-19

³ "The Foundations of Mathematics", p. 116.

incomplete and both are dependent. The reason why individuals cannot stand as predicates is that they have one set of propositions which do not easily allow themselves to be expressed in language.

That universals are not incomplete in the Russellian sense has been stated by Prof Eaton in the following passage "A descriptive phrase refers then to a fact or complex object, one of the constituents of which (in language) is not explicitly mentioned in the phrase but is understood through the use of the particle, and this constituent is the term—the *x*, *y*, or *z*—described. The very omission of the term focuses the attention on it. Such a phrase is, in one sense at least, an incomplete symbol, but not in Mr Russell's sense. It is incomplete not because it is meaningless outside a context but because there is no symbolic element in it which corresponds to the term described. This element must be supplied in interpreting the expression; and it is always a variable."¹

It is therefore obvious that the assumption that individuals are complete entities while universals are incomplete symbols is not accepted even by those who have great sympathy with logical positivism. Russell himself has not succeeded in assigning any reasons for this hypothesis. Why an individual, say, Socrates, should be taken to be independent and complete is difficult to understand. The only reason that Russell gives is that otherwise the feeling of reality will be lost. According to Russell, as we saw before, there is only one world, the world of Shakespeare and Napoleon, but not of Hamlets and Othellos. I have full sympathy with the world that Russell has in view. But the main problem is whether its exclusive reality can be proved on logical grounds. £

To say that universals are incomplete symbols and that they do not refer to anything in terms of 'denoting' is simply to beg the issue. It is to assume that what can be denoted is the only existent. It further implies that

¹1. "Symbolism and Truth," pp 113-114.

linguistic symbols symbolise nothing unless they refer to empirical entities. Prof. Eaton, who agrees with Russell that existence is only empirical, differs from him in that he accepts the notion of context and allows symbols to have syntactical meaning quite independent of empirical reference. "A descriptive phrase," says Eaton, "or proposition whose simple symbols refer to data or are defined in terms of references to data, may as a whole stand for no object; it may state no fact, describe nothing and still be significant"¹

This analysis of syntactical context is not accepted by Russell whose main contention is that meaning must refer directly or indirectly to empirical entities. "Suppose we say: 'The round square does not exist'. It seems plain," says Mr. Russell, "that this is a true proposition, yet we cannot regard it as denying the existence of a certain object called 'the round square.' For if there were such an object, it would exist: we cannot first assume that there is a certain object, and then proceed to deny that there is such an object. Whenever the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed to be meaningless without rendering the propositions meaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is not a proper name, that is, not a name directly representing some object. Thus in all such cases the proposition must be capable of being so analysed that what was the grammatical subject shall have disappeared."²

Russell thus accepts the naturalistic interpretation of meaning. We have discussed in the last chapter the idea that meaning need not revive an image and that it is not necessary that the meaning should depend upon actual reference. The root cause of all this confusion is that Russell did not recognise that meaning always involves a context without which meaning has no meaning. To mean anything is not to point out but to discover the relation between facts and contexts. When I mean 'a man'

1 "Symbolism and Truth," p. 35

2. Whitehead and Russell, "Principia Mathematica." : 69

I need not revive an image of a man or see an actual man. What is needed is that the context in which man is referred to is clearly recognised, and, further, its interconnection with other contexts is also implicitly understood. When I say, 'man is mortal' and when I say 'man is rational', though the word 'man' occurs in both these statements the meaning in these two propositions is not the same, even though the images revived in both the cases are the same. The difference in meaning lies in the context in which the word 'man' occurs. In the one case the context is 'rationality' whilst in the other case it is 'mortality'.¹

Russell, however, differs from Eaton in that he does not accept the notion of context (except in propositions) as the latter does, in spite of his assumption that what is existent is empirical. And this is due to his pluralistic position. The universe according to him is an assemblage of facts, which are independent of one another. There are some facts that are known by acquaintance and others that are known by description. The facts of acquaintance can be denoted whilst the facts of other kinds cannot be denoted directly but they refer to such facts indirectly. The meaning of universals therefore lies in such indirect reference to facts by acquaintance. In the case of facts that, according to Russell, denote nothing, for example, 'centaur', indirect reference is also involved in the sense that the components of centaur are all facts that can be known by acquaintance. Hence meaning for Russell is nothing but reference to such facts either directly or indirectly in terms of images or mnemonic¹ causation. It is in this sense that universals have meaning but not existence. When he denies them existence what he means is that they cannot be directly referred to objects of acquaintance. But they certainly refer to such objects indirectly either by reviving memory-images or by arousing mnemonic links of causation. Without such memory-images or mnemonic units meaning has no meaning. The difference between him and Wittgenstein therefore is not so profound as it looks at first

¹ Russell, 'Analysis of Mind,' pp 208-212, chap X.

sight. Ultimately both of them base their theories of meaning on the reference of symbols to empirical facts. Whilst Wittgenstein does not admit of any other reference except the direct one of picturing these facts, Russell admits that there may be an indirect reference. Ultimately for both of them meaning is inseparable from this empirical reference.

"By an 'incomplete symbol,'" say the authors of "*Principia Mathematica*," "we mean a symbol which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain contexts. This distinguishes such symbols from what (in a generalized sense) we may call proper names 'Socrates' for example, stands for a certain man, and therefore has meaning by itself, without the need of any context. If we supply a context, as in 'Socrates is mortal,' these words express a fact of which Socrates himself is a constituent"¹

The reason why Russell denies the existence of context with reference to individuals is that otherwise atomic facts would lose their atomicity and would establish internal relationships with other facts. Context is not merely a sum of the facts but the very nexus that makes facts significant. But according to Russell all relations between facts are external. I shall discuss this point later. But the question I want to raise at this stage is whether there can be a fact without a context. A significant proposition must always involve a particular, but that particular must not be an isolated entity but must refer to some context. Predicates are such contexts to which individuals as subjects always refer. Predicates are not incomplete because they do not refer to any individual. In the nature of the case they cannot refer to them because they refer to contexts which make the individuals significant. To charge predicates with being incomplete because they do not refer to empirical entities is to defeat the very significance of contexts and their function. Predicates are incomplete because without their incompleteness, they

1 Whitehead and Russell, "*Principia Mathematica*" I. 60.

would not function as predicates or stand for universals at all. The incompleteness of predicates is not their defect, but is a sign of their importance, in that they are required to characterise and include particulars which also are incomplete.

Universals therefore cannot be denied existence because they are incomplete. On the other hand, are particulars which are said to be always subjects and never predicates complete? There are no individuals that are complete by themselves without requiring anything to complete them. There never was such an individual and there never will be. An individual as an independent entity is merely an abstraction. Socrates is not independent because for certain purposes he was an individual separate from others. On the contrary, he is most dependent because apart from the context, that is, the Greece in which he lived and the Greek life that he led, he has no meaning and no reality. Socrates is as much a part of the Greek life of the times in which he lived as his body was part of the physical environment around him. How much can you have of Socrates when he is thus forcibly torn from his context? Forget that there was Greece, forget that there was the particular life that was led by Greek citizens, and you have merely a pale abstraction of Socrates and not the real Socrates at all. Apart from this context, therefore, Socrates who, as an individual, Russell thinks is most complete, is meaningless, and his completeness is lost.

The error of Russell in taking all reality to be empirical resulted in the dissolution of the individual itself, the basis of his thesis that universals are incomplete. If universals do not exist because they are incomplete, the same argument can be applied to individuals, and they can be proved to be incomplete also. Russell seems to be aware of this difficulty when he says: "I say, I sit at my table; I ought not to say that. What I ought to say is this: One of a certain string of events causally connected in the same way that makes the whole series what is called a 'person' has certain spatial relation to one of another string of events causally connected with each other in a different way and

having a special configuration of the sort denoted by the word table."¹ The table is dissolved into a string of events which are casually connected. But the point is, how can the events connect themselves unless there is something else on which this connection depends? The whole procedure seems to be involved in mystery. So the tables and chairs, Socrates and Plato, who were supposed to be individuals and complete, cannot maintain their independence in the face of this logical analysis and their reduction to simples, while simples themselves have to maintain their precarious existence at the sweet will of the analyst, who through his goodness allows the simples to have existence by arbitrarily stopping at a certain stage of the process, but who could, if he so desired, threaten their very existence by reducing them to nothingness.

▷ The upshot of this is that individuals themselves are arbitrary from both sides. Inside they tend to dissolution, outside they try to expand till their very individuality is lost. This consequence is kept out of Russell's view because he arbitrarily stops at the simples on the dogmatic belief that whatever is empirical is real, and that the simples being such empirical entities their reality is self-evident. It is this dogmatism that is responsible for his keeping universals and particulars mutually exclusive, one existent and the other symbolic. He did not feel the necessity of revising the very category of individuality, and if he had done so he would have discovered that the individuality that he was so much depending on was precarious to a degree. He would have found that both individuals and universals are incomplete and demand completion not in mutual exclusiveness but in their unity. Universals are incomplete because they demand completion in particulars, and particulars are incomplete because they demand completion in universals. But to admit this the 'robust sense of reality' that Russell speaks of must be given up. Reality is not merely empirical, because everything empirical demands completion in something

1 Russell, quoted by Urban, "Language & Reality", p. 290

that is non-empirical. Even such objects as chairs and tables cannot be understood apart from something that makes the collection of simples a possibility. Mere simples cannot collect. They can collect only when the category of 'thinghood' which is non-empirical is somehow interpolated. A mere 'simple' is not so simple if it is meant to be independent of everything. In that case it is nothing. Every simple 'belongs' to something complex, and abstracted from this complex it is nothing. When Wittgenstein and Russell talk of structures they mean what we mean by 'context'. But according to them this is otiose and does not in any way affect the simples. I pointed out the fallacy in my examination of Wittgenstein's thesis that the truth and falsehood of propositions depend on their ability to picture these structures. But what this admission amounted to was that a structure without simples was nothing, but simples without structure were everything.

The doctrine of 'incomplete symbols' brings us face to face with 'the systematic ambiguity' of the notion of 'existence' which is mainly responsible for the denial that universals exist. An ambiguity is said to be 'systematic' "when the same words are used in sentences which express different kinds of propositions yet in each case the usage is significant."¹ This definition of 'systematic ambiguity' given by Prof Stebbing is certainly valuable, but it is surely questionable whether the remedy proposed by her, following Russell and Moore, to remove the ambiguity, by reducing one significant usage to another is to be preferred. This would mean that other significant usages have no significance as such, and it would mean further that there is only one standard usage of significant propositions to which all other propositions of different kinds should be reduced. But this, at the outset, is an arbitrary procedure. Whether there is only one standard usage or not cannot be decided unless the question of standard usage is properly examined and the grounds on which these standards are based are proved to be logically sound.

1 I. S. Stebbing, "A Modern Introduction to Logic," p. 161, 2nd ed.

But is there no other way of removing the ambiguity? Prof. Stebbing hardly takes this into account. Take these propositions which on the face of them are ambiguous 'This man is mortal,' 'this man is immortal.' To predicate 'mortality' and 'immortality' of the same individual is not only ambiguous but also contradictory. But may not the ambiguity be removed by drawing attention to a context in which the first proposition is true and another context in which the other proposition is true also?¹ We may, if we remember the different contexts, say at the same time that 'this man is both mortal and immortal' without making nonsense of the whole statement. I therefore believe that there is another way of removing 'the systematic ambiguity,' and the way prescribed by Prof Stebbing cannot at the outset be taken to be the only way. If by 'man' we mean his body, then it is true that he is mortal. But if by 'man' we mean his soul then he may as well be said to be immortal. Here the ambiguity is removed but not by reducing one usage to another. What we have done is that we have pointed out the different universes of discourse in which the apparently contradictory propositions can be significant.

But this is exactly what some modern thinkers do not admit. For them there is only one universe of discourse and this universe is the standard one to which all other universes should be reduced. This is the main reason why Russell and others believe that universals are merely incomplete symbols. According to them there is only one universe, that is, that in which there are empirical objects only, and all the rest merely descriptive. It is only when propositions which are significant in this universe are wrongly said to be significant in different universes that this ambiguity occurs. Moreover our language, they

1. Compare the following passage by Bosanquet: "Are not, it may be asked, those terms intrinsically contrary which can in no wise be affirmed of one another, such as the circle and the square? Why, no. They do not impede one another or the process of thought unless we bring them together in a special form, to which their content is inadequate. They may quite well be conjoint predicates of the same complex term, and when thus affirmed and protected by adequate distinction, have nothing in them contrary to one another. There are places for all predicates, and when all predicates are in their place, none of them is contrary to any other. It is the bringing them together on an inadequate basis of distinction, which is the essence of contradiction and contrariety." "Science and Philosophy", pp 76-77

urge, is mainly responsible for this ambiguity. For example, we use the copula 'is' for different types of propositions, like 'Unicorns are thought,' and 'lions are hunted.' In the former case, since unicorns do not fall into the standard universe they do not exist, and to use the same copula 'are' both in this and in the second proposition, where lions are empirical objects, is certainly ambiguous. Prof. Moore deplores this ambiguity and says, "why we should use the same form of verbal expression to convey such different meanings is more than I can say. It seems to me very curious that language. should have grown up as if it were expressly designed to mislead philosophers, and I do not know why it should have"¹ We must therefore examine this position and see how far this systematic ambiguity is really responsible for the thesis that universals do not exist and, further, whether when this ambiguity is removed the contention of these philosophers that universals do not exist can in any way be substantiated.

It is, however, quite obvious that the notion of 'thing' or 'substance' is absolutely indispensable for the very existence of that empirical reality that is made the ground for the denial of the existence of universals. The importance of this notion was recognised by Aristotle and Kant even though they were wrong in insisting too much upon it. If the object 'lion' in the illustration above is real because it is empirical and falls into this world, then what Russell and others should hold is that an empirical object has no metempirical element in it. But this is what they cannot succeed in doing. It is true that according to Russell every object is a logical construction out of logical simples and in this way he shows signs of the fear that he has no right to admit the existence of a non-empirical element. But, if so, it is very difficult to make sense of the following passage:—

"We can now define the momentary commonsense "thing," as opposed to its momentary appearances. By the similarity

1. "Philosophical Studies", p 217.

of neighbouring perspectives, many objects in the one can be correlated with objects in the other, namely, with the similar objects. Given an object in one perspective, form the system of all the objects correlated with it in all the perspectives, that system may be identified with the momentary common-sense "thing". Thus, an aspect of a "thing" is a member of the system of aspects which is the "thing" at that moment. (The correlation of the times of different perspectives raises certain complications, of the kind considered in the theory of relativity, but, we may ignore these at present.) All the aspects of a thing are real, whereas the thing is a mere logical construction.¹ It has, however, the merit of being neutral as between different points of view, and of being visible to more than one person, in the only sense in which it can ever be visible, namely, in the sense that each sees one of its aspects."¹

If we read this passage carefully we find that Russell has not been able to discard the notion of thinghood. Otherwise there is no meaning in describing an aspect 'of' a thing when the thing itself is a construction and therefore hardly existing. Is the relation 'of' between aspects and nothing? If not, then the whole theory of 'logical construction' must be deemed to be a failure.

That Russell was aware of this difficulty can be seen when he calls empirical objects 'logical fictions.' Prof. Stebbing tries to defend Russell by pointing out that in the knowledge of such objects it is not assumed that such constructions are actually made. It appears that according to her you take only some logical simples, a finite number, and then these simples fall into the class, say, of tables, and it is such classes that allow us to declare the existence of objects without ever requiring us to effect an actual construction. But this hardly meets the difficulty. First of all, the reason why Russell calls them fictions is precisely because they are classes, and classes according to him are fictions.² Russell admits that every class implies a defining characteristic but adds that it is never unique though useful.³ But it may be questioned whether this usefulness of

1. Russell, "Our Knowledge of the External World," p. 89

2. "We shall then be able to say that the symbols for classes are mere conveniences not representing objects called 'classes', and that classes are in fact, like descriptions, logical fictions, or (as we say) 'incomplete symbols'."—"Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy," p. 162

3. Ibid, p. 14

classes can ever be understood without the uniqueness of defining characteristic that is constitutive of the members of the class. How can a class be defined without in one way or another implying the essential value of defining characteristics? And if this is implied, then the objects are not constructions, and the empiricism of Russell receives its deathblow.

Russell, however, appeals to the notion of continuity to effect the miracle. But it is obvious that one logical simple cannot by itself continue with other simples to construct an object. For continuity implies the relation of transitivity with other simples, and this is possible only when there is something common between them.¹ To appeal to the notion of similarity between all these simples is also not helpful, because similarity, like resemblance, implies identity, which Russell urges to be non-existent.²

Prof. Stebbing, however, tries to meet the issue by the following analysis of the situation. "The point to be emphasised," says Prof. Stebbing, "is that every statement which would commonly be said to be a statement about the 'table' can be transformed into a set of statements which can be jointly substituted for the original statement but no grammatical element in the substituted set will be expressed with the same meaning as any grammatical element in the verbal expression of the original statement."² If this is so then the original statement must be different from the substituted set. What is therefore true of the object is not true of the logical simples which are its constituents. In other words an 'object' is something different from the constituents which are the only empirical data available to the logical analyst. But if logical atomism is true, then not only will this confusion which Prof. Stebbing warns us against have to be guarded against, but it is to be questioned whether this confusion will ever be possible.

1 "This assumption (compact series) entails the consequence that if one event covers the whole of a stretch of time immediately preceding another event, then it must have at least one instant in common with the other event, i.e. it is impossible for one event to cease just before another begins. I do not know whether this should be regarded as inadmissible 'Ours' knowledge of the External World." p. 120

2 "A Modern Introduction to Logic", p. 504, 2nd ed.

because the object 'table' will itself be impossible. This somewhat moderate logical analysis thus enables us to see that in any empirical object if there are logical simples, the category of 'object' is not empirical or 'given' but metempirical, and also must exist.

This brings us to the important problem of the relation between meaning and existence. The relation between meaning and existence is an old one and it finds its best expression in the famous ontological argument. This argument formed the basis of Descartes' main system of philosophy and it has earned a place in the history of modern philosophy by the criticism of Kant, who attempted to demolish it. Russell's argument may be said to be in the same spirit as that of Kant, who said that it is absurd to hold that because one has an idea of a hundred dollars therefore the dollars exist. Here we can also see the dogmatism of Kant who urged that only the empirical world is the existent world. What Kant should have done was that he should have analysed the nature of meaning, and then he would have seen that it was a mere caricature of the profound significance of the argument to try to stifle it with such an example as he gave, and he would have realised that his 'Critique' was the best illustration of the truth of the ontological argument. The question raised by him,—'How are *a priori* ideas synthetic?' could easily have been put in the form—'Do ideas imply existence?' and then he would have seen that all that he wrote was in defence of this argument, though popularly his name is associated with its critics.

It must be admitted that if existence only means empirical reality, then that 'meaning necessarily implies existence' is false. But it must also be borne in mind that under these circumstances the very meaning of 'meaning' is meaningless. Say, for example, that I want to mean an object 'table'. This can be done either by denoting or by using a linguistic symbol. In the first case, when I denote the object, what I do is to make a perspective stand for the whole object which is not given in awareness. Here what I am

interested in is not the perspective by itself, but the object as a whole which it represents. But if the only existence was empirical existence it is obvious that such a representation would be impossible, because there would be nothing existing which could be represented. Unless the object is somehow said to exist to talk of representation is meaningless. To maintain that one perspective may stand for other perspectives is absurd because unless these perspectives belong to the 'object,' the identity that characterises all the perspectives, perspectives themselves will have no meaning and no existence. Unless the perspective that one is aware of in denoting transcends itself and points to something else, the very purpose of its standing as a vehicle of meaning will be defeated. That is to say, the perspective does not refer to itself, nor does it refer to all the future and past perspectives, because these perspectives cannot be given in totality, but it must refer to the object as a whole which is the identity or the universal.

To mean anything therefore is already to admit that there is something not given in sensation but yet existing in its own right. When I mean 'table' this symbol represents an object that remains the same whenever the symbol is used. If the object were not identical, the use of the symbol would be without any significance. The symbol represents the identity, the universal, that remains constant among these changing perspectives. And this universal must exist and must not be a mere fiction.¹

There is another consequence that follows on this theory that meaning need only refer to the empirical on the ground that whatever exists is empirical. I have already referred to the fact that one of the unfortunate consequences of Wittgenstein's logical positivism is that it has resulted in solipsism. If all that I know about the object is the perspective or the collection of perspectives, then it is impossible to convey my meaning to others. Meaning is not only a logical category but a social category also. When I mean anything,

¹ Samuel Alexander, the realist, admits this. cf. "Likewise the concept or thought of a dog is as real a constituent of the dog as what makes him a singular thing." "Space, Time and Deity," Vol. I, p. 151

besides pointing out something, I also expect others to do the same. But to fulfil this requirement the object to which the symbol refers, must be public and not private. If, as Wittgenstein seems to hold, all simple symbols refer to simple entities or logical simples, then it is impossible that out of these private symbols reference to a public entity can be generated. This, in the very nature of the case, is impossible. If inter-subjective intercourse is to be guaranteed, then the public character of the object must be assumed to exist, and cannot be generated out of the private perspectives. The object must, in other words, be a universal.

We have thus seen the nature of the ambiguity in the notion of existence, its causes, and the way it should be removed. Our conclusion is that the copula 'is,' is used to denote not only empirical existence but also the existence of universals that may be called metempirical. It is as much true that there is a universe because there are facts as that there are facts because there is a universe, which is the unity, the identity in these facts. The logical atomism of Wittgenstein and Russell reduces the universe to mere meaninglessness. If their Ockham's razor were further used, then solipsistic behaviourism would be the only consistent theory that they have any right to hold.¹ Solipsism of the old type at least believed in the individual self, which this logical atomism considers to be a myth. I shall not inquire whether on this theory knowledge is possible, or whether the notion of the 'world,' whether empirical or otherwise, has any meaning at all. It is enough to suggest the absurd conclusions that would follow if their theories were carried to their logical conclusions. But from a philosophy where logic and mathematics are mere tautologies nothing better should be expected.

¹ Dr. Wenberg rightly described logical positivism as "a solipsism without a subject"—"An Examination of Logical Positivism", p. 68

CHAPTER IV

THE DILEMMA OF PREDICATION

I.

IN the last two chapters we were mainly concerned with establishing the thesis that universals exist, after an examination of some of the theories that maintain that they are either names or merely incomplete symbols. We discovered that all these theories were based on an uncritical assumption that what exists is empirical and since universals are not empirical entities, universals do not exist. We proved the absurdity of this assumption by pointing out that nominalism whether old or new is tenable only if universals are assumed to exist, and that nominalism contradicts itself if such an assumption is not made. We further examined the relation of meaning with existence, and found that meaning and existence are correlatives and cannot be divorced from each other. In this case the Russellian position that universals are mere incomplete symbols falls to the ground. We urged that the notion of 'existence' was very ambiguous and that they only escape from this ambiguity was to admit that there are infinite universes of discourse and that the empirical universe is only one of these.

But the thesis that universals are universes is not accepted by some philosophers, according to whom there are universals and universes which are not identical¹. Our discussion in the last chapter has moved towards the identification of these two. If what we urged in the last chapter is true, universals and universes must be identical. In this chapter we shall be mainly concerned with the relation between universals and particulars in order to discover in what sense universals are universes.

¹ "A universe of particulars is not the universal of them. Further, 'the universal parabola' is not, however, the universe of all parabolas and in fact there is no such individual or universe." Alexander, "Space, Time and Deity," Vol. I, pp. 234-35.

In a discussion about the relation between universals and particulars it is impossible to ignore Plato, who is supposed to have held that universals are distinct from particulars, the former being in heaven and the latter existing on earth. Further, according to him, universals alone are real, and the reality of particulars is due to their 'participation' in universals. It is not necessary to go into the details of this theory, on which there is no unanimity among the students of Plato. My own reading of the Platonic dialogues, however, assures me that this is a mere travesty of the Platonic philosophy, and that on a careful reading of the later dialogues like the 'Parmenides' and the 'Sophistes', a theory entirely different from this supposed Platonic theory emerges into view.² What I am, however, concerned with is not the examination of the nature of the Platonic philosophy, but with pointing out that if Plato held this theory, namely, that universals and particulars are distinct and that this distinction is ultimate, then Plato was wrong, and that he was open to the charges which Aristotle levelled at him.³

But if universals are not distinct from particulars in the way Plato is supposed to have held that they were, then the question that stares us in the face is, whether they can be said to exist at all. It might be argued that if they exist, then they must be separate from particulars, and in that case they must be held to be distinct, as Plato held them to be.⁴ If the conclusions of the last chapter are valid, then the separation of particulars from universals cannot be held to be ultimate. And if it is ultimate then both must be mutually exclusive. In other words what this will amount to is that a particular is a particular because it is not a universal, and a universal is a universal because it is not a particular.

1 "Only the name 'participation' was new, for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by 'imitation' of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name."—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 987b 10 14

2. This view of the Platonic philosophy has been due to Aristotle mainly. Ross, however, shrewdly remarks, "Nothing in the works of Plato corresponds exactly to what Aristotle says here"—*The Works of Aristotle*, Vol VIII, ed Ross, 987b

3 Vide, *Met* 990 b15, 1079 n11 "of the more accurate (but the meaning is rather 'more finished' 'more subtle') arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations others involve the difficulty of the 'third man' " (fr Ross)

4 See specially his "Phaedo"

It is this dualism that sometimes is expressed when particulars are called percepts whilst universals are called concepts. A percept is that which is perceived and therefore given, whilst a concept is conceived by the mind and created by the mind. And mind and matter being mutually exclusive, it is argued that universals and particulars are distinct, and, therefore, any attempt to bridge the gulf between them is doomed to failure.¹ We are thus impaled on the horns of a dilemma. Either universals exist or they do not. If they do, then they are distinct from particulars and in that case they cannot characterise particulars. If they do not exist, then our conclusions in the last chapter are erroneous and further discussion of the problem must stop.

Now, we have already admitted that universals and particulars are in a sense distinct. Whiteness, for example, is not the same as 'this white.' If that were the case then the proposition, 'This flower is white,' would be identical with the proposition, 'This flower is whiteness.' We see that there is a difference between these two propositions. The first proposition is significant whilst the second proposition is downright nonsense. If all that is required from me is the admission that this 'white' is distinct from 'whiteness' when thus used in propositions, then the argument does not add anything to what we have already insisted upon in the last chapter, when we argued against the nominalists that universals cannot be reduced to particulars without remainder.

I believe that when we are required to admit the distinctness of universals from particulars, what is suggested is that universals are spatially separate from particulars just as 'this table' is spatially separate from 'that table.' But this is inadmissible. When Aristotle criticised Plato for his theory of ideas it was this kind of distinctness that he had in mind and his criticism is relevant only on the

1. This is the common ground of the writers "Essays in Critical Realism," however much they may differ as to their relationship. Meinong and Husserl also hold similar views, establishing another world called the 'subsistent' as contrasted with the 'existent' though the entities called the 'subsistent' should not be confused with the essences of the American critical realists.

hypothesis that Plato was guilty of maintaining this kind of distinctness. We are not concerned whether Plato actually held such a type of distinctness between universals and particulars but if he held such a theory, then not only does the question of participation become mysterious, but the very definition of universals as 'identities that characterise particulars' becomes unmeaning. We started with the statement that the notion of universals is intelligible if they characterise particulars. But this notion is absolutely unintelligible if universals are spatially separate from particulars, as the argument in question appears to admit. We may, therefore, frame a counter-dilemma to the effect that if universals characterise particulars then they cannot be spatially separate, and if they are spatially separate then they are not universals.

If universals are spatially separate from particulars, then the relation between a universal and a particular would be exactly the same as that between two particulars. The relation between 'this table' and 'that table' is not, however, the same as between 'this table' and 'tableness.' 'Tableness' is what characterises the table while this table does not characterise that table. A particular does not characterise another particular. If that were the case then the distinction between the subject and the predicate in a proposition would be meaningless. In a proposition it is the predicate that characterises the subject and not *vice versa*. The subject is characterised by the predicate. If the relation between one particular and another particular was the same as that between a particular and a universal, then in a proposition a particular might as well stand for a predicate. In that case the proposition 'this table is brown' would be interpreted as 'this table is this brown' which is certainly meaningless.

Apart from this distinction between a universal and a particular, which is evident in virtue of the distinct functions performed by the subject and the predicate in a proposition, there is another difference between the two in virtue of the fact that a universal not only characterises

actual particulars, but also determines the characterisation of possible particulars. A universal is a universal not only because it characterises a particular in a proposition, but also because it stands for a function determining the possible particulars that would stand for the values of the function. In the proposition, 'this table is brown,' the universal 'tableness' characterises 'this table' which is a particular. But tableness also characterises that table which is brown, and possibly many other particulars that do not have 'brown' for the predicate. If the tableness were spatially separate, and therefore distinct, then its universality as a function would disappear and it would cease to be a universal.

So the relation between a particular and a universal is entirely different from that between one particular and another particular, firstly, because a universal characterises particulars and thus stands as a predicate in a proposition, and secondly because a universal is a function determining the characterisation of possible particulars in possible propositions. If a universal were spatially separate, then a universal would neither characterise a particular nor would it be a function. Thus the difficulty that we met with at the outset is based on an uncritical assumption. That the existence of one particular implies its distinctness or spatial separation from other particulars does not necessarily imply that the same relation should hold between a particular and a universal. A universal exists, but it need not be spatially separate from particulars, because in that case it would cease to be a universal. A universal characterises a particular; it is a function of which particulars are definite values. If a function were to exist apart from its values it would cease to be a function. The relation between a particular and a universal is a unique relation, and no relation of whatever kind between one particular and another particular can explain it.

So the existence of universals need not imply that they are distinct from particulars in the sense of being spatially

separate from them. Moreover if distinctness were to be interpreted only in terms of spatial separation, then space would be ultimate, and a universe would be a collection of spatially separate particulars. It is not suggested that this position is *prima facie* untenable, but that space is ultimate cannot be accepted without further examination. There have been philosophers, especially of the monistic type, according to whom space and time are not ultimate. But it should be noted that even such radical pluralists as Leibniz and McTaggart have declared that space and time are not ultimate. It is therefore very difficult to maintain that space and time are ultimate, in face of the recurrent statements of philosophers who differ violently from each other on other matters. In other words there may be entities that are spaceless and timeless. Whether universals are such entities cannot however be decided at the present stage of the argument.

But it might be urged that this dual function that the universal appears to perform, only succeeds in landing our theory in a serious contradiction. It can be easily seen that if a universal is a predicate, then it cannot be a function, and if it is a function that determines actual and possible values that are to stand as the subjects of propositions, then it cannot be a predicate. Let us by way of illustration take this example, namely, 'this sensum is red'. Here the redness is the universal that characterises the sensum, and therefore it stands as a predicate in the proposition. Now it is obvious that a predicate is a constituent of the subject to which it belongs. The proposition 'this sensum is red' may be analysed as 'this sensum has redness'. It will be meaningless to analyse it as 'this sensum is redness' or 'the redness has this sensum' or 'redness is this sensum'. The reason why all these three propositions appear to be meaningless is that in these cases either the predicate is identical with the subject or the subject is a part of the predicate, whilst in a meaningful proposition the subject is a whole of which the predicate as a character stands as a part. Now when 'red' is the

character of this sensum it is obvious that it is the whole being of redness that is included in it and not a part of it. Redness does not have parts just as the red of this sensum may be said to have them. Redness is not divisible.

Now if the character is a part of the subject, then it seems obvious that the whole being of the universal must be a part of the subject to which the character belongs. In that case it is impossible that the same universal should characterise another particular and thus stand as a predicate of another subject. If the whole of redness is a part of this sensum, then it stands to reason that the same redness cannot stand as a part of another sensum unless one sensum is identical with another sensum. But this is exactly what would take place if redness were a universal characterising different particulars.

A universal cannot characterise unless it is a predicate.¹ But as a predicate its whole being is exhausted in such characterisation, and it therefore ceases to be a universal for lack of further characterisation. In other words, if a universal is a character then it cannot be a function. The same difficulty takes place if it is made to work as a function. If redness is a function then it must characterise other particulars and in that case the whole being of redness cannot be exhausted in such characterisation. In other words, the predicate will not only be a part or a constituent of the subject to which it belongs but it will also be a part of the universal itself. Redness will therefore have to be infinitely divisible and each part must consequently stand as a predicate in a proposition and never be the whole of the universal.

Now both these alternatives seem to be untenable. If we hold to the first alternative then we shall have to say that there cannot be more than one proposition having the

¹ Joseph clearly dissents from this view. "As I understand the issue, no universal is ever predicated of a particular (I would rather have said of an individual). *Arist. Soc. Proc.* 1926, Supp. vol VI. Moore, however, insists upon this, e.g. "there is one well-established usage of the expression 'is a universal', which is such that, in that sense, every character without exception—is quite certainly a universal—that sense, namely, in which is a universal' is simply logically equivalent to 'is either predicable of something or is a relation'—Supp. vol III of the *Pro Arist. Soc.*, p. 114

same predicate. In that case, to say that 'this sensum is red' and 'that sensum is red' will be false because meaningless, since there will cease to be any distinction between 'this' and 'that', redness having been exhausted in the first predication. But this will make the very existence of universals precarious. A universal as we defined it, is an identity that characterises particulars. That is to say, there must be different particulars for the universal to characterise, and if these do not exist then universals themselves will be without any function to perform and will cease to exist.

But if, on the other hand, we hold to the second alternative, our position will not have improved at all. If we divide the universal it will cease to be a universal and therefore will have ceased to be an identity. An identity is a unity, and to divide the unity into unities, just as a line is divided into infinite points, is not only ridiculous but also impossible.¹ And, moreover, if every subject has a corresponding part of a universal, then this part will be another particular and in that case it will cease to be a predicate. We saw that one particular cannot be a predicate of another particular. A particular is a 'that' whilst a universal is a 'what'. But since the parts of a universal will themselves be particulars, they will be 'thats', and therefore will be incapable of performing the function of predicates. A universal must be indivisible, and apart from the impossibility of dividing it into infinite parts, its parts would cease to be universals if such a division could be successfully carried out.

Surely we have drifted into a hopeless dilemma. The main difficulty that stares us in the face is how the unity

¹ That this is not a rhetorical difficulty can be seen from the following dialogue between Parmenides and Socrates.

"And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only and different parts different men?"

The latter

Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them?

That seems to follow

Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Certainly not," he said — "Parmenides", Jowett's translation, Vol IV, P. 50-51

of the universal can be kept indivisible even though a universal is a function that characterises different particulars. It appears that a universal must be a whole, whether a character or a function. But it does not appear to be such at the same time. If the universal is a character, then there cannot be more than one grammatical subject and in that case the universal commits suicide. But if the universal is interpreted as a function, then it fritters itself into infinite parts and in that case also ceases to be a universal. Let us see whether any escape from this dilemma is possible.

CHAPTER V

SOME MODERN THEORIES EXAMINED

IN the last chapter we have become familiar with the dilemma that the problem of universals raises. It is the old dilemma of 'the one and the many'. To put it in simple language, it comes to this. Is the predicate universal or particular? As a 'character' qualifying the subject in a proposition it appears to be a particular, whilst as a 'function' determining an infinite number of propositions it appears to be universal. Both views, contradictory as they may seem, are held by competent modern thinkers. There is no doubt that this is the crux of the problem that we have undertaken to examine. It will therefore be profitable, and at the same time interesting, if we examine certain modern theories which have tried to provide an answer. Incidentally they will tend to clarify the issue between the universal and the particular, and point the direction from which a solution to the dilemma may be expected.

Ramsey

It might be urged that a universal is only a function, and that the question of predication does not arise because the very distinction between a subject and a predicate is erroneous. The difficulty whether a universal is a 'character' or a 'function' arises only when the distinction between the universal and the particular is taken to be ultimate. This was the position that was maintained by Russell¹. According to Ramsey this is mistaken, because in a proposition where the question of predication arises the subject is not a particular to which the universal stands in the relation of a predicate, but the subject itself is a universal. "There is no essential distinction between the subject of a proposition and its predicate, and no fundamental classification of object

1. *Proc. Arist. Soc.* 1911. "The purpose of the following paper is to consider whether there is a fundamental division of the objects into two classes, universals and particulars. My own opinion is that the dualism is ultimate."

can be based upon such a distinction"¹ He argued against Russell that if a universal is distinct from a particular because the former is an incomplete symbol whilst the latter is a complete individual, then the particular which is the subject of a proposition is also incomplete in precisely the same way as the universal which, according to Russell, is the predicate of the proposition. Both are incomplete symbols, logical constructions, and therefore the distinction between a particular and a universal, subject and predicate, is only superficial. Both the particular and the universal are functions, and the distinction between them, which, for Russell was ultimate, is a mistake. To the argument that we use a predicate as 'belonging to' a subject in a proposition, and thus make a distinction between an individual and a function, Ramsey replies that "it is simply due to the fact that certain things do not interest the mathematician,"² and further adds that "were it not for the mathematician's biased interest he would invent a symbolism which was completely symmetrical as regards individuals and qualities; and it becomes clear that there is no sense in the words individuals and qualities; all we are talking about is two different types of objects such that two objects, one of each type, would be the sole constituents of an atomic fact. The two types being in every way symmetrically related, nothing can be meant by calling one type the type of individuals and the other that of qualities, and these two words are devoid of connotation."³

Ramsey, therefore, tries to solve the difficulty by denying that there are individuals, and therefore invalidates the very question of predication. Since the subject and the predicate in a proposition stand for two symmetrical functions, the entire difficulty according to him disappears. For Ramsey the subject represents only one type of objects whilst the predicate represents another type of objects. And these are constituents of atomic facts. How these two types are connected together he, following Wittgenstein, confesses he

1 "Foundations of Mathematics", p. 116

2 Ibid., p. 132

3 Ibid., p. 132

does not know. Further, according to him, the notion of characterisation is a 'verbal fiction.' "The truth is that we know and can know nothing whatever about the forms of atomic propositions; we do not know whether some or all objects can occur in more than one form of atomic proposition; and there is obviously no way of deciding any such question."²

Now in the face of all these confessions of ignorance it may be doubted whether Ramsey has really offered any true solution of the difficulty. First of all it may be questioned whether Ramsey has any right to talk about the structure of any atomic fact. I have already dealt with this difficulty above when I criticised Wittgenstein for his denial of universals, and pointed out that to say that atomic facts have forms but that nothing can be known whatever about these forms, is not only mystifying but also self-contradictory. I believe that a little reflection will convince us that either the atomic facts are mere collections of constituent objects or they are related into a structure. According to both Wittgenstein and Ramsey they are not mere collections. But if, on the other hand, they have a form and are therefore structural entities, then either the form is related to the objects or the form is another object besides the objects that constitute the atomic fact. In the former case the whole fact, that is, constituent objects with structure internally related, will be different from each constituent object. And this difference will exactly correspond to the difference between a particular and a universal, the subject and the predicate, which Ramsey has denied. If the form is an object different from the constituent objects, then it will either be a 'tie' as maintained by Mr. Johnson or it will itself be a constituent as maintained by Russell. But Ramsey does not accept either of these positions. The form is neither a constituent of the atomic fact nor is it, according to him, something that ties all these constituents together without itself being a constituent. What the exact nature of this form or structure is, is enveloped in darkness. I

1. *Loc. cit.*, p. 183

2. *Ibid.*, p. 133

wonder whether a theory that takes refuge in ignorance when faced with an important issue may be said to have solved the difficulty at all.

Russell

Let us, on the other hand, see whether the Russellian theory that a universal is a constituent of the atomic fact offers any escape out of the difficulty. Russell maintains that the distinction between a subject and a predicate is ultimate, and, unlike Ramsey, faces the difficulty as to how a universal can be both a predicate and a function. Ramsey could escape the difficulty by reducing the subject to a function, and therefore to a universal, and thus denying that there was such a difficulty at all. No such escape is possible for Russell since, according to him, the distinction between a particular and a universal is ultimate

Now what does Russell mean by 'ultimate'? The first difference between a particular and a universal according to him is that a particular can be denoted, it is an occupant of space-time and therefore distinct from other such occupants. This red and that red are two reds and not one red. They are mutually exclusive. But universals cannot be said to occupy any space-time context at all¹. Universals are spaceless and timeless. And since they are spaceless and timeless the question 'where' and 'when' does not become relevant with reference to them. Our difficulty was how a universal could be a function as well as a character. If a universal exists and the whole being of a universal is exhausted in predication then it cannot act as a function. To this Russell would answer that this difficulty is due to the fact that we have assumed that because a particular occupies a space-time context therefore a universal also does. This would land us in the supposed Platonic theory according to which ideas are in heaven. Once this assumption is proved to be mistaken and the real nature of universals as being spaceless and timeless is admitted, the difficulty ceases to exist

¹ "Thus the fact that it is logically possible for precisely similar things to co-exist in two different places, but that things in different places at the same time cannot be numerically identical, forces us to admit that it is particulars, i.e. 'instances' of universals that exist in places, and not universals themselves"—Arist. Soc. Proc., 1911-12

Further, being spaceless and timeless, universals do not exist but they are mere incomplete symbols. Since they are symbols and thus do not imply existence, the question how they can be functions and how at the same time they can characterise as predicates can easily be solved. When a universal stands as a predicate in a proposition, the whole being of the universal is implied in such a predication. But this in no way contradicts its nature as a function, because the universal, being merely an incomplete symbol, can be repeated in every actual or possible proposition without in any way involving any contradiction. The contradiction is involved only when a universal is assumed to exist in the same way as the particular exists. Universals do not, according to Russell, exist. Redness, for example, may be a constituent in every proposition that has red as the predicate, and since redness is an incomplete symbol it can be repeated in all propositions where red occurs as a predicate in an exactly identical manner. Our difficulty, that if redness were a function it would have to be frittered away into infinite parts so that each part as a character might stand as a predicate in corresponding propositions, does not arise in view of the fact that a symbol cannot be divided and need not be divided for the purpose of characterising subjects of different propositions. In every proposition where red is the predicate, 'redness' is the same and not different. In the propositions 'this is red' and 'that is red' what is different are the subjects which exist. The predicate 'red' is identical in all cases, and it can be similar because 'redness' is spaceless and timeless. Only particulars cannot be identical. Universals, being symbolic descriptions, can.

In every proposition therefore, besides atomic objects that constitute the atomic fact, there is at least one other constituent that properly speaking is not an atomic object, but is merely an incomplete symbol¹. Every grammatical subject

¹ Compare the following passage from "Symbolism and Truth" by Eaton, p. 78, "A universal is an aspect of a group as a whole. It is that which distinguishes the group from another whose constituents, apart from the universal, are indistinguishable from those of the former except by their bare numerical diversity. The group as a whole is an instance of this universal, which is itself an element in the group but not an element co-ordinate with the others. The Universal is an element of unity, whilst the others are terms." Is it ever possible to discover how 'a universal' is 'an aspect of a group as a whole' and at the same time the group 'as a whole' is an instance of this universal? Mr Eaton seems to have unwittingly fallen into a serious contradiction.

therefore is a combination of the facts given by acquaintance and at least one fact given by description. That which is given by acquaintance can be denoted and, therefore, exists. But that which is known by description cannot be denoted and, therefore, cannot exist. The subject is not merely a universal as Ramsey maintains. There is an element of givenness which makes it a subject, a particular, and this givenness cannot be explained away in any manner. The relation between a universal and a particular, both as a predicate and a subject, and as "a function and a value of the function, can be thus easily explained. A universal is a constituent in every subject and, as such, it is included in the subject and is not merely tied as Mr. Johnson supposed. Being a mere symbol it can be used as a function, and repeated in every possible or actual proposition, without raising the question how its whole being can be exhausted in such predication, and since it is incomplete it makes functional variation possible. Thirdly, since every subject is a group of atomic facts and since these facts exist and are not merely descriptive phrases, the distinction between substance and quality, subject and predicate, can be maintained without resorting to the radical method used by Ramsey.

Russell's theory therefore has obvious advantages that make it more attractive than that of Ramsey. But a little reflection will convince us that these advantages are bought at a very high cost. First of all, it is evident that it suffers from the defect we pointed out in a previous chapter, namely, that of divorcing meaning from existence. A universal on this theory can characterise a particular as a predicate and at the same time be a function only because universals are mere descriptions without implying existence. We have pointed out that universals cannot be mere incomplete symbols if that is understood as meaning that they are mere symbols without anything to symbolise. We do not maintain that they exist in the same sense as particulars like flowers and chairs and tables exist. If they cannot be denoted their meaning is certainly understood, and as such, they may be called concepts. But concepts are not mere nonentities.

Concepts also exist, and unless their existence is postulated, we have urged, the very existence of percepts or, in other words, particulars, becomes impossible

I shall not press these considerations here as they have already been discussed in a previous chapter. I shall examine the theory from another point of view. Let us grant that universals are mere symbols and that they are incomplete. Let us further grant that in every grammatical subject one universal at least is included. But when so much is granted it is fair that we should draw the conclusion, that the particular standing as the grammatical subject should also be admitted to be incomplete. If every subject involves at least one universal as an incomplete symbol, then the rest of the subject apart from this incomplete constituent must also be incomplete. Hence, the distinction between a particular and a universal, which according to Russell is ultimate, is untenable. If the ultimacy of the distinction lies in completeness and incompleteness, then such distinction cannot be successfully maintained, because it can be urged that both the subject and the predicate are incomplete and therefore the universal and the particular also. Ramsey's contention against Russell was therefore completely justified when he urged that this distinction was not fundamental. And if this distinction is not fundamental the whole theory of Russell falls to the ground.

It may, however, be urged that there is a fundamental difference when a universal is an incomplete symbol and when a particular is proved to be incomplete. Russell himself has maintained that both the particular and the universal are 'logical constructions.' He has even gone to the extent of calling particulars 'logical fictions.' There is certainly a great deal of ambiguity in the use of such expressions by Russell. I have already drawn attention to it in a previous chapter. It might be urged that a particular is a 'logical construction' although in a sense different from that in which a universal is said to be a 'logical construction.' If that is the case then this usage on the part of Russell only leads to confusion of the worst type. A thinker should have

the right to use expressions of any kind, provided by such usage he does not create ambiguity in the minds of his readers. And when such ambiguity is made to cover formidable difficulties in the theory and to ensure plausibility for it, certainly he does not deserve forbearance. My charge against Russell is that his theory of the relation of universals and particulars appears to gain plausibility because of this ambiguity and once this ambiguity is discovered the defects of his theory become glaring.¹

I shall allow that when a particular is said to be a 'logical construction,' it is not so in the same sense as a universal is a 'logical construction.' What this difference amounts to is that whilst a universal is a 'construct,' a particular is not a 'construct.' This table before me is not an actual construction out of perspective or atomic simples. It is not, that is to say, a 'construct' because if it were, then the table would have been actually 'constructed.' This would be absurd. A particular is therefore a 'logical construction' because it is nothing more nor less than the past, present and future logical simples, but it is not a 'construct,' because these logical simples are not actually collected and then the table constructed. We can thus easily allow the difference between a 'construct' and a 'construction,' though the difficulty that we touched upon in a previous chapter as to how these simples are collected is insuperable.

Now when a universal is said to be a 'logical construction' in a different sense, what does it amount to? It means that

1 "It is not easy to know from Russell's language what he means by logical construction because he is confused in two respects."

(1) He does not distinguish between saying that a thing is a 'logical construction' and saying that it is 'an incomplete symbol.' He says for example classes are, in fact, like descriptions, 'logical fictions' or as we say 'incomplete symbols.'

(2) Russell fails to distinguish between a broad sense of incomplete symbol and narrow. He fails to notice that the sense in which "The King of England" as used in "The King of England is happy," is an incomplete symbol, is very

incomplete symbol as used in "The King of England exists." The phrase is an incomplete symbol in the first sentence merely because it does not name anything in Russell's sense but refers to something indirectly by one of its characteristics, viz., that of 'reigning over Englishmen.' The phrase is an incomplete symbol in the second sentence because it neither names nor refers to anything by one of its characteristics. It is in terms of the second sense of 'incomplete symbol' that logical constructions are to be defined. Russell perhaps failed to notice the difference between the two senses partly because he did not notice that a phrase might be an incomplete symbol in one use and not in another.—J. Wisdom, 'Logical Constructions,' *Mind*, 1931, p. 188-89.

a universal is an abstraction from particulars in thought, and is, as such, a thought-construct. Universals are 'constructs' whilst particulars are 'logical constructions' though they are not constructs. Being constructs, universals are mere abstractions in thought. They are therefore concepts. And since they are concepts, which are mere thought-abstractions, they are of the nature of descriptive phrases and, as such, do not exist. Universals are therefore incomplete because, firstly, they are thought-abstractions, and, secondly because they do not exist. Particulars, on the other hand, are not thought-abstractions, they are percepts and therefore concrete. They also exist. The incompleteness of particulars therefore is different from that of universals, and, as such, they are, in an important sense, complete, and fitted to be logical and grammatical subjects.¹

I have already dealt with the theory that universals are abstractions and proved that such an attempt ends in a miserable failure. This therefore need not be examined again. I shall raise another issue. What I shall urge is that if every subject is complete because it is given, and every predicate incomplete because it is constructed, then to say that in every proposition the universal is a connecting link between atomic objects is not defensible. When a universal is said to be a thought-construct it means that particulars were independent of the universal before the actual operation of abstraction was started. But then such an operation cannot start if the universal is only a 'constituent' holding together other atomic objects. Again we find the universal performing two contradictory functions simultaneously. In one sense it is prior to itself, in another sense it is posterior to itself. If the universal is a thought-abstraction then as a constituent it must be like a disinterested spectator, an idle and otiose entity, without affecting in one way or another the constitution of atomic objects. However, it performs a very important function because it is the universal that holds together all the other constituents without which

1. Russell does not always distinguish between the grammatical and the logical subject. It is due to the ambiguity in the notion of 'incomplete symbol' and his sentence that a proper name always stands for a particular which is always a subject in a proposition, cf. *Introduction to Math. Phil.*, p. 192.

there cannot be a logical subject. But in that case it cannot be a thought-abstraction because an abstraction involves a temporal process and must be posterior to the logical objects out of which the abstraction was effected. So the difficulty still remains. If the universal is a thought-construct and therefore an abstraction, then it cannot perform the function of a constituent holding together all the other constituents, and if it is such a constituent, then it cannot be a thought-construct, and therefore an abstraction, and hence its incompleteness cannot be distinct from the incompleteness of the particular.¹

There is another difficulty that reduces the theory almost to an absurdity. In such a proposition as 'Socrates is wise,' Socrates is the logical subject while 'wise' is the predicate. This logical subject is the particular, 'Socrates,' and 'wise' represents the universal, 'wisdom.' Now, according to Russell, 'wisdom' is a constituent of the subject 'Socrates.' But Socrates is complete, and therefore the universal, 'wisdom' or 'mortality,' should not make any difference to the logical subject. Its completeness in that case should remain unaffected. But, if on the other hand, the universal constitutes a connecting link and gives rise to difference between one proposition and another, then the subjects can never be complete, because universals, instead of being otiose entities, introduce important differences in propositions. If there are atomic propositions, then one proposition cannot be the same as another proposition, and since propositions with the same subject can be different propositions, the difference must be due to the universals that stand as the predicates in such propositions and to nothing else. And if this is true, then logical subjects can never be complete and the distinction between the universal and the particular can never be ultimate. If on the other hand every logical subject is complete, then there cannot be more than one atomic proposition having the same subject and propositions

1. It is this circularity of the argument that reduces his doctrine of 'classes' to a needless muddle. The class-concept is both a common mark of members of the class and, being a propositional function, incomplete.

like 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates is mortal' must be identical. I do not know how Russell would resolve this difficulty.¹

Further, if every universal is a thought-construct then it is difficult to know whether every universal of sense-quality like redness is also such a construct.² When I say that 'this flower is red' and declare that redness is a universal, does it follow that redness is also a thought-construct? Since on the theory of Russell every universal is a thought-construct and therefore incomplete, redness also must be such a construct. But when I see red, the redness seems to be in the sensum and therefore as much given as anything could be. If redness is a thought-construct then I cannot be aware of red when I see the red sensum for the first time unless the construct is already there as an innate idea, and I somehow extrapolate this construct 'out' there to constitute the sensum. Or the red sensum must be composed of neutral stuff such that when it comes into contact with the human body, automatically the thought-construct redness is jerked out to constitute the red sensum.³ In any case the redness cannot be in the flower but must be somewhere in one's head. These consequences may be said to be utterly ridiculous, but on the premises they are inevitable. It is true that when predicates are not sense-qualities the ridiculousness is not quite apparent. We are likely to believe that wisdom is a thought-construct because there is no entity called wisdom out there as in the case of the red sensum.

1 Moore seems to have noted the difficulty when he gives the following definition of logical construction. 'Lions are logical constructions,' means "there is a common usage of the expression 'is a lion' such that in that usage 'is a lion' is an incomplete symbol." Mr. Wisdom does not agree with Moore here. He urges 'there is a common usage' is not enough. For every substantive there is a common usage, namely, its usage in instancial sentences, in which it is an incomplete symbol."—*Mind* 1931 p. 193. The whole theory of logical construction, Mr. Wisdom admits, is full of difficulties.

2 That this consequence follows on the theory of incomplete symbols is shown by Mr. Aaron in "Mind", April, 1939. According to Aaron there are two senses of universals. "Universals in this first sense of the word seem to pervade the natural world, and belong to it whether I happen to discover them there or not. The universality of y1 (yellow) is an objective, natural fact which the mind may, or may not, discover." Universals in the second sense lack this objectivity. As an example we may take the universal 'man.' The universal 'man' as I use it in thinking and in discourse is not so much discovered as framed by me. For y1 is objective and discovered whereas 'man' is subjective and fabricated by the mind." pp. 168-69. Aaron urges that if all universals are predicates, as Russell believes, then they are universals in the second sense, and, as such, fabricated by the mind.

3 In his "Analysis of Mind" Russell appears to hold a view of neutral monism similar to that put forward by Holt in his 'Concept of Consciousness'.

But the fallaciousness of the theory becomes apparent when sense-qualities like redness are distinguished from this red and reduced to thought-constructs. Either redness is spatially distinct from this red or it is not. If not distinct then redness must be located where the red is located and if the red is given, the redness must also be given. The only possible alternative is that universals are not mere constructs and, as such, are not mere nothing. They also exist and they exist where the particulars exist too.

Russell tried to avoid the difficulty by dividing the universe into two mutually exclusive realms, one spatial and temporal, and the other timeless and spaceless¹. If the traditional interpretation of the Platonic theory is correct then this theory is hardly to be distinguished from that of Plato. But while for Plato universals were the only reality, for Russell they are practically nothing. This is an inverted Platonism. On his theory of descriptions he tries to avoid the difficulties from which this sort of dualism always suffers. But such a theory creates other difficulties of a very serious nature. We have already dealt with some of them, and have seen that by making the particular complete the nature of the universal becomes very difficult to understand. I shall not discuss the curious position assigned to the universal. By making the predicate a mere constituent of the logical subject Russell hardly solves the difficulty that we have raised. Sometimes his universal becomes a mere idle entity hardly functioning in any manner in the particular, a merely idle constituent. Sometimes it is assumed to complete the individual by holding all the other constituents together. But by calling it a concept and contrasting it with the percept, no recognition seems to be taken of its existence at all. It is, therefore, difficult to understand how all these contradictory statements can be reconciled so as to make the theory of universals consistent, and thus resolve the difficulty which Russell with all his ingenuity does not seem to have succeeded in resolving.

¹ Though he repudiates this now (Introduction to the second edition "Prin. of Math.")

Johnson

Mr. Johnson is fully aware of the difficulties that Russell fell into and tries to avoid some of them, but unfortunately he falls into many more of a very serious nature. He does not agree with Russell that the individual is a complete entity whilst the universal is incomplete. Nor does he believe that the universal is a constituent of the particular.¹ For Johnson both the universal and the particular are incomplete in the sense that they cannot be understood apart from each other. If the particular exists, then, according to Johnson, the universal also exists "The terms particular (or substantive) and universal (or adjective) cannot be defined as functioning in isolation but only as they enter into union with one another."¹ And further he maintains that "if the term 'exists' may be predicated equally of a universal as of a particular, then we may agree with the Aristotelian dictum that the universal exists not apart from but in the particular, and by this is meant that the adjective exists, not apart from, but as characterising its substantive; to which must be added that the substantive exists, not apart from, but as characterised by its adjective."²

For Johnson, therefore, two things are clear, first, that both the universal and the particular exist, and secondly, that neither can be understood in isolation, but both must be understood in their union. It is true that they can be separated, as Russell did, by calling the particular 'percept' and therefore existent, and the universal 'concept' and therefore a mere subsistent, but this according to Johnson, is done 'in thought' only. "Now in thought," says Johnson, "the substantive and the adjective may be said to be separately and independently represented,"³ but to him "the existence of the universal not in mere thought but in actuality is so clear that though the matter is difficult to argue because strictly speaking the antithesis between the universal and the particular does not exist in the real yet such an "antithesis" in the sense that the conception of the substantive

1. *Logic* Vol I, p 11

2. *Ibid*, p 12

3 *Ibid*, p 12

apart from the adjective, as well as the conception of the adjective apart from the substantive, equally entail abstraction."¹

So far we can easily follow Johnson in his insistence on the solidarity of the particular and the universal in their unity and in his insistence that they are both existent entities. The position that we maintained in a previous chapter was not different from this. But difficulty begins to appear when he introduces the notion of 'tie'.² This entity called 'tie' is, I must confess, one of the most difficult things that I have met with in Johnson. It does more to introduce confusion than to help us in the resolution of the difficulties under which we are labouring. By using it Johnson desires us to understand that in a proposition the subject and the predicate, the substantive and the adjective, are joined together by means of a copula. It is this function that he calls 'characterisation'.³ By copula he does not mean that the predicate is a part or a constituent of the subject. It only means that the predicate and the subject are brought together in union to function in a proposition. But the serious question is whether the union is brought about externally or whether it is in the very nature of the subject and the predicate thus to enter into a union. From all that we have seen so far, Johnson maintains that the union must not be an external function. We have seen that to separate the particular and the universal is an abstraction. But if they are never actually separated, then they cannot be tied together, and therefore the notion of 'tie' is not only superfluous but also highly misleading.

I shall quote the highly confusing statement of Johnson in this matter when he says that "in order to understand the verbal juxtaposition of substantive and adjective, we must recognise a latent element of form in this construct, which differentiates it from other constructs—which also are necessarily expressed by a juxtaposition of words. This

¹ Op. cit., Vol. II, p. xiv

² Ibid., Vol. I, p. 12

³ Ibid., Vol. I p. 13.

element of form constitutes what I shall call the 'characterising tie.' The general term 'tie' is used to denote what is not a component of a construct, but is involved in understanding the specific form of unity that gives significance to the construct, and the specific term 'characterising' denotes what is involved in understanding the junction of substantive with adjective"¹ If we analyse this statement it means that 'tie' is the 'latent element of form in this construct' and that this form is involved in the 'junction of substantive with adjective' Now if the form of characterisation is latent in the construct, then how the substantive and the adjective can be juxtaposed, and thus how their union is brought about by this characterising tie, is absolutely incomprehensible. A union always implies that the things that enter into the union are at first separate. The notion of tie is intelligible only if such a separation of substantive and adjective is granted.

But this position Johnson does not accept and maintains that such a separation is "an abstraction"² But if so, then the term 'union' is highly misleading and along with it the term 'tie' also should be discarded. By calling it 'specific term' the difficulty is not solved. A philosopher is not expected to cover his difficulties under the cloak of improvised verbal phrases. Mr Johnson should tell us in what sense this term, 'characterising tie', is specific. To say that the universal determines the particular and therefore is a determinant whilst the particular is a determinandum, only adds to the confusion. Two externally united objects do not determine each other. They determine each other only when there is an intimate unity between them to such an extent that the one without the other is a mere abstraction. It is true that Johnson admits this last, but the question is, having admitted all this, whether he has any right to talk about the 'characterising tie'.

It is therefore futile to discover any consistency in Johnson's dealing with the problem. If Russell failed to

1. Loc. cit. p. 10

2. Ibid, Vol II. p. xiv

enlighten us as to how the universal can be a mere incomplete symbol and yet be a constituent, a logical fiction and yet an active function in the complete particular by holding together all the other constituents, Johnson fails to enlighten us as to how the universal can be separate from the particular, a kind of 'wandering adjective' in Bradley's words, and yet be in the particular. He has also failed to make clear how the notion of 'tie' is intelligible if both the universal and the particular are mere abstractions, when taken separately. We can see that the notion of 'tie' is asked to perform two impossible functions. It is a tie because the universal and the particular are both distinct. But it is a tie also because both these are implied in each other. If Johnson is to be consistent, he must maintain either that the substantive and adjective are not separate or that they are. If they are separate then the use of the term 'tie' can be allowed. But if they are not, and that is what he argues, then he has no right to use such a term. What Johnson asserts is that both the substantive and the adjective are implied in each other and that they are not separate. But what he appears to mean is that they are separate and therefore they are brought into union somehow. Such a contradiction can scarcely be expected to help us in the solution of the difficulty.

But this is not the only difficulty. There is another. Our difficulty was how the universal as a predicate representing a 'character' can have all its being in the particular as the subject and at the same time be a function determining the predication of other particulars. On the first part of the difficulty we have seen that Johnson is not at all helpful. But it will be quite obvious that he is equally unhelpful on the other part of the difficulty. If the predicate is distinct from the subject, and when both come together in a proposition they do so only with the help of a tie, then what demands solution is whether in the case of such a union the whole being of the universal is involved or only a part of it.

It must be noted that this difficulty is very serious because Johnson has admitted that universals, just like particulars, also exist. Russell could escape the difficulty by denying existence to universals. No such escape is possible for Johnson. According to him the universal is "a factor in the real" "Thus red or redness," he argues, "abstracted from any specific judgment is held to be universal, but the redness manifested in a particular object of perception, to be itself particular"¹ Here also the main difficulty is covered over by a phrase.

What he says amounts to this, namely, that the universal when 'a factor in the real' is so as a particular. Now this appears to be highly misleading. Does the universal become particular when thus it becomes 'a factor in the real,' and yet remain universal, or is the whole being of the universal exhausted in such a particularisation? For example, let this red be the particular and redness universal. Is this redness completely included in this red patch or only a part of it included? But if the whole being of the redness is included, then what is the meaning of the phrase that it is 'itself particular'? What this might mean is that in this red patch the whole being is included, but since this red patch is a particular and since the whole being of redness is included in this particular red patch, therefore in this sense the universal redness is particularised. But since the universal is distinct from the particular, or, in other words, the redness from this red patch, the question still remains unsolved as to how this redness can be a determinant in other propositions, when its whole being is thus exhausted in such particularisation.

It might be argued that the existence of universal redness is of a different nature from that of the particular red patch. Redness is a subsistent whilst the particular is an existent. But, Johnson does not tell us what sort of existence universals have. According to him redness is abstracted from specific reds, which are particulars, and in that case it must be "separation for thought" only² But if so, then he has

¹ *Logic*, Vol II, p. xiii

² *Ibid.*, p. xiv

to explain how that which exists for thought alone can be 'a factor in the real' An abstraction for thought, even if it were possible, to Johnson does not mean mere nothing as it did to Russell An abstraction also exists according to him. A way thus appears to be made for the discarded Platonism, where the existence of universals in a separate realm is said to have been maintained by Plato If this is what Johnson means then the conclusion is that there are two realms independent of each other and both are equally real If for Plato universals are more real than particulars and for Russell particulars are more real than universals, for Johnson both are equally real and existent Johnson cannot escape this conclusion if to him universals are abstractions and at the same time existent No light is thrown by saying that they exist 'only for thought' The difficulty is aggravated by such explanation, because on such a distinction the relation between thought and empirical existence becomes mysterious If the thought of the red, i.e., redness, is distinct from this red, then it is obvious that the awareness of objects becomes impossible, a kind of Cartesian dualism which could be solved only by invoking the help of a *deus ex machina* He says that the copula is "a characterising tie" as well as "an assertive tie." In the former the predicate is tied to the subject without the intervention of the thinker, whilst in the latter it is the thinker that influences the operation of tying.¹ But what the relation of these two sorts of ties is, is scarcely intelligible.

This unintelligibility is due to his notion of "atomic propositions" which is also highly ambiguous Johnson is

1 This twofold nature of the 'tie' can be compared to a similar distinction in Cook Wilson. In every act of thought we must recognize a twofold aspect. In the first place it appears as an event, when regarded as the activity of a particular thinker, because it happens at a particular time, and is a particular time-order with reference to other events. Again it is connected in this time-order with all those occurrences, physical or mental, which may be said to contribute in any way to the fact that the person thinking thinks a particular thought at that particular time, for example the thinking suggested by the sight of some memorandum we have made. But there is another and a totally distinct aspect in every thought: (this aspect is simply the thinking as thinking about something, an apprehension of something, whether accompanied or not by a conjecture or a question about it.) This aspect is the same whenever the thought occurs and is wholly unaffected by that other aspect of the thought as an event. It is something complete in itself, wholly independent of the time-order as such and of anything which conditions that time-order as a mere time-order — Statement and Inference, Vol. I, pp. 31-32

anxious to maintain the public character of an atomic proposition, and he thus distinguishes it from judgment. But at other times he identifies the atomic proposition with judgment. When it is public it is the 'constitutive' tie that is operative. But when it is not public and is identified with judgment it is the 'assertive' tie that is discovered. And these two ties are never tied together, to the utter confusion of the reader. It is therefore pertinent when Mr Broad caustically remarks that his "propositions in fact seemed to be public and neutral on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and to be private and mind-dependent on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. On Sundays they, no doubt, underwent a higher synthesis in which both these opposed characteristics were absorbed, transmuted and reconciled."¹

It will therefore be quite obvious that the whole treatment of Johnson is highly ambiguous and misleading. His theory combines all the virtues and vices at once. His universals are determinants and at the same time characters without our knowing how. They exist and at the same time they are thought-abstractions and again no one knows how. His copula is both a 'characterising tie' and an 'assertive tie' and we gasp for breath in our attempts to know how. The heroic attempt on the part of Johnson must, therefore, be treated as a great failure, bringing into relief our strong conviction that the problem of the relation between the universal and the particular cannot be solved by such measures.

Johnson had not made up his mind about the exact nature of the substantive and the adjective, the particular and the universal. He believed that a substantive is a particular, *i.e.* self-limiting entity, and that one substantive cannot be another substantive, and that one cannot construct a genuine compound substantive out of simple substantives. Two simple adjectives can be compounded, but two simple substantives cannot. "We may," says Johnson, "properly construct a compound adjective out

1 Broad, 'Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy' Vol. I, pp. 69-70.

of simple adjectives, but the nature of any term functioning as a substantive is such that it is impossible to construct a genuine compound substantive"¹ So a substantive functions as a unique entity. This uniqueness according to him further means that one substantive is different from another substantive. Difference to Johnson implies distinctness or otherness. Many statements can be gathered from his *Logic* to this effect. I shall take only two. "One determinandum," he says, "is one to which its own adjectives may be assigned just because the other must be presented in separation or apart from the one before the most primitive form of articulate judgment is possible."² Further he says that "the first important relation which will be elicited from otherness is, in fact, not any relation of agreement or difference at all, but a temporal or spatial relation; and thus the primitive assertion of otherness is only occasioned and rendered possible from the fact of separateness in presentation"³

This should have landed him in unmitigated pluralism with terms and relation between them. But having gone so far with pluralism by his insistence on the separateness of particulars he refuses to go further. According to him there are only substantives and adjectives, but he does not admit that there are entities called 'relations' that stand between substantives. Relations for him are "transitive adjectives"⁴ This denial of the existence of relations on the other hand should have landed him in monism. And here we see the real trouble which is mainly responsible for his failure. If the substantives are others, then relations must exist. But if relations do not exist, then substantives cannot be mere others. On the first theory substantives become monads, whilst on the adjectival theory of relations they become modes. And when the two versions are brought together for reconciliation, substantives become merely an amorphous stuff,

¹ *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 61

² *Op. cit.* p. Vol. I, p. 21

³ *Ibid.*, p. Vol. I, p. 22

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. Vol. I, p. 204. Russell not only denies this, but treats 'relations' extensively of "Relations, like classes, are to be taken in *extension*."—*Principia Mathematica*, Vol. I, p. 27.

neither modes nor monads. He cannot give up the otherness of the substantives, and shows a great concern to save appearances. But these cannot be saved if the adjectives include relations also. When the otherness of the substantives dominates his thought the adjectives become mere wandering entities. But when the second thought reigns uppermost in his mind the adjectives become determinants. If all the adjectives are made to wander, and if mere otherness is strictly preserved, then substantives become hardly distinguishable from the Lockean substance, mere I-know-not-what. But when these substantives are allowed to be determined by adjectives they come out with all the richness and glory of the concrete individual and are comparable to the secondary substance of Aristotle. Their otherness is lost and they become modes, with their existence not at all affected by spatial and temporal separateness.

Johnson thus cannot decide what nature his substantive ultimately has. In the former case, a substantive 'has' adjectives whilst in the latter case the substantive 'is' adjectives. That the substantive has adjectives appears to him self-evident. And when adjectives are thus 'had' by the substantive they become its property. But when the substantive 'is' nothing more than the unity of adjectives or determinants, the specific nature of property is lost and along with it the question of 'belonging'. Adjectives in this case do not belong to anything which remains distinct from the belongings, just as a man is separate and distinct from the coat which he wears and which belongs to him. There is nothing over and above the adjectives in the substantive. In this case the substantive is a unique relation between adjectives and nothing more. For McTaggart a substantive 'has' adjectives and he refused to identify the relation of 'has' with that of 'is'. Johnson vacillates between these two positions and cannot come to a solution of the problem. An attempt to reconcile these two conflicting tendencies in Johnson will involve a radical change in the whole theory of substantives and adjectives.

with a corresponding change in the exact function of the copula 'is'.

McTaggart

McTaggart, as we said before, believes that the relation between a substantive and its adjectives is that of 'has'¹ in the sense that a substantive has adjectives, whilst for Stout the relation between a substantive and its adjectives is that of 'is' in the sense that a substantive is nothing more than adjectives. It will, therefore, be very interesting and highly instructive to enquire whether these two philosophers can offer a solution of the problem how a universal can be both a character and at the same time a function. Let us examine McTaggart's theory first

According to McTaggart the substantive has adjectives or, as he calls them, characteristics. But by a substantive or a substance McTaggart does not mean what we generally understand by the term. His position will be more clear if we refer at this stage to the distinction between an 'occurrent' and a 'continuant'² McTaggart, however, does not recognise such a distinction. To him it is not the continuant that is the substance but the occurrent.³ We ordinarily call the table a 'substance' because it continues for some time and because it has perspectives which are its occurrents. But for McTaggart the table will mean only a group of substances and not a substance. According to him it will be a compound substance. This distinction between what we ordinarily call a substance and what McTaggart calls a substance would have been irrelevant for our purpose had it not been for the fact that it is upon this distinction that he bases his principle of 'Endless Divisibility.'

What this principle means is that any substance is a compound substance and that it has parts which can never be simple, however far the division is carried. He agrees with Russell and defines a substance "as having qualities

1 "The Nature of Existence," p. 68

2 "Logic" Vol. II, p. xi-xii

3 "The Nature of Existence," p. 73.

and relations without being itself a quality and a relation."¹ He further agrees with Russell that a substance 'has parts within parts to infinity'² much as Russell reduced ordinary objects of perception to 'logical simples'. Hence for McTaggart any substance is not only actually compound but it cannot be simple, *a priori*.

In this he differs from Leibniz³ according to whom monads are simple substances. But to McTaggart this principle of infinite divisibility is not applicable to characteristics. Though a substance is never simple, a characteristic is always composed of simple characteristics.⁴ This difference between a substance and characteristic in the matter of divisibility allows McTaggart to maintain the thesis that a substance has characteristics without its being different from them. If the substances were reduced to simples or, in other words, if there were simple substances as there are according to him simple characteristics, the relation of 'has' between a substance and its characteristics would be impossible. Since the substance 'has' characteristics it means that the substance is a surd, something that exists over and above all the characteristics.

However, "the substance," says McTaggart, "is made this substance by its nature, and if the nature is the same, the substance is the same."⁵ This, therefore, offers a curious problem. If the substance is made by its nature, that is, by its characteristics, it is impossible to understand how the substance can be different from its characteristics in the sense that the substance 'has' characteristics. If the substance 'has' characteristics in the sense that the substance is never simple, whilst the characteristics are always ultimately simple, then the only other alternative is that a substance is a thing-in-itself which owns its characteristics and

1. "The Nature of Existence," p. 68

2. Loc. cit. p. 182, note 1

3. "The Monadology"—"The monad, is nothing but a simple substance which enters into compounds simple, that is to say, without parts" cl. 1

4. "For it seems to me that the possibility of a characteristic being both real and simple can be seen to depend on its being a characteristic. This would support the view that a substance cannot be both real and simple."—"The Nature of Existence" pp. 184-5.

5. Loc. cit. p. 96.

remains distinct from them. On the first alternative a substance is a complex whole composed of attributes or characteristics interrelated in a peculiar way, a position developed by Stout, which McTaggart rejects¹ But he also rejects the other alternative² It is therefore impossible to know exactly what is the nature of the substance which 'has' the characteristics Since the principle of 'endless divisibility' is not applicable to characteristics, but is applicable only to substances, the difference must be profound But McTaggart nowhere gives us any better help as to the exact difference than he has given us, on the ground that a substance 'has' the characteristics whilst itself is never a characteristic It is impossible to know whether a linguistic usage can be such as to be capable of supporting the structure of a philosophical theory But McTaggart does believe that apart from other arguments, it is quite obvious to anyone that a substance is distinct from its characteristics, and that the relation between itself and its characteristics is that of 'has' and not that of simple 'is'.

Let us, however, grant that the relation between the substance and its characteristics is that of 'has' in the sense explained above And in this sense, when in the proposition 'this flower is red' red is the characteristic of the flower, what it amounts to is that the 'red' is possessed by the flower and that the flower is distinct from it though not a thing-in-itself So far the problem of predication may be taken to be intelligible But when it is asserted that 'that flower also is red' and further that 'all flowers are red' what is the relation between 'redness' and all flowers, or, in other words what is the relation between the nature of predication implying character and that of function? According to McTaggart it is the same redness that is in all the particulars that are red, and when all these flowers are called red the relation between all these is therefore that of 'exact similarity' Redness is therefore a common

¹ Thus we may reply to Dr Stout's question as to what it is which is related by giving the qualities of the substance. Smith, who is related is happy, he is also a man and so on. — 'The Nature of Existence' pp. 70-71

² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

characteristic that is found in different particulars Surely McTaggart does not mean that 'redness' is a name. To him qualities exist as much as substances exist¹ Nor could he mean that the red of this flower is one simple quality, and the red of that flower is another simple quality, on the principle that qualities can be divided into simple qualities If that were the case there should not be common qualities and the relation of 'exact similarity' due to common quality would not hold So by 'common quality' he means one indivisible quality that is the same in this flower as in that.

Now if this interpretation is correct, it is very difficult to understand how there can be 'dissimilarity of the diverse' with each substance having its 'exclusive description.' According to McTaggart no two substances are identical² This may mean that they are similar in some respects but dissimilar in others. This flower may be similar to that flower in that both have red colour while in other respects they ~~are~~ are dissimilar But when one substance is said to have 'exclusive description' it is difficult to understand how this 'exclusiveness' can be reconciled with the notion of exact similarity of certain qualities This could be intelligible only on two grounds It might mean that substances are dissimilar though some or all the characteristics are 'exactly similar' This would force him to admit that there are substances in the sense that they are things-in-themselves, or it might mean that all the characteristics are distinct from one another, and that they are externally grouped together in each substance. This alternative is rejected by him on his principle of 'Extrinsic Determination.'³ On this principle a substance is what it is because of its charac-

1. "We are certainly aware of the quality of redness which we attribute to the table for otherwise the statement that the table is red would mean nothing to us and the only way we can be aware of it is by perception" "The Nature of Existence", Vol II, p. 58

2. "We must adhere to our view that diversity implies dissimilarity, and that all substances must be dissimilar to one another"—"The Nature of Existence", Vol. I p. 100

3. "Since all qualities of a substance extrinsically determine one another, it follows that all characteristics of a substance intrinsically determine one another For if any relationship in which a substance stands were different from what it is, then one of its qualities—the quality of standing in that relationship—would be different from what it is" "The Nature of Existence, Vol. I, p. 114"

teristics, and this substance ceases to be this substance if there is any change in its characteristics. Now if we take both the principles, namely, that of 'Exclusive Description' and that of 'Extrinsic Determination' together, we find that they result in there being no characteristic that is 'exactly similar' to any other characteristic in another substance

Let us take A and B as two flowers, and let x be the redness in both that makes their 'reds' exactly similar. The first flower will be denoted by Ax and the second by Bx. By the principle of the 'Dissimilarity of the Diverse' A and B are mutually exclusive. A and B are two and not one. They are dissimilar. Let A have other characteristics which describe it sufficiently, say, pqr, and let B have similar characteristics, abc. A therefore 'has' characteristics p q r x, while B has the characteristics a b c x. The relation between p q r x is so close that any change in a or b or c or x will involve corresponding changes in the rest. The same is true of B. Now, when so much is postulated, is it intelligible to hold that the x of A will be 'exactly similar' to the x of B?

It might be urged that even though x in A is determined by abc there yet remains something absolutely simple, say xn, which is the same in both A and B. In other words the relation between this xn and other characteristics is external and not internal as required by the principle of Extrinsic Determination. But in this case apart from contradicting the principle of 'Extrinsic Determination,' which according to McTaggart is universal, it raises the further problem as to the relation of xn in A with the common quality, the universal, to the xn in B with the same universal. Somehow both these xns have to be related to the common quality X. Either the relation between X and xn in A will be the same as the relation between X and xn in B, in which case both A and B will be identical in so far as they have the common characteristic; or, if ~~the~~ 'dissimilarity of the diverse' is to be rigorously insisted

upon, these relations will involve an infinite regress and the question of exact similarity can never arise.

Now we have already seen reason to reject the theory of resemblance on which this notion of 'exact similarity' could be based. We saw above that mere resemblance is a psychological category, and that resemblance cannot work unless identity is presupposed. We said that two things resemble each other because they are identical, and that they are not identical because they resemble each other. The same reasoning applies to the notion of 'exact similarity'. But this reasoning cannot be relevant to the argument advanced by McTaggart because, as contrasted with nominalists, he admits the existence of the 'common quality,' the universal, which the nominalists did not admit.

This makes the position of McTaggart very difficult to understand. To him the universal, the common quality, that is found in particulars, is, I believe, a class-concept. "A class," according to him, is determined by a class-concept. This concept consists of one or more qualities, and everything that possesses these qualities is a member of that class."¹ So it appears that redness is the class-concept of which these two reds are members having the relation of 'exact similarity'. In this he appears to follow Russell very closely. Now, is not all this circular?²

"One class is said to be similar to another when there is a one-to-one relation of which the one class is the domain, while the other class is the converse domain."³ But when the one-to-one relation is defined, the definition of similarity is tacitly involved "A relation is said to be one-to-one when if x has the relation in question to y , no other term x^1 has the same relation to y , and x does not have the same relation to any term y^1 , other than y ."⁴ If we take both these statements side by side the vicious circle is apparent. A relation therefore is similar because it is one-to-one and

1. Loc. cit., p. 130

2. "Such a definition has a verbal appearance of being circular, but in fact it is not."
—Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 19. I do not believe that, in spite of Russell, it is not

3. *Ibid.*, p. 16

4. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

the relation is one-to-one because it is similar. It is not possible to avoid this once the universal is made distinct from particulars and particulars are made distinct from each other. We have seen that according to McTaggart all the particulars are diverse, which means numerically distinct from one another. If therefore the particulars are numerically distinct from one another, and also distinct from the common quality, the universal, an escape from the vicious circle is impossible. His theory that a universal is a common quality that is in different particulars must therefore break down.

It will therefore be evident that McTaggart has failed to solve our difficulty how the universal can characterise the particular and at the same time be a function. He has failed to enlighten us on the exact nature of predication, which he describes as the substantive 'having' the predicates and not 'being' the predicates. On examination we find that either the substantive tends to become a thing-in-itself or that it fails to maintain its separate existence by which the relation of 'has' can in any way be substantiated¹. It is not clear how characteristics characterise the substantive, nor is it clear how the universal characterises particulars. And between these two extremes the position of particulars and characteristics seems to be very mysterious. When characteristics belong to their respective substantives they seem to be unmindful of the universal. But when they are characterised by universals they do not seem to be owned by their respective substantives. We see the same difficulty in Johnson when he distinguishes some adjectives as determinables and some as not. According to him colour is a 'determinable'² in such a proposition as 'red is a colour.' But further he thought that 'human' is not a 'determinable' though it is a 'determinant' of 'Plato' in the proposition 'Plato is human.' And for want of clear insight into the difference there appears to be an irreconcilable dualism in McTaggart as in Johnson, which no ingenuity can overcome.

¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 97-101
² *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 176

CHAPTER VI

SOME MODERN THEORIES EXAMINED

(Continued)

Stout

PROF. STOUT has put forward a very interesting doctrine of universals which seems to escape the difficulties we encounter in McTaggart's theory. We have seen that McTaggart's theory introduces a dualism parallel to that of Kant. According to Kant an ordinary object of perception involves a dual synthesis. One kind of synthesis of the sense-manifold is effected by the 'object', which he sometimes calls 'thing-in-itself'. But he also maintains that without the influence of categories such a synthesis is impossible. And the relation between these two types of synthesis is not clearly explained by him. What the exact relation of the 'object' with the 'synthetic unity of apperception' which works on the sense-manifold with the help of *a priori* categories is, is left obscure.

Stout, therefore, begins by denying two things that led to dualism in McTaggart. He differs from McTaggart in that he believes that the relation between the substantive and adjectives is not that of 'has' but that of 'is'.¹ There is, according to him, no entity that 'has' adjectives or characteristics and itself stands apart from them. It is a complex whole composed of attributes related in a peculiar way. It is not the Lockean substance, bearer of attributes, nor is it the Kantian thing-in-itself. If you analyse substance you will find nothing more than qualities. You will not find something that stands apart from these qualities and which owns these qualities. The substance of McTaggart was such an owner of qualities and thus was responsible for the dualism.

1. "What, then, is the subject itself as distinguished from the attributes? It would seem that its whole being must consist in being that to which its attributes belong."—Stout, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1914-15 p. 350.

The second point is that the attributes of any substance are not themselves universal but are particular, just as this substance, say table, is a particular.¹ Russell had maintained that every grammatical subject that represented an object had at least one constituent that was a universal. Stout denies this. According to him the red of this flower is a particular. The particularity of the object flower is analysable into the particularity of its attributes. To say that redness characterises this flower, as if the universal redness was somehow in the character or was its attribute, is an error. All the attributes of a substance are particular. They are just where the substance is. To say that a particular substance occupies space is another and a shorter rendering of the fact that there are particular qualities somehow related in a peculiar unity, all of which occupy space. So according to Stout attributes can occupy space and endure through time.² He criticises Russell for calling them spaceless and timeless. He complains that Russell "disjoins particulars and universals as two intrinsically independent realms of experience. He finds it possible to do this because for him qualities and relations are, as such, universals. Inasmuch as they are universals they cannot in any way form part of the being of the particular things which they qualify or relate"³

This thesis that attributes are particulars and are where the substance is, would logically involve Stout in the position of nominalism, on which theory universals are mere names and all the attributes are mere percepts. But Stout maintains that it is not so. He is not a nominalist, neither does his theory, he argues, logically land him in nominalism. He urges that though

"Agreeing with the nominalist that characters are particulars as the things or substances which they characterise, the inference I draw from the thesis is not that there are really no universals, but that the universal is a distributive unity."⁴

1 "A character characterising a concrete thing or individual is as particular as the thing or individual which it characterises." *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, p. 386.

2 "The roundness, smoothness and whiteness of one ball is locally separate from the roundness, smoothness and whiteness of the other." *Ibid.*, pp. 388-90.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 402-3.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 388.

So according to Stout universals exist. They are not mere names. But for him they are distributive unities. This is the third point in the thesis of Stout and by far the most important and the most original.

I shall examine Stout's doctrine of 'distributive unity,' which is the most debatable point in his theory. Now what does Stout mean by this unity and what are its distinctive features? First of all, he holds that this unity is an *a priori* category, and indeed the most fundamental. What he means by this unity can be made more clear if we contrast it with some other unities that are not distributive.

According to Bradley and Bosanquet a unity always implies identity in difference. A unity is always found in diversity. The best illustration of a unity is the human organism, where the body and organs respectively imply unity in diversity. You cannot understand the body without the organs that are its parts. The human body is not a mere collection of organs but it is a unity of such a unique type that an organ, if removed from the body, ceases to be an organ and becomes, as Aristotle said, a mere abstraction. Every organ performs a peculiar function of such a nature that it contributes to the functioning of the body as a whole, and the whole body holds together all the organs in such a manner that even a slight change in the one will be reflected in corresponding changes in all the other organs and therefore in the body as a whole. So for Bradley and Bosanquet the best illustration of unity can be found in an organic unity. A collection is not such an organic unity. All the units in a collection do not perform such functions as the bodily organs perform. The addition or diminution of one unit in the collection does not affect the collection as a whole nor the remaining units, as the cutting off of a limb from a body does.

But according to Stout this kind of unity is not a unity of the distributive type. But neither does Stout mean by his unity a unity generated through resemblance. According to him resemblance cannot generate identity; on the contrary, it must presuppose identity. First of all, for Stout

resemblance, being a relation, presupposes a complex unity within which the terms resembling one another have any significance.¹ Secondly, on the resemblance theory it is not possible, he argues, to use universal propositions of the type 'All men are mortal' as was done by Mill. Against Mill for example, Stout argues,

"Consider the example 'all triangles'. It may be said that this means all shapes that resemble each other in a certain respect. But such formulas presuppose that the word 'all' has a meaning of its own that cannot be reduced to relations of similarity. It is precisely the concept of distributive unity that remains unexplained."²

He further argues,

"Hence, in the mouth of the nominalist the answer can only mean that the figures must resemble each other inasmuch as they are all triangles, members of 'class triangular figures'. This is plainly a vicious circle, when what requires to be explained is precisely the meaning of the words 'class' or 'kind'."³

Some light, therefore, can be said to have been thrown by Stout on what he calls 'distributive unity'. It is not a unity comparable to the unity in diversity of the idealists. Neither is it to be compared with the 'shorthand formula' of Mill derived from the resemblance between particulars. Its distinctive feature lies, firstly, in being a unity not derived from resemblance. But here his agreement with the idealists stops. Whilst for the idealists, members of the unity are parts of the whole, just as the species are parts of the genus, to Stout members of this unity are not such parts but they are the instances of a class.

What Stout desires to emphasise by thus insisting on the category of 'instances of a class' rather than on that of the 'part and the whole' is that, whilst in the latter parts are not independent of each other, and thus distinct, but are identical in so far as they are parts of the whole, the instances of a class are not such parts of the whole in the sense that they are identical with each other as the

1 Op. cit. p. 384
 2 Ibid. p. 387
 3 Ibid. p. 388

parts of an organic whole are. A hand and a leg in so far as they are parts of the body are not independent of each other, but there is a very close interdependence, so that any change in the one will result in a change in the other. If the organs of the body were instances of a class, then there would not be such a close interdependence, and any change in the one need not result in change in the others.

Take as an illustration 'the class' of flowers. The destruction of one flower does not in any way reflect change in the class 'flower' as such. Many flowers bloom unseen but this fact has nothing to do with the notion of the 'class' flowers. If the class of flowers were an organic unity then the destruction even of one flower would bring about some change in the unity of the 'class' of flowers, just as any change in one of the organs would result in a corresponding change in the rest of the body. The difference between the notion of 'class' and that of 'organic unity' is so clear as to need no further analysis. The most distinctive feature of the former is that it ensures independence of the members that make the class, while in the latter the independence of the individual members is non-existent.

In other words by calling the universal a class what Stout wishes to gain is the numerical difference of individual objects. This flower and that flower are numerically different. There is no unity 'floweriness' of which these two flowers are parts just as the organs are the parts of the body. But, secondly he does not agree with those who base their notion of 'class' on the resemblance or the similarity of the individual members of the class. Russell, for example, believes that the notion of 'class' is based on similarity between the members of the class, and at the same time considers the notion to be fundamental.

Now if Stout had maintained that his notion of universal as being a 'class' was similar to that of Russell, it would be ridiculous to say that his distributive unity was a

fundamental category and that it was something novel. But, as we saw before, Stout as against nominalists maintains that universals do exist. But if they are classes then on the interpretation of the notion 'class', as based on that of the distributive unity of the members, the process of "instantiation" would involve an infinite regress. For example, let redness be the universal. If it is a class, and if the reason why this red is a red, and that red is a red, is that this red was compared to that red in order to discover similarity between two, then either the universal would be a derivation from this process of comparison, or, if the relation between the red and the universal redness is that of 'being instance of' then this relation itself would demand another relation of 'being-instance-of-instance-of' and so forth, and would thus be on the path of a vicious regress. This is inevitable because in spite of his notion of unity, 'class' is a quantitative notion and as such, as said before, every member is externally related to others, and further there is no quality common to them all. This would not be so if the distributive unity were a system, where every part implied the whole and the whole was implied in every part. But Stout, in the interests of the numerical identity of the members of the class, repudiates this and therefore has to meet the prospect of an infinite regress.

Now to avoid this infinite regress Stout urges that it is not necessary in order to know that this is red that there should be another red for the purpose of comparison. When the first red is seen the redness, the universal, is simultaneously known. When the first red is seen what is apprehended is this red, along with the other fact that this is an instance of the universal redness. On the orthodox notion of 'class' this immediate notion of the red as being an instance of redness would be impossible. There redness would be regarded as an abstraction because it would actually be the product of comparison. Nor does this recognition of the first red as an instance of redness involve an infinite regress.

The reasons advanced by Stout are, first, that the class of characters is not constituted in the same manner as a class of things Stout says

"A thing belongs to a certain class only because a character of a certain kind is predicable of it. But, we cannot, without moving in a vicious circle, go on to say that the characters themselves can belong to classes or kinds, only because other kinds of characters are predicable of them What I maintain, therefore, is that qualities and relations belong to classes or kinds just because they are qualities and relations Characters, as such, are instances of universals, and this fact is just what makes so plausible the false statement that they are themselves universals"¹

Hence on Stout's theory the following facts emerge: firstly, that the universal is a unity, not organic, but distributive. An organic unity is a non-distributive unity. Secondly, the unity being distributive, every character which is a member of this distributive unity or class is numerically different Thirdly, the relation of every particular to the universal is that of 'being an instance of' and this relation is fundamental and is not derived from a prior comparison of the things to which the character belongs On this theory, Stout urges, the numerical difference of the particulars is guaranteed without resorting to the theory of similarity as on the orthodox view. The defect of the orthodox view is that it had to presuppose the unity which it sought to derive from similarity, and thus moved in a vicious circle The defect of the organic or non-distributive type of unity is that it ignored the numerical difference of particulars and made them moments of one whole It is only the distributive unity that secures the virtues of both the conflicting theories without including their vices.

As against those who believe in the orthodox view of similarity he would argue that their notion of similarity is narrow, and that there is another notion—a broader one—where the things may be similar even though there are no points of similarity parallel to the similarity found in

¹ Arist Soc Sup., Vol III, p. 116.

reds All the parts of a chair are similar to each other in virtue of the fact that they contribute individually to the functioning of the whole, though there is no 'similarity' in the parts as required by the orthodox view Hence things may be 'similar' though there are no points of agreement in them which can be known by direct inspection That all the reds thus agree in having points of agreement is only a special case of the notion of similarity. Stout assures us that even this type of similarity can be easily explained on his theory of similarity.¹ As against those who maintain that all unities are of the non-distributive type, he argues that a table is not a universal of which all the parts are particulars. This table is not a universal, and the parts of this table, e.g., its legs, are not particulars What is universal is 'tableness', which is identical in all the objects that are called tables and which are its instances There is no tableness as distinct from tables just as there is no 'colour' as distinct from 'red', 'yellow' etc The tableness is identical in all the tables, but the table is not identical in the same sense in all the parts of the table Though the notion of distributive unity may be implied in that of non-distributive unity, it is not identical with it and must be given separate cognisance. The one is similar to the unity of the organ, the other is similar to that of a class In the one, parts are not numerically different, whilst in the other they are numerically different In the one, the universal does not repeat itself identically in all particulars, in the other such identical repetition is possible

I shall not raise the issue whether this notion of similarity in the broader sense is really more fundamental than what he calls similarity in the narrower sense. But one point can be immediately admitted, that Stout is quite right in his insistence that similarity presupposes the notion of identity, and therefore an attempt to establish

¹ Compare Johnson, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 173, ff. who holds similar views "Colour is metaphorically speaking, that from which the specific determinates, red, yellow, green, etc., emanate while from shape emanate another completely different series of determinates such as triangular, square, octagonal, etc." Johnson however is not prepared to apply the same reasoning to substantive class names

identity on similarity involves a vicious circle. The question, however, that is relevant for our purpose is whether his notion of distributive unity, implying, further, the position of particulars as instances of the universal, is free from difficulties.

Now when he says that the red of this flower is an instance of redness just as the red of that flower is also an instance of the same identical redness, this hardly seems to be consistent with his insistence that characters as particulars are numerically different. According to Stout both the reds are numerically different. What is identical is the universal redness. Now if the redness is identical, what can Stout mean when he says that characters are numerically different? Our difficulty was how redness, the universal, could remain identical and at the same time characterise different particulars? Stout instead of answering our difficulty repeats the difficulty in a round-about way and tries to evade the issue by calling it 'ultimate'.¹ If the two reds are numerically different because they are specific reds redness also should be different in the numerically different reds and as such would be incapable of functioning identically in all the particulars. But, if on the other hand, the universal repeats itself identically in all the particulars which are its instances, then particulars cannot be numerically different from each other, because then they will cease to be specific instance.² Either, therefore, the notion of the universal being a class should be given up, or the universal must be admitted to be a mere abstraction derived from

1. "The distributive unity of a class or kind is an ultimate and un-analysable type of unity"—*Studies*, p. 387. Further he explains "A relation of above and below as subsisting between a and b presupposes a spatial complex including both a and b and the spatial relation between them. In like manner, resemblance presupposes a complex unity of the peculiar type which I call the distributive unity of a class"—*Ibid*, p. 388.

2. Mrs Helen Knight reports a discussion with Moore on this point in the following passage in *Mind*, 1938, p. 54. "Moore has put the case against this analysis in its most serious form, namely, that 'instance' as used by Stout is meaningless. And if he is right then the claim that characters are particulars is also meaningless. How would Stout answer this objection? It is clear that he cannot point to any meaning of 'instance' in actual usage. It is a question of whether he himself is attaching a meaning to it. I think he would appeal to inspection, and we might put his case like this. Consider two patches A and B that exactly resemble each other in colour. Then this (referring to the colour of A) is one instance, and that (referring to the colour of B) is another. But Moore points out that *this* does not name anything different from 'that', and since Stout says that there are two instances he has not succeeded in giving a meaning to the word."

the particulars. In the former case the universal will cease to be a distributive unity and will become a unity of the non-distributive type, a position held by Bradley and Bosanquet; in the latter he must side with the nominalists and maintain that universals are mere names and therefore are not distributive unities, which according to him are *a priori* and therefore fundamental. On the latter theory the fundamental character of the distributive unity will have disappeared and along with it the broader notion of similarity which is contrasted with what is called the narrower notion.

It is very difficult to understand how the indivisible character of the universal which repeats itself unchanged in particulars can yet remain indivisible and identical when particulars are numerically different. What Stout does is that he dogmatically asserts that the universal must function as identical in numerically different particulars because the notion that the universal is a distributive unity is 'ultimate'. But the viciousness of the argument is clear when it is remembered that the notion of the distributive unity is made plausible by him because such a repetitive identity is assumed.¹ A universal therefore is a distributive unity because it repeats itself in numerically different particulars; and it repeats itself in numerically different particulars because it is such a distributive unity. But what Stout has so far not succeeded in proving is how the universal can remain indivisible and at the same time identical in different particulars. Our main difficulty was precisely this, and what Stout has done is that he has merely assumed that such a difficulty does not in any way affect his novel notion of distributive unity. He has therefore not offered any solution of the difficulty, and to that extent has failed to offer any solution to the problem of universals.

1. In this connection compare the two following passages: "It is precisely the concept of distributive unity that remains unexplained." *Studies*, p. 387. "What I maintain therefore is that qualities and relations belong to classes or kinds just because they are qualities and relations."—*Proc. Arist. Soc. Sup.*, Vol. p. 116. This means, to put it in simple language, that the distributive unity is distributive because it refers to qualities and relations, and qualities and relations are instances of the distributive unity because they are qualities and relations.

If it is urged that the difficulty is meaningless and therefore Stout is not bound to answer it, on the ground that a universal is a determinable and particulars are its determinates, and therefore this relation is self-evident and must be accepted, (just as it is meaningless to ask for the exact relation of identity-in-difference as if identity could be intelligible without differences and differences could be intelligible without identity) the answer would be that Stout has forfeited his claim to such consideration because according to him particulars are numerically distinct, inasmuch as they occupy different space-time contexts. Stout, unlike McTaggart, maintains that space and time are real and that they are *fundamenta divisionis*. This flower is numerically different from that flower because this flower occupies this space and that flower occupies that space. As against McTaggart such an objection would have been irrelevant. But not so as against Stout or Johnson. Johnson could at least escape on the plea that universals are thought-constructions, though, as we have seen, this plea makes the theory all the more confusing. But no such pleas are intelligible and acceptable if advanced by Stout. For Stout the universal is not a thought-abstraction, neither are space and time mere phenomena. If, therefore, particulars are numerically different because they occupy different space-time contexts, then Stout should explain how the universal that repeats itself in these numerically different particulars can maintain its identical nature. The question still remains to be answered, how the same identical universal can appear in the 'many'?

I shall raise another difficulty that threatens to destroy the very basis of the 'distributive unity.' So far we have seen that Stout is not at all helpful in enlightening us on the nature of the universal as a function. What light does he throw on the nature of predication? When this patch is declared to be red, it is, as a character, an instance of the universal redness. Now what is the exact nature

of this relation 'instance of'?' This is an important question.

According to Stout this red patch is a particular, and it will be illegitimate to say that redness somehow is part of its being if the universal is a distributive unity as explained by him. Further, distributive unity is an identity not derived from the common characters of particulars. It is fundamental. But it must be distinguished from the unity of the non-distributive type because it does not in any way affect the members of the unity, and leaves them numerically different. Now, if this unity neither signifies the notion of identity-in-difference of the idealists, wherein the unity characterises particulars, nor signifies any general character between particulars, then what type of unity is it, and what is the precise relation of this unity to the different members that enter into it? That it is not of the latter kind is insisted upon by him when he urges that this unity typifies a broader view of similarity, according to which the parts of a table may be said to be similar because they together function in the unity and rejects the orthodox notion of similarity as based on common characteristics as a narrower notion. But having rejected these two possible interpretations of unity and also looking to the fact that according to him the universal repeats itself identically in all particulars, the only alternative that seems to me to be valid is that it is merely a name. We have seen that according to Russell the universal, though a constituent of the particular, does not affect the completeness of the grammatical subject because the universal is a mere incomplete symbol and can repeat itself in an infinite number of predications without in any

1 Mrs Knight in the article referred to above explains the ambiguity in this notion in the following passage. "I shall start by discussing two senses in which he uses the word 'character,' for unless we see that he is using it in these two senses we shall not be able to understand his claims. Understanding of them has in fact been impeded because he himself does not point them out. And pointing out is required because we are not concerned with a well-established and consequently obvious difference. On the contrary, we get the impression that the word is being used in one sense only. In other words, saying that two things are red is a specific case of saying that two things share in a common character. Thus red is a character, a common character in which particular things share. And, according to Stout, when we say a thing is red we are saying that it has a character which is an instance of a certain class. Thus an instance is a character. But red is certainly not an instance, and thus Stout is using 'character' in two senses, the sense in which red is a character, and the sense in which an instance is a character"—pp 45-46

way raising the problem of how the one can be at the same time many. But Stout does believe that he is not a nominalist, and one of the virtues of the distributive unity is that according to him it saves him from landing in nominalism

But, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, I am afraid this distributive unity¹ lands him in a position which he abhors. According to him various colours red, green, yellow, have no character in common. But, if these have nothing in common, why are they called colours at all? And if they are called colours, is it not because the word 'colour' is not a mere name, a linguistic symbol? I do not know what else it could be

However, Stout, through sheer logical necessity comes very near to the notion of an organic unity when he says that the universal is "the unity of a class or kind as including its members or instances," just as the body is the whole of the organs which are its members. Here Stout appears to hold the view that the identity is of the non-distributive type since he maintains that the unity 'includes' its members¹. It is, therefore very curious to note that in this passage he appears to interpret "class" intensionally and not extensionally as is done by Russell. He, it is thus obvious, tries to reconcile two contradictory positions at once. When he insists upon the numerical difference of particulars the "class" becomes extensional, and distributive unity becomes an incomplete symbol, or a name. But on the other hand when he insists upon the fundamental nature of the category of identity, which is an intensional whole, the particulars cease to be numerically different and his distributive unity tends to be absorbed in a unity of the non-distributive type. Obviously, this inner contradiction is fatal to the theory and cannot offer us any guidance in the solution of our difficulties.

¹ Also "what I really hold is that there is a certain supra-relational form of unity which may be called unity of kind. But this peculiar form of unity, like every other, is the unity of multiplicity comprehending terms in distinctly characteristic relations" *Op. cit.*, p. VII

Similar contradictions are also apparent if we look at the theory from another point of view. It is obvious that according to Stout the notion of substance is another name for that complex unity among characteristics. There is no substance that 'has' the characteristics, but the substance 'is' the characteristics. I shall use the term *continuant* for substance, and *occurrents* for characteristics. A *continuant*, therefore, is a complex unity of *occurrents*. This table as a *continuant* does not repeat itself in all the *occurrents* just as redness repeats itself in all the reds or tableness repeats itself in all the tables. This table is a substance, whilst redness is not a substance. The *occurrents* are constitutive of the *continuant* but tables are not constitutive of 'tableness.' We have already seen that Stout is not clear on this point, but this is what he ought to mean if his statements about the nature of the distributive type of unity are to be rigorously insisted upon.

Now if these *occurrents* are such as to belong to the non-distributive type of unity the position of these *occurrents* becomes very difficult to understand. As instances of the universal they contribute to a unity of distributive type, while as *occurrents* of the *continuant* they contribute to a unity of non-distributive type. Their nature thus appears to be dual. It cannot be consistently maintained that when they are said to be instances they are merely particulars of qualities, just as reds are particulars of redness, while when they are said to be *occurrents* they are not mere qualities but events having a nature different from that of qualities. But this plea is useless, because according to Stout a substance is nothing apart from qualities. The *occurrents* are, therefore, not events as distinguished from particulars of qualities. A particular as a characteristic has exactly the same nature as an *occurrent*. If so, it is very difficult to understand how the same entity as a character can possess a nature absolutely different from that possessed by the same entity as an *occurrent*.

It is not possible to understand what exactly Stout's position ultimately is. His notion of substance, his notion of distributive unity, his insistence on the spatial and numerical difference of particulars, all these are too inconsistent with each other ever to admit of any reconciliation. They collide with each other, and it is obvious that no consistent theory can emerge out of these conflicting elements. He must either admit that particulars are spatially different, and, universals therefore, are mere names, or that universals are real unities, identities in the true sense of the term, and give up his notion of numerical difference. His frantic efforts to cling to both these contradictory positions at once only succeed in involving the theory in total destruction.

Moore

It will not be out of place if a few remarks are added on the theory maintained by Moore, who attempts to persuade us that particulars may be numerically different and yet the result need not be nominalism. What we urged against Stout was that numerical difference of particulars based on their spatial difference leads to nominalism. According to Moore nominalism can be avoided even with the numerical difference of particulars, provided some improvements are introduced into the theory of Stout.

Moore does not agree with Stout in his notion of distributive unity. Nor does he seem to agree with the attempts of Stout to liquidate the notion of substance and introduce in its place a mere complex unity of qualities that are particulars. In criticising Stout, Moore points out that it is a large assumption on his part "that absolutely specific characters can really be 'locally separate' in the same sense in which 'concrete things' are so."¹

In other words Moore does not agree with Stout in denying the existence of substance that 'has' characteristics, and believes that two substances are spatially separate and that their spatial separateness cannot be

1. Proc. Arist. Soc. Sup., Vol. 1923, p. 107.

reduced to that of the characteristics that belong to them. In other words, Moore does not agree that if substances are spatially separate, their characters should be spatially separate also. According to him 'the grey of this coat is exactly similar to the grey of that coat'¹ and there is no need to introduce the notion of both being 'instances of' greyness as a 'distributive unity' as is done by Stout. To Stout the notion of exact similarity was not intelligible because he assumed that if things are separate, their qualities must be different.

According to Stout that 'a common quality is indivisibly single'² or that it 'belongs indivisibly to everything it characterises'³ or that it is a singular term 'standing for a single positive quantity,'⁴ is wrong. But to Moore it is quite obvious that characters or qualities differ from concrete things in that they transcend this local separation and maintain their identity. Qualities, according to Moore, "spread undivided, operate unspent"⁵

Further, Moore points out "that there is one well-established usage of the expression 'is a universal,' which is such that in that sense, every character without exception is quite certainly a universal that sense, in which 'is a universal' is simply logically equivalent to 'is either predicable of something or is a relation'"⁶ In this sense, therefore, the very definition of the universal gives the lie to the whole thesis of Stout and removes the main barrier which Stout believed to be insuperable. Once this precise nature of the universal is understood the difficulty in the acceptance of the notion of exact similarity which Stout repudiated disappears also. Hence, in place of the notion of 'instance of,' Moore reverts to the orthodox notion of 'exact similarity' between particulars.

But does not this involve reference to the Universal? The two greys may be exactly similar but are they not 'exactly

1 "Identity" *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1900-1, p. 110 ff.

2 *Studies*, p. 385

3 *Ibid.*, p. 395

4 *Ibid.*, p. 397

5 *Proc. Arist. Soc. Sup.*, Vol. 192J.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 113

'similar' because they are both related to the universal 'greyness'? And if they are thus related, then does not this involve a vicious circle? We have already drawn attention to this fact when we criticised McTaggart. We agreed that two greys were exactly similar to each other because there was greyness in them,¹ (not in the spatial sense, of course), and these were related to greyness while the notion of greyness could be understood only because it was thus particularised in greys. On the notion of exact similarity this clearly involves a vicious circle. But Moore believes that this is not the case because the relation between this grey and that grey is not the same as the relation between this grey and greyness. Between two numerically different particulars the notion involved is that of 'exact similarity,' while the relation involved between a universal and a particular is an 'unnamable' relation which it appears Moore cannot make more clear. And according to him both these relations are different and thus do not involve a vicious circle.³ The viciousness would follow only if both these notions could not be made intelligible without the one implying the other. In that case it would be illegitimate to maintain that particulars are numerically different from each other and also different from the universal.

He, therefore, agrees with Stout that particulars are numerically different. He also further agrees with him that particulars are different from the universal. But his differences with Stout are these: first, he does not agree with him, that because particulars are numerically different, therefore, they are not exactly similar, and, secondly, he denies that because the universal is different from particulars the relation between the universal and particulars is that of 'instance of' rather than, a 'nameless,'⁴ relation,

1. Compare Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed. p. 537. "And where exact likeness does not mean the identical character, bankruptcy at once is patent."

2. *Proc. Arist. Soc.* 'Identity,' 1900-1 p. 116

3. In answer to Stout who had maintained, "I could not define 'particular character' in this way for the very sufficient reason that I can discover no means of distinguishing two concrete things except by distinguishing their characters." *Proc. Arist. Soc. Suppl.* Vol. 3, p. 114.

4. Moore "Identity," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1900-01.

which can only be understood though not further explained. The relation of exact similarity thus does not involve any viciousness because, according to Moore, it is involved in the relation of numerical difference¹

The most important point in Moore's doctrine of universals is the question whether particulars are numerically different. "The admission of numerical difference seems, then, to be necessary . . . It has, however, become quite plain that several important consequences not generally recognised follow from its admission."² "It is only when the numerical difference of particulars is established beyond doubt that the fact that universals are conceptually identical can be established.

Moore's attempt to prove the numerical difference of particulars is based on the denial of the famous Leibnizian law of the Identity of Indiscernibles. His complaint against Leibniz is that the latter did not take account of the fact that particulars are numerically different besides being conceptually different. What the law of the Identity of Indiscernibles proved was that the monads are conceptually different without implying further they are numerically, i.e., spatially different. What Moore attempts to prove is that not only are particulars conceptually different but that they are also numerically different, a fact which was completely ignored by Leibniz

That particulars are numerically different is evident, Moore urges, from the fact that its denial would involve a *reductio ad absurdum*. Thus he says,

"Let us suppose that there is no such thing as numerical difference. In that case when two things have the same predicate, the only difference between them consists in the difference between two different predicates one of which belongs to one and the other to the other. But what are the things to which these different predicates belong? We predicate of the things both a common predicate and a different predicate of each."³

¹ Moore, "Identity," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1900—01.

² *Ibid*

³ *Ibid*.

He adds,

"For anything we predicate of them, and the relation of predication itself, may always both belong to some other point of difference, so that every property by which we may try to distinguish our new thing from the old will merely identify part of the new thing with something else, without producing any whole, which, as a whole, differs from everything else in the world in the way in which our original points of difference differ from one another"¹

A brief examination of the theory of Moore will convince us that his argument purporting to establish numerical difference of particulars is a serious case of begging the issue. His whole argument involves that wherever two characters are exactly similar, the things to which they belong should be numerically different. But I for one cannot see how the second proposition follows from the first. Neither do I see that its denial involves any *reductio ad absurdum*. Two things may be numerically different because they can be numbered and not because they are spatially different. The parts of an organic whole may be numerically different in that they belong to the one whole which includes them. Spinoza's modes for instance are numerically different from each other but they are not external to each other as Moore seeks to establish. And unless Moore holds that the whole of the Ethics of Spinoza is a case of *reductio ad absurdum* the doctrine that similar predicates imply subjects that are externally related cannot be accepted as self-evident. Things may be numerically different and yet they may not be locally separate as Moore seeks to establish.

The whole theory of Moore is based on his doctrine of external relations, which will be examined in a subsequent chapter. There we shall prove that all relations are internal and that there are no external relations. In this case the attempt of Moore to prove that particulars are numerically different will be shown to be false. But before that, I shall point out certain consequences that would follow if the doctrine that particulars are numerically

different and universals are conceptually identical were valid.

If particulars are numerically different in Moore's sense of the term, it is very difficult to know how they can be related to the universal which is distinct from them. This is the most pressing difficulty in the problem of universals. But Moore fails to answer this difficulty and takes refuge under a phrase. "Every particular has some one universal from which it differs numerically only. To this universal it has also a peculiar nameless relation, which the universal has not to it and which it has not to any other particular"¹ But this is surely unhelpful. Further, he adds that "all particulars which have this relation differ from one another numerically only"² But this on the face of it is a case of arguing in a circle. Moore's argument comes to this. Particulars are numerically different because there is a 'nameless relation' between them and the universal. And the relation is 'nameless' because particulars are numerically different. But what we want to know is the nature of the relation that keeps particulars numerically different and universals conceptually identical. We had believed that a relation qualifies its terms and thus establishes identity between them. But this 'nameless' relation of Moore has a curious nature which keeps one term numerically different and the other term conceptually identical. The nature of this relation seems to be mysterious and mystifying and our difficulty has remained unsolved.

The upshot of our argument is that Moore has failed to persuade us that particulars can be numerically different and at the same time conceptually identical on the basis of facts that are self-evident to him. We on the contrary maintain that that is impossible. We urge that things cannot be numerically different without making the universal a mere name. We have already urged this with reference to the theories of Russell and McTaggart. The

¹ Op cit p 116

² Ibid

arguments need not be repeated. But we urge again that either you have numerical difference or conceptual identity. You cannot have both. And we further urge that apart from the proofs based on self-evidence, we have already proved that the simultaneous acceptance of both these involves a radical contradiction which can never be explained or explained away. In the absence of proofs that are not of the nature of self-evidence Moore has failed to make good his thesis that particulars can be numerically different and yet related to the conceptually identical universal. His attempts have only succeeded in throwing into bold relief the conviction that the problem of universals needs radical re-orientation.

Whitehead

Whitehead, however, has realised the utter self-contradiction that is involved when particulars are held to be numerically different from each other and also different from universals. He would admit that if universals and particulars implied two mutually exclusive realms, then any attempt to establish a relation between them would result in the bad infinite and thus their characterisation would be an impossibility. He also would admit that if particulars were made numerically different from each other their functional determination by universals would be impossible unless universals were reduced to mere names. In other words he admits that universals cannot be functions if the numerical difference of particulars is a fact. Nor, according to him, is predication possible if universals and particulars are made mutually exclusive. But, again, if their mutual exclusiveness is not accepted it is impossible to maintain the numerical difference of particulars. To urge that particulars and universals are mutually related is to admit that particulars are parts in an organic whole. They cease to be monads and become modes. If particulars are monads then universals become at best names or incomplete symbols. But if they are modes then they lose their numerical difference.

THIS is the important truth in the theory of universals under discussion, and we have seen the validity of these remarks when we reviewed some of the theories above. Whitehead has an insight into the real trouble and knows that unless all these conflicting tendencies are reconciled the problem of universals cannot be said to approach any satisfactory solution. He does not take refuge under self-evidence or indefinables nor does he improvise fantastic philosophical theories which instead of solving the difficulty only succeed in making it all the more unintelligible. In the spirit of the mediaeval theologian he believes that the difficulties are too great for human ingenuity. He is honest enough to realise that without Divine help the contradictions cannot be reconciled. He knows that when Descartes found that human knowledge was impossible without some kind of reconciliation of mind and matter, which he had divided into mutually exclusive realms, he had to invoke the help of God, and it was this Divine help that came to the rescue of the philosopher. He also remembers that when the monads of Leibniz, whose doors and windows were hermetically sealed by him, had yet to transcend their limitations with a view to securing their development, God's help was found to be absolutely necessary to save his theory from ruin. And if it is considered that in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, owing to mechanistic conceptions of the universe, God's help is superfluous, then one has only to open the last chapter of Sidgwick's 'Methods of Ethics' to persuade oneself that God has still an important task to fulfil, namely, to help philosophers out of their difficulties. Whitehead therefore is in good company when he seeks the help of God. Let us see whether God, from his long worn-out machine, can in any way help Whitehead towards the solution of the problem.

Whitehead starts with the conviction that particulars are numerically different. As against Bradley he urges that "‘Wolf-eating-lamp’ as a universal qualifying the Absolute is a travesty of the evidence. That wolf ate that

lamb at that spot, at that time: the wolf knew it; the lamb knew it; and the carrion birds knew it."¹ "The point to be emphasised," says Whitehead, "is the insistent particularity of things experienced and of the act of experiencing"² But if particulars have such an 'insistent particularity' then Whitehead has to explain how universals can characterise these particulars as predicates and also determine future characterisation And it is here that Divine dispensation becomes a necessity.

According to Whitehead God has two natures: primordial and consequential³ Owing to His primordial nature all the universals or, as he calls them, eternal objects are realised in Him⁴ In other words He may be said to be 'the concrete unity of all universals' We are reminded here of Plato's idea of the Good which according to Plato was the prius and the terminus of all other ideas or forms⁶ The idea of the Good was not, an idea distinct from other ideas but it was their unity But Plato made particulars moments of the Idea of the Good They had no such 'insistent particularity' as Whitehead demanded. And here the God of Whitehead differs from the Idea of the Good of Plato.

Whitehead's God has to save the insistent particularity of particulars and therefore must not be related to particulars as an organic whole is related to its parts To realise the particularity of particulars Whitehead's God must Himself be a particular or an occasion⁷ God therefore, is not the Absolute The Absolute is God and particulars. But God is not only an occasion as other particulars are occasions If God were an occasion as

1 "Process and Reality," p. 39

2 Ibid, p. 59

3 "But God, as well as being primordial, is also consequent", p. 468 Ibid

4 "The primordial created fact is unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects This is the primordial nature of God"—Ibid, p. 42

5 Ibid, p. 42 also Part V ch. 2

6 "In like manner the Good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the Good is not an essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power"—Plato, 'Republic,' 589

7 "God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far off empty space"—Ibid, p. 23

other particulars, then universals would not be related to particulars and would remain as mere possibilities. They would be mere functions without having any values.¹ It is God Who by His consèquent nature mediates these possibilities with particulars and makes the predication possible.²

Take redness, a universal. It is an eternal object. As an eternal object it is a mere possibility, because redness does not necessarily imply that it should be present in this object and that it will be present in all possible objects.³ The fact that redness is present in this object is due to the consequential nature of God Who makes the possibility an actuality.⁴ This flower for example is red because God owing to His consequential nature realises redness, which is a mere possibility, but which is already realised in Him on account of His primordial nature. This, however, does not mean that God includes all other occasions, just as the Substance of Spinoza included all the modes.⁵ This is not the case, because, though the primordial nature realises all the eternal objects in Him, His consequential nature does not involve that He is an organic unity and that all the occasions are His modes. The consequential nature therefore makes room for the independence and particularity of God and other particulars and ensures His creativeness. Whenever eternal objects are realised in the actual occasions it may be said that God realises Himself in them. But it would be a mistake if this led to the forfeiting of the particularity of particulars. When this flower is red, redness is realised in this flower owing to the joint action of both God and this actual object, the flower. Both God and the flower are involved in the flower's being red. God's part in it is only to the extent of conceptual

1 "God's primordial nature is God in abstraction, alone with Himself. As such it is a mere factor in God deficient in actuality", *Op cit* p. 46

2 "God is the principle of concretion—the principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from situation otherwise riddled with ambiguity." *Ibid*, p. 488

3 "A conceptual prehension is a direct vision of some possibility as to how actualities may be definite" *Ibid*, p. 45.

4 "It is God's conceptual realisation performing an efficacious role in multiple unifications of the universe, which are free creations of actualities arising out of decided situations" *Op cit*, p. 404

5 "Also Spinoza's 'modes,' now become the sheer actualities" *Ibid*, p. 8

ingression of redness in this object with an urge towards the future whilst the part of the object is that of concre-scense.¹ It is difficult to determine the exact share of God and of the particular when the redness is objectified in this occasion or group of occasions² This is one of the obscure points in Whitehead But Whitehead believes that once God is allowed to have both a primordial and a consequential nature, the one implying the conceptual realisation of eternal objects or universals in Himself and the latter furnishing the creativity of the universe, the difficulties we have so far met will be easy of solution. By His former nature God sustains the organicity of the universe without making the universe a collection of monads. But since God Himself is a monad in one respect, though *primus inter pares*, the organicity does not imply that the universe is the rattling off of a chain forged innumerable ages ago The universe is an organism because all the eternal objects are eternally realised in God. but yet the universe is the universe of contingencies because the consequential nature of God allows the insistent particularity of other monads and thus allows choice on their part and makes room for contingency³

For Spinoza Substance was "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself" And he believed that "the conception of Substance does not depend on the conception of another being from which it must be formed."⁴ Whitehead would agree only with a part of this definition. He would say that his God is conceived through Himself

1. "God's immanence in world in respect of His primordial nature is an urge toward the future based on an appetite in the present" Ibid, p 43 Also "an actual entity in the temporal world is to be conceived as originated by physical experience with its process of completion motivated by consequent conceptual experience initially derived from God." Ibid, p 489

2 "This double problem cannot be separated into two distinct problems. Either side can only be explained in terms of the other." Ibid, p 491. Also "God and the world stand to each other in this opposed requirement, both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God and the world, is the instrument of novelty for the other" Ibid, pp. 493-94

3. "God's role is not the combat of productive force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization. He does not create the world. He saves it, or, more accurately, He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness." op. cit, p 490

4. "Ethics," def III

but that He does not exist by Himself.¹ His existence is limited by the existence of other monads, but the fact that, in spite of their mutual limitations and independence, He can maintain the organicity of the universe is due to the fact that God can be conceived through Himself, or, in other words, can be conceptually realised.² But to be conceptually realised is not equivalent to being existentially realised. His existential realisation depends upon the existential realisation of other monads. If God were existentially realised also then the monads would be modes, and the particularity of particulars would be forfeited. The distinction between conceptual realisation and existential realisation which Whitehead describes as the primordial nature and the consequential nature of God thus allows for both the organicity of the universe and the fact of contingency in the universe.³ The universe is one because the conceptual realisation of the universals or eternal objects is indivisible. But the numerical difference of the particulars is also a fact and renders the universe many, because universals are mere possibilities and leave a choice to monads in whom they are to be realised.⁴ God's being a monad and yet having two natures thus makes the question of predication very easily intelligible. If the conceptual realm and the existential realm were two mutually exclusive realms, or in other words, if universals and particulars were separate from each other, the question of predication would be unintelligible. By the mediation of God this difficulty is solved. If, on the other hand, universals were actualities and not possibilities the question of functional variation would be no less unintelligible. But

1 "The particularities of the actual world presuppose it (unity of God and His actuality) while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance of which it is the primordial exemplification." *Op. cit.* p. 487.

2 "God's conceptual nature is unchanged, by reason of its final completeness. But His derivative nature is consequent upon the creative advance of the world."—*Ibid.*, p. 488.

3 "The point is that the actual subject which is merely conceiving the eternal object is not thereby in direct relationship to some other actual entity, apart from any other particularity in the composition of that conceiving subject. This doctrine applies also to the primordial nature of God, which is His complete envisagement of eternal objects. He is not thereby directly related to the given course of history."—*Ibid.*, p. 60.

4 "An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world. 'Potentiality' is the correlative of 'givenness'. The meaning of givenness is, that what is 'given' might not have been given, and that what is not 'given' might have been 'given'." *Ibid.*, p. 60.

this difficulty again is solved by the fact that universals are mere possibilities waiting to be actualities. But since the numerical difference of the monads from one another and from God is relieved by the organicity of the universe the difficulty as to how the universal can characterise the numerically different particulars is also found to be easy of solution .

It is not possible to give a brief resumé of the main tenets of Whitehead's philosophy, so ingenious and rich is it. From what I have described above it is easily intelligible that there is a singular attractiveness in the theory on account of the mission that God has been asked to fulfil. We have, however, to see whether the attractiveness is in keeping with its consistency

At the outset it must be urged that though none should have any particular objection to the seeking of help from God to overcome difficulties, and though it is true that God can overcome them quickly and effectively, yet God also should be expected to be logical and consistent in this feat. God's will may be done in Heaven, but at the same time it is true that it is also done on earth. Even the Demurge of Plato, when in the "Timaeus" he attempted to fashion the universe, had to obey logic and had also to accept limitations to his power thus imposed by forms. I should also expect the God of Whitehead thus to obey logic.¹

First of all, it might be questioned whether it is consistent with the indivisible character of God to have two natures, one primordial and the other consequential. Let us examine the first kind of nature. What does Whitehead mean when he says that God by His primordial nature realises all the eternal objects? These eternal objects or universals are mere possibilities waiting to be actualities.

1. It is very difficult to be sanguine in view of the following passage - "God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which stands in His nature to impose." However, the following sentence is more reassuring "No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality." - Science and the Modern World, ch. 11, p. 257. ●

Now is it not a contradiction in terms to say that these possibilities have been actualised in God? If they are realised in God they cease to be mere possibilities and thus become actualities. To this it might be urged that though they are actualities in God they are possibilities to other monads. But this escape is impossible because, according to Whitehead, God by His consequential nature maintains the solidarity of the universe through these eternal objects. Either God is related to the universe of monads or not. If He is related, then He must be related through His realising in them the eternal objects and not otherwise. He Himself is a monad. And being a monad Himself, He cannot include in Himself other monads. But if His relation to the universe is through His primordial nature, and if it is due to His primordial nature that all the eternal objects are realised in Him, it must also follow that they are also actually realised in Him in so far as He is related to other monads, or the universe. There is no other way of sustaining the organicity of the universe except through the conceptual realisation of the eternal objects. But if the eternal objects are already actualities to God owing to His primordial nature, they must also be actualities to Him in so far as they are invoked for the purpose of sustaining the organicity of the universe.

Let us by way of illustration take this flower as red. Redness will be an eternal object. This eternal object will have been already realised in God. And to that extent redness as a function determining the future realisation of redness in possible objects that are red will have already been an actuality in Him. In God owing to His primordial nature redness is not a possibility but an actuality. Now this might mean that redness is an actuality in God because God is the unity in the conceptual realm only. But this is not the case. God is also related to the universe owing to His consequential nature. And in this case God will be related to the actual red objects as well as to the possible red objects.

Now is this not a contradiction ? If redness is actually realised in God in virtue of His primordial nature, does it not follow that in so far as this nature is concerned all objects are actual in Him, and there is no possibility of objects being red in future ? And if, in virtue of God's being a monad, the possibility of objects is a contingent fact, or, in other words, if to God objects are possible because their emergence in the universe is contingent, what meaning is there in saying that the redness is already realised in Him ? This will mean that what is actual in virtue of God's primordial nature is possible and contingent in virtue of his consequential nature. And if this is so, there would be an inner contradiction in God's nature, which would destroy the very unity and the indivisibility of God. There will be two Gods and not one. One would be the primordial God where all the eternal objects lie in peaceful harmony and from which contingency has been ruthlessly excised, and the other would be the consequential God where the struggle between monads is the order of the day and where contingency marks every event. And these two natures cannot be reconciled in view of their contradictoriness.

So the difficulty has not been removed. If God succeeds in securing predication, i.e. objectification of particulars by universals, then universals cease to be functions, because, since all universals are realised in God there will be no possible characterisation by them. But if God succeeds in making universals functions, then they cannot do so because there will be no particulars and no contingency, in virtue of the fact that all the universals as functions have been actualised in Him. God being the actuality of universals leaves no room for future predication and in this sense they cease to be functions. But He being a monad Himself, His attempts to save the organicity of the universe along with contingency only end in failure. If the world is an organic whole, then contingency is not real but only apparent. But if the facts in the world are contingent and the relation between one fact and another fact is external,

then the world cannot be organic. Whitehead attempts two things at one time. Since he is anxious to maintain the contingent character of the universe, monads enter into external relations with one another. But since he is at the same time anxious to maintain the organicity of the universe the monads have to be organically related. These two relations reflect in God, making Him have two contradictory natures, one conceptual and the other existential. Conceptually God is actual, existentially He is possible. And these two natures in God are not successfully reconciled by Whitehead, and the problem of universals recurs in the same form as it left his hands.

I shall close this chapter with a few more remarks. The two facts that stand out in bold relief after this brief examination of these modern efforts to solve our problem are these. That all these theories have striven to maintain the numerical difference of particulars, either on the ground of spatial separateness or of empirical self-evidence. We have also seen that all these have in one way or another striven to maintain, as a corollary to the first position, separation of two realms, that of universals and that of particulars. As a result of this our problem has remained unsolved. If the two realms are mutually separate, then the question of predication has been found by us to be difficult to understand. Since particulars are numerically different the question of functional variation, and, further the question whether in such variation the whole being or a part of the being of the universal is involved have received no answer. And so long as particulars are made insistently particular this difficulty can never receive a satisfactory solution. In the next chapter we shall examine the nature of the particular and see whether, when this is properly examined, any way is found out of our difficulties.

CHAPTER VII

INSTABILITY OF THE PARTICULAR

THE last two chapters were mainly devoted to the examination of some of the more important modern theories that have attempted a solution of the problem of universals. It is obvious that none of these could resolve the issues raised by us, with the result that all these attempts ended in failure. One fact, however, that stood out boldly from the welter and confusion that was created by them was, that all these assumed without any critical analysis that particulars are numerically different from each other and also from the universal. Modern philosophers, especially those whom we have reviewed in the last two chapters, deny that particulars can be in any way identical with each other and thus lose their numerical difference¹. To lose this difference, they believe, would reduce them to the status of modes and not monads. Each particular is a monad that exists by itself and also can be conceived through itself. It is true that it is related to other particulars and also to the universal. But this does not negate its monadic character. This red flower may agree with another flower in being red; but this agreement at best only amounts to an exact similarity and never an identity.

It is, therefore, obvious that with this type of numerical difference, or what Whitehead calls 'insistent particularity,' the issues that we raised in a previous chapter could not receive any satisfactory solution. If the universal is distinct from particulars then how the universal characterises the particulars cannot be explained. Similarly, if particulars are numerically different from one another in the sense that

1. Compare e.g., Dawes Hicks: "And I confess I am baffled when I am bidden to conceive of my individuality, in the latter sense, as included within a wider individuality to which I and other finite individuals belong. I do not, that is to say, see in what conceivable way a state or act of my mind can be part of a state or act of infinite mind, or the latter state or act be "immanent" in my state or act. I can understand what is meant by "Immanence" when that term is used with respect to values in their relation to finite consciousness. I cannot understand what is meant by it if it has reference to the relation between one existent individual mind and another"—Critical Realism, pp. 337-38

each particular leads its own separate existence unaffected by the existence of others, and also unaffected by the presence of universals, then it is illegitimate to talk of universals as functions. A function, in other words, means an organic unity. Just as the body cannot function without in some way being present in the organs through which its character as a function is understood, similarly the universal, if it is a function, must be a unity that must be present in particulars, which alone can lend significance to the functioning character of the universal. If redness is a function it means that redness is present in all the particulars, that is, in all reds, in the sense in which the whole of the body is present in all the organs. But in that case particulars lose their insistent particularity and become modes.

In this chapter we shall be mostly concerned with the examination of the theory that particulars are numerically different in the sense explained above or, in other words, that they are insistent particular. It is obvious at the outset that there is a sense in which this particular, say a flower, is numerically different from that flower. Common-sense ordinarily says that this flower is one, and that flower is also one, and in that sense this flower is different from that flower. But when these philosophers talk of the numerical difference of particulars they mean something more than this legitimate use of the notion of numerical difference, with which everyone should agree. I have already suggested what they mean by this phrase. According to them when these flowers are said to be numerically different, what is suggested is that every flower is identical with itself and that this self-identity can never allow a particular to be identical with others. If this flower were to be identical with that flower, then according to them this flower would lose its self-identity and would cease to be a particular.

In a sense it is a truism that every entity is identical with itself. Every universal is also identical with itself just as every particular is. But when a particular is described as self-identical, its self-identity is in some respect

different from the self-identity of a universal. It is this difference that is emphasised by Moore when a particular is described as 'numerically identical,' while a universal is described as 'conceptually identical' We cannot say that one universal is numerically identical and numerically different from another universal That is to say, the identity of a universal is not self-limiting but rather it is self-transcending¹ A universal is identical with itself because it is identical in many particulars² Redness is identical with itself because it is identical in all the objects that are red But this red is identical with itself for different reasons. This red is identical with itself because it is not identical with anything else³

This difference between the identity of a particular and the identity of a universal is sometimes expressed by calling a particular "substance"⁴ while a universal is described as an "attribute"⁵ We are already aware of this distinction in Aristotle, according to whom the only true substances are individual things or particulars⁶ One of the arguments by which he sought to disprove the separate existence of ideas was that if they were separate from particulars they would themselves become substances and thus cease to be ideas or universals. We can say 'this flower' but we cannot say 'this floweriness' However that may be, what we want to know is what makes a particular a substance and a universal a non-substantial entity If the numerical identity of a

1 "The universal is determinately known, it can be represented in thought by a symbol whose meaning is invariable because it is presented as self-identical in different 'things' and 'that' in different individuals. Universals are strands of identity which spread themselves out through time and space, it is of the essence of universals to be recognised as the same in changing and diverse instances"—Eaton, *Symbolism and Truth*, p. 75

2 "But the universal is common, since that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing"—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1038b, 10-12

3 "For it seems impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance: for firstly the substance of each 'this' is that which is peculiar to it, which does not belong to anything else"—Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1038b. Also, "Further, substance means that which is not predicable of a subject, but the universal is predicable of some subject always."—Op. cit. 1038b, 15

4 "And so to reduce all things thus to Forms and to eliminate the matter is useless labour, for some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter, or particular things in a particular state"—Aristotle, *Met.* 1080a, 20.

5 "It is plain that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also from the fact that no common predicate indicates a 'this' but rather a 'such'. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the 'third man'—Aristotle, *Met.* 1085b 34.

6 "By a 'primary' substance I mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something else, i.e., in something that underlies it which acts as matter. But things which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include matter, are not the same as their essences, nor are accidental unities like that of 'Socrates' and 'musical', for there are the same only by accident"—Aristotle *Met.* 1087b.

particular is due to its substance, then what we wish to understand is in what that substantival consists.

It is, however, impossible to secure any unanimity amongst those whose theories we have examined above. We have seen that all these thinkers employ the notion of substance and hold particulars to be substantives as contrasted with universals, which are sometimes called adjectives or attributes. For example, Johnson believed that the particularity of a particular is ultimately based upon the separateness of 'presentment of reality'. That is to say, for Johnson a particular is a particular or a substantive because it is a datum that has a space-time context and which is given to thought as a determinandum (for being determined). But this does not seem to be quite clear. Is an entity substantive because it is in a space-time context or is it because it is a substantive that such a location is possible? Thinkers like McTaggart have insisted that a substance need not be in space and time in order to be a substance. Others, like Stout, maintain that it is the characteristics of a substance that are in space and time, and that a substance is spatial only as a unity of these characteristics. To Whitehead this description of a substance, which involves space-time location, appears to be fallacious, as is evident from the fact that he denies that the categories of substance and predicate are ultimate, and charges them with involving "a muddled notion"¹. According to him there are only events, only passages of nature.² There is no Nature that is distinct from the processes of nature. There are therefore no substantives nor are there adjectives that 'belong' to them. And hence the distinction between a particular and a universal on the score of substance and attributes must be given up.

I do not believe that we can substitute processes for things to which these processes belong. Somehow, Whitehead has to introduce this distinction when he distinguishes univer-

1 "Accordingly, 'substance' which is a correlative term to 'predication' shares in the ambiguity. If we are to look for substance anywhere, I should find it in events which are in some sense the ultimate substance of nature."—*Concept of Nature*, p. 19. Also "I think that predication is 'a muddled notion'."—*Ibid.*, p. 18.

2 "I believe that in this doctrine I am in full accord with Bergson though he uses time for the fundamental fact which I call the passage of nature (in virtue of which) nature is always moving on."—*Op. cit.* 54.

sals as eternal objects from particulars, occasions, into which these eternal objects have to find ingression. Somehow, the distinction between a substantive and an adjective is there and we cannot give it up without careful scrutiny. I believe that when a particular is described as a substantive what is suggested is that every particular has a unique nature that remains identical with itself and therefore does not change. It was this notion that was mainly responsible for the search for substance which Locke described as I-know-not-what, and which Kant on some occasions called thing-in-itself. But we do not now believe that when this flower is called a particular what is suggested is that this flower has some unique nature that defies change and remains identical. Modern philosophers take time seriously and do not believe in this sort of substance. But if there is no such substance that makes a particular, it is very difficult to understand in what the substantive nature of a particular consists.

It might be urged that a particular has existence as distinguished from content'. This flower is a particular because it exists and also because it has contents which are its properties. The properties may change but the change in properties or content does not change the substantial nature of substance, because it is based on its existence. The distinction between existence and content may be expressed by calling the one 'that' and the other 'what'. A particular may lose one of its properties but it does not become another particular on that account. A leaf that was green may turn grey, but though the property changes, the leaf as an existent does not. We say that a leaf is green, but we do not say that leafness is green. Leafness is not a substance because it is common to all leaves. This leaf is therefore

1. Compare, "Existence appears to me to be another undefinable quality which is such that all which is existent is necessarily real, but all which is real is not necessarily existent. Qualities and relations are in themselves real without being existent."—McTaggart *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. I, "An Ontological Idealism," pp. 251-52. Similarly Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, pp. 449-50. "Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of thought, in short, to everything that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions, themselves. Existence on the contrary is the prerogative of some only amongst beings. Indeed it is a sheer logical error to suppose that, if there were an ultimate distinction between subjects and predicates, subjects could be distinguished by differences of predicates. For, before two subjects can differ as to predicates, they must already be two, and thus the immediate diversity is prior to that obtained from diversity of predicates."

different from that leaf and also different from leafness. And this is because this leaf is a substance and leafness is not.

This argument therefore means that every particular has two parts, one existence and the other content¹. A universal will have only content and not existence, while a particular will have both existence and content. But this solution leads to further difficulties. If existence and content are thus placed in two mutually exclusive realms, one timeless and the other temporal, the same difficulty occurs which appeared in the supposed ideal philosophy of Plato, namely, how that which is timeless can have any relation with the temporal. This flower is a particular and, as such, a continuant. But this flower will cease to be a continuant, if it does not change. If it is maintained that only redness changes, it will not solve the difficulty, because in that case redness, the universal, will turn out to be a continuant, and therefore a particular. Either the flower is a continuant or not. If it is a continuant then it is the flower as a whole that changes and not only its properties. If the flower does not change then it ceases to be a particular, because for us every particular is a continuant and, as such, must change. It is therefore difficult to maintain that the flower is a continuant and at the same time, to hold that what changes is its content, and that as an existent it remains identical with itself and therefore a substance.

Leibniz's philosophy is a classic example of the attempt to safeguard the numerical identity of the particular. According to him a monad is numerically identical because it is a simple substance. The existence of this simple substance or monad is the result of the choice of God by whose will, with the help of the laws of thought, monads are created. They are simple because they are created simple². God is responsible for their existence only.

¹ I owe this point thus, "According to a very common usage the name substance was employed to indicate a rigid real nucleus, which was taken, as self-evident truth to possess the stability of reality"—Met. ch. IV.

² "Thus God alone is the primary unity, or original simple substance from which all monads, created and derived are produced, and are born, so to speak by continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being, which is of its essence limited"—*Monadology*, sec. 47. Leibniz here is very confusing. As a matter of fact as Prof. Latta puts it, the creation is "rather a negative release into existence than a positive creation."

Now this account of the creation of monads would have been quite intelligible even if the monads were mere atoms. But according to Leibniz a monad is not an atom. An atom is a static entity it is an existent without any content. A monad on the other hand is a dynamic entity and it has infinite content. Every monad reflects the universe from its own point of view.

. The difficult question in Leibniz's theory of monads is whether the simplicity of the monad can be reconciled with the complexity of its content. There would have been no difficulty if the simplicity of the substance of the monad had been only ideal in the sense that it was a unity of all the content, and that it was not distinct from its content. This was the position that, we saw, is maintained by Stout as against McTaggart. But for Leibniz, as well as for McTaggart, the substance of the monad is in a sense distinct from its content. While in the case of God essence involves existence, in the case of the monad its essence does not involve its existence. Its existence is an act of God. It is therefore not a mere unity of content, but a simple substance that somehow stands distinct from its content just as the soul is supposed by many theologians to remain different from all its states.

Now this account of the monad as a simple substance introduces a serious rift into the argument of Leibniz. That a monad is a simple substance is not only an analytic proposition; it is also synthetic. But it is impossible to reconcile both these on a proper examination of his theory. According to him the existence of the monad necessarily follows from the truth of the principle of sufficient reason. So far, his argument appears to be analytic. But he also introduces another law, that of the "identity of indiscernibles," by which he seeks to prove the numerical differences of one monad from other monads and its numerical identity. Further, he believes, that two monads can be discernible as different from each other because of the fact that no two monads are identical. What Leibniz proved on the latter principle is that if there are two monads identical in content,

then they cannot be numerically different. But on the strength of the Principle of Sufficient Reason there cannot be two identical monads. Hence there cannot be two indiscernible monads, and since no two monads are ever identical, each must be numerically different from others.

Thus what Leibniz proved on the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernible is that two monads are numerically different as two existents, on the ground that there cannot be two numerically identical contents. This argument proves that a monad is a simple substance because its content is numerically identical with itself. But with all this what Leibniz failed to prove was that the simplicity of the substance as a monad could be reconciled with the complexity of its content. Leibniz, however, seems to have taken it as self-evident that the simplicity of a substance is compatible with the complexity of its content.

By the Principle of Sufficient Reason what Leibniz proved was that a monad was simple because it was simple existentially or identical with itself, irrespective of its content. What he proved by the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles was that the monad was simple because it was the ideal unity of its content. Leibniz, however, believed that he had proved the same thing, whilst his arguments yielded conclusions that were not identical. On the former ground he proved the simplicity of existence, while on the latter ground he proved the simplicity of substance as an ideal unity of content. But the notion of substance as existence is contradictory to the notion of substance as an ideal unity of content. If the monad is simple as existent, then it cannot have content because the content would detract from the simplicity of existence. But on the other hand if the simplicity of substance is due to its being a unity of content, then substance cannot exist apart from content, and hence the monad cannot be simple existentially. If content and existence are distinct from each other, then the one cannot involve the other. A monad therefore cannot be simple existentially and at the same time be the unity of its content.

Leibniz must therefore be declared to have failed to reconcile the existential or numerical identity of the monad with the identity of its content. It is not therefore surprising that those modern philosophers who insist upon the particularity of particulars and urge that a particular is numerically different from other particulars and numerically identical with itself, do not fare any better. They also suffer from the same ambiguity that we discovered in Leibniz when the same term identity was used to denote existential identity and identity of content. We have found that if a monad is numerically identical, then it becomes indistinguishable from an atom, a mere thing-in-itself. Hence when a particular is described as being numerically identical, this phrase is unmeaning, if it is meant to suggest that a particular is a substance in the same manner as a monad was described as simple substance. Hence the numerical identity of a particular must be understood in the sense that a particular is only a unity of all its content.¹

The same result follows from its character as a continuant. A continuant is the identity of all its occurrents and is not distinct from them. "A continuant," says Johnson, "means that which continues to exist whilst its states and relations are changing."² Now if the identity of the continuant is taken to be distinct from that of its states, then the continuant ceases to be a continuant and the states cease to be its states. If therefore the continuant is to exist, and if the states and relations are to belong to it, then the continuant cannot be a numerical identity but must be an identity of the ideal type. A continuant is a continuant only when it is an identity of all its occurrents and is not distinct from them. If a continuant were distinct from its occurrents it would cease to continue and would be a timeless x.

¹ All identity then is qualitative in the sense that it all must consist in content and character. There is no sameness of mere existence, for mere existence is vicious abstraction. And everywhere identity is ideal and consists in the transcendence of its own being by that which is identical."—Bradley, *Op. cit.* p. 327.

² Johnson, *Logic*, Vol. II pp. xi-xii.

The attempt to prove the numerical identity of the particular on the ground that a particular is a substance whilst a universal is not must be taken to be a failure, in virtue of the fact that a particular is not a substance in the sense of a timeless entity, impervious to any change, nor can its substantial nature be understood if it is abstracted from its content. On the contrary, we find that a particular ceases to be a particular if it is a timeless entity because for us a particular is a continuant and not a mere timeless atom. We also saw that by a continuant we mean an ideal unity of all the occurrents that are its states. A continuant does not stand behind all the occurrents with its separate home, but it is a unity of all the occurrents inclusive of them. If a continuant were distinct from its occurrents it would not continue, and would thus cease to be a continuant. A continuant is not an abstract unity, that is to say, a unity that is abstracted from the plurality of its occurrents. It is a concrete unity because it is a unity that includes all the plurality, it is an identity that informs all the differences.

If the unity of a particular as continuant is only ideal, then it follows that it cannot be distinguished from the identity of a universal'. A universal was said to be a conceptual unity while the identity of a particular was taken to be numerical or existential. But we have found that the existential identity of a continuant is a contradiction in terms, because an existence without content is inconceivable for the simple reason that it would be self-contradictory. A continuant, therefore, if its identity is ideal, must be a universal, and the alleged difference between a universal and a particular, that the one is conceptually identical and the other is numerically identical, must disappear. Both are conceptually identical. The identity of this red flower is exactly of the same type as the identity of redness. It is true that we can count this flower and that flower and many others of the same

¹ And in its principle and in its essence, identity is everywhere one and the same though it differs as it appears in and between different kinds of diversities."—Bradley *Op. cit.*, p. 527.

kind There are not as many rednesses as there are flowers But the mere fact that these particulars can be counted, does not necessarily imply that the identity of particulars is different from the identity of the universal This red flower is not identical because it is counted as one. We have already agreed that in a sense particulars are numerically different from each other What we have admitted by this is the fact that particulars are a plurality, and being a plurality they are amenable to the application of the category of number But the fact that particulars can be counted does not give us any right to hold that the identity of a particular is *toto coelo* different from the identity of a universal¹

A particular is not therefore a particular because it is one numerically If the particularity of the particular depended upon its being counted, then serious puzzles would follow, with which we are already familiar in the "Parmenides" of Plato² If this flower is a particular because it is one numerically, then a part of the flower, say, a petal, would also be another particular in the same sense, and since this petal is also one, the flower as a whole would be equal to a petal which is its part This would mean that a whole and a part were numerically equal to each other, which would be a serious contradiction The identity of a particular is not due to the fact that particulars can be counted while a universal cannot, and this fact alone cannot make the identity of a particular different from the identity of a universal A particular in this case is also a universal, and therefore the distinction between a particular and a universal is a difference of degree and not of kind³

Our argument has so far succeeded in abolishing the distinction between the universal and the particular that was taken to be ultimate by some modern philosophers.

1 "Thus even simple counting involves the elements of the judgement—of an identity exhibited in differences and affirmed of Reality,"—Bosanquet, *Logic*, I, 147

2 'Parmenides,' Jowett's translation, 145, p 72

3 "There is no ultimate reason for taking one complex, at least below conscious individuals, as a single being more than another"—Bosanquet *Life and Finite Individuality*, .. 79

The universe cannot be divided into two mutually exclusive classes of entities, one of particulars and the other of universals. Whether an entity is a particular or a universal depends upon its relation to other entities and its exact nature in the scheme of things. Whether this flower is a particular or universal, cannot be decided off-hand. We maintain that every entity is both a particular and a universal at once.¹ This flower is a universal because it is a continuant, and being a continuant, it is the conceptual identity of all its occurrents. When you contrast the continuant with its occurrents, the flower can be called a universal and the occurrents particulars. By parity of reasoning every occurrent also can be described as a universal because every occurrent also is an identity including other events that are its occurrents. There is no limit to this division of occurrents into events, and these events into other events *ad infinitum*.

There is no end also if we proceed upwards. This flower, though a universal compared to its occurrents is itself an occurrent of redness which is its universal. This red is a particular not because it is an entity, numerically distinct from other entities, but because it is an occurrent of the redness which is their continuant. We have already proved that the identity of redness is of the same type as the identity of this red flower. If this red flower is an identity inclusive of its occurrents, redness also should be considered to be an identity, inclusive of all the reds that are its occurrents. In that case redness will be a continuant just as every entity that we ordinarily take to be a particular is. There is no reason why redness should not be taken to be a continuant. The fact that we do not take it so, is no reason why it is not so. To the angel of Alexander who could see things *sub specie aeternitatis*, things would look entirely different from what they appear to us, and what we take to be continuants would look as mere occurrents. Similarly to the mind of a beetle what we

1. "A pebble or bit of rhomboidal, spar has a self-relation, a characteristic peculiarity, which makes it single and distinguishes it as a persistent universal from things external to it"—Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 217.

ordinarily take to be an occurrent would appear to be a continuant. There is no reason why we should impose our own will on the universe and declare that the universe must be so because we think so. I believe that of all human beings, philosophers should be the least ego-centric.

The upshot of the argument is quite clear. The point that I desire to emphasise is that the distinction between the universal and the particular is not ultimate. One of the main difficulties that we discovered in the accounts of these modern philosophers was that according to them a universal is what a particular is not, and *vice versa*, with the result that the characterisation of the particular by the universal became quite unintelligible. If a universal is exclusive of the particulars, then either it becomes a mere name or it means nothing. Nominalists met with the difficulty and they faced it by denying existence to universals, and thus reduced them to mere names. These modern philosophers are not nominalists, but the grounds on which their theories are reared are not different from those employed by nominalism. Nominalism has at least the merit of being straightforward, but these modern theories make the confusion worse confounded. We have already seen in the last two chapters how all these theories ended self-contradiction. Russell's description of the universal as a mere incomplete symbol, Stout's description of it as a distributive unity, are mere apologies for nominalism.

If what we call particulars are so not because they are numerically different in the sense that the one is never identical with another, but because they are different occurrents of the same continuant and thus are identical with each other, just as all occurrents are identical with each other in being the occurrents of the same continuant, it follows that every particular is conceptually identical with the rest. It cannot be repeated too often that by conceptual identity we do not mean what Moore meant by the term. It is not the type of identity that remains distinct from the differences but includes them. It is the

identity of a continuant. This flower and that flower are identical because they are occurrents and are therefore parts of the same organic whole. We have already referred to the notion of organic unity. By an organic unity we mean the type of unity that is best illustrated in the human organism. The human body is a unity of the organs that are its parts. But the difference between this unity and other unities, for example, that of a heap of stones, is very obvious. A heap of stones is also a unity in the sense that all the stones are together, just as all the organs are together that make the body. But the unity of a heap of stones is different from that of the body in the sense that a stone, qua stone, is not a part of the heap as the hand is a part of the body. A hand abstracted from the body is not human hand, just as a dog is not the same as the dog-star, except in name.

It must, however, be noted that this distinction is not ultimate, because the heap, inclusive of this stone, is not the same heap exclusive of it. Even the difference of one stone does make a difference, though it may not be quite apparent for practical purposes. In this sense it must be admitted that the difference between an organic unity and other kinds of unity is only one of degree and not of kind. But it is also true that a difference in degree is also in another sense a difference of kind. All the species of a genus differ in degree, and a monkey and a man may be said to differ in degree only. But this difference in degree is a profound one in so far as a man can be a philosopher while it is not so far known that any monkey has had any philosophical system. The unity of a heap is in a sense different from the unity of the body only in degree. But this difference amounts to one of kind in virtue of the fact that heap does not reflect the purpose of the heap just as the hand does. An organism has a unity because it has a purpose. It is a teleological unity, and this teleological unity is reflected in all the organs. A heap does not have any teleological unity in the sense that that unity is

reflected in each and every stone. Though, according to Leibniz every monad reflected the same universe, yet he was careful to note that a self-conscious monad differed profoundly from a sleeping monad in so far as the former was conscious and knew God while the latter did not. The same may be said of Spinoza, according to whom too, a mouse and a man, though modes were different kinds of modes.

Hence two flowers as particulars are parts of such an organic unity, just as the occurrents of a flower are parts of the organic unity of the flower, which is the continuant. Every entity in the universe is an organic unity because, as we have seen, every entity is a continuant. This flower is as much an organic unity as redness. It is true that in some cases the purpose of such unity is more obvious while in other cases it is less so. A heap is also an organic unity because even by the diminution of one stone the heap undergoes a change. The second heap is not the same heap as the first. The universe therefore is also an organic unity because it is a whole of parts. And since every unity is according to us an organic unity, the difference between one unity and another is only a matter of degree that may amount to a difference in kind.

The universe therefore is a whole because its parts also are wholes. A true universe is one whose parts also are universes. It is a self-reflective unity. The only difference between the universe and the entities in it are that the universe is a whole and not a part, while an entity that is merely an occurrent and never a continuant would be merely a part and not a whole. But between these two extremes every entity, whether what is ordinarily called a particular or a universal, is both a part and a whole, a universe and a part of the universe.¹

1. The finite individual "being double-natured is torn between its existence and its self-transcendence. For no finite existence as such can maintain itself in the whole without incurring contradiction, and the spirit of the whole, present in the finite mind, is bound in its intolerance of all contradiction to contradict its own existence. Thus the self, in striving to complete itself will break in pieces every partial form of its crystallised being, will welcome the chapter of accidents, and clothe itself in conflict and adventure."—Bosanquet, "Value and Destiny of the Individual," pp. 16-17.

NOTE

In describing the relation between the particular and the universal I have used the notion of 'organic unity'. It is declared by many philosophers that this notion is not free from ambiguity, and doubts have been raised as to whether it can explain adequately the fundamental relation between the particular and the universal. I desire in this note to say a few words on this head in order to point out what I understand by this notion.

Prof Hobhouse complains (*The Theory of Knowledge*, pp 585-89) that an organic whole is "an instance of quasi-teleology" because according to him the real teleological whole is that whose parts are valuable independently of the whole. As an illustration he cites a poem. Prof Taylor (*Elements of Metaphysics*, p 97) echoes the same complaint and wonders whether in such a whole, the whole in any sense exists for the members or each member exists for itself. McTaggart, though adopting the notion, remarks that "neither the name of organic unity nor the name of inner teleology is without its inconveniences" (*The Nature of Existence*, Vol I, p 166), mostly because it might be confused with a purely biological category. According to Mr Hallett, (*Aeternitas*, p 203) "there is thus a constant increase of disorganisation (or organic entropy) due to the natural development of organic life and it is thus that organicism, like mechanicalism, reveals its ultimate inadequacy as an account of the Real."

Thus there is a danger of this notion being misunderstood. I shall, however, state, in brief, what I intend by it. It is obvious that by an organic unity I mean a unity where the parts determine the whole and the whole determines the parts. To me the question whether the part has value by itself or the whole has also value by itself is a meaningless question. This is because the part and the whole have values respectively because of each other. Value is dipolar (to use a term of Whitehead's).

Neither do I desire to restrict the notion to the field of biology. Organic unity, as used here, is not a biological category but a spiritual category. Hence the question of 'entropy' cannot arise here.

The relation that I claim to understand between the particular and the universal is exactly the one Spinoza had in mind, where the modes followed by 'geometrical necessity' and in this process the Substance itself got determined. It is self-

determination of both the particular and the universal. This "is the paradox at once of reality and inference" so obliquely described by Bosanquet. In this, a member of the unity does not lose its freedom in such determination but gains it because as a draught of the fountain of the whole which is free, he is always free. And further the more his freedom is enhanced, the more he allows himself to be determined. The particular is free because the whole is free and the whole is free because the part is free. It is the freedom of love and not of compulsion.

How in the process of being determined by the universal, the particular gains freedom instead of losing it, is illustrated by Bosanquet in his distinction between Contradiction and Negativity. In contradiction there is no determination, in negativity there is determination but freedom. "Negativity is fundamental in all that is real. It is the same characteristic which has been described as the fact that experience is always beyond itself—the character, indeed, that we have described from the beginning as that of the universal, or in other words, the tendency of every datum to transcend itself as a fragment and complete itself as a whole" (Principles of Individuality and Value, p. 231). This is the process of self-realisation. The universal in its turn also participates in this realisation because in determining the particulars the universal determines itself.

The organic unity is thus both self-reflective and self-creative. It reflects in every part and is reflected by every part, creates every part and in this process enjoys the intensity of creation.

CHAPTER VIII

UNIVERSAL *Versus* PARTICULAR

THE importance of the results reached at the end of the last chapter cannot be exaggerated. There we saw that every universal is a continuant of which every particular under it is an occurrent. Similarly, we also maintained that every particular is a continuant and therefore a universal. In this way the distinction between the universal and the particular, that was taken to be ultimate by thinkers like Russell and Moore and to some extent by Johnson and Stout, was found to be inadmissible. Redness, we said, is as much a continuant as this red flower is a universal. Thus, the difficulty as to how the universal could characterise particulars, if the distinction between them is ultimate, simply did not exist. Further, every continuant being an ideal unity or a unity of organic character, the numerical difference between particulars that was taken to be self-evident also disappeared. We urged that two particulars are not numerically different in the sense that one is exclusive of the other, but that they are occurrents or parts of the same ideal unity, and therefore qualitatively identical. We further maintained that 'all identity is qualitative and that it realises itself in the numerically different particulars, that is to say, in particulars that are different because they can be numbered, but not different in the sense that one has a dark nucleus, a substrate, that keeps it absolutely separate from others, like the Democritean atoms. We did not accept the notion of substance and urged that a particular is not substance plus content but the whole of content organised into a unity.

But prejudices die hard, and all these results have been repudiated by some modern thinkers. They are not prepared to admit that a universal, say redness, is a continuant, nor are they prepared to admit that a particular

like this red flower is a universal. They also resist our claim that particulars are qualitatively identical, and insist that if this were the case, then the very particularity of particulars would disappear. They therefore bring forward certain arguments to rehabilitate the numerical difference of particulars, which notion, we found after a careful examination in the last chapter to be unfounded. In this chapter I shall examine certain other reasons advanced by these thinkers for denying the validity of the conclusions that we arrived at in the last chapter.

It is urged by them that if particulars are qualitatively identical then they must transcend the limits set to them by space and time and thus negate their very existence as particulars. Space and time being *fundamenta divisionis* it is impossible for particulars to be particulars and at the same time not to be numerically different from other particulars. To deny that particulars are numerically different would, according to them, mean that space and time are non-existent and thus be a denial of the very basis of experience, which is set in a space-time matrix. Thus Russell says,

"It is this spatial plurality which makes the difficulty of the theory that denies particulars"

and adds,

"The numerical diversity of the two patches is self-evident. They have the relation of being outside each other, and this requires that they should be two, and not one."¹

Prof. Montague also urges that a particular cannot be conceived without a position in space and in time.

"The given elements of experience are complexes of universals, each complex being associated with a particular position in space and time series. It is this latter factor of position which constitutes particularity and makes each individual numerically different from each other individual . . . in short, a particular is nothing but a complex of universals endowed with a position in space and time."²

1. Proc Arist Soc. 1911-12.

2 "Ways of Knowing" p 77

At one time Russell held the absolute theory of space-time against the doctrine that space-time is relative. As against Lotze he had urged that there were absolute points and instants¹ It appears that he has moved from this position and is now more sceptical about his conclusions that points and instants are absolute² He has even allowed himself to be persuaded that points and instants are 'logical constructions' composed of events.³ Mr. Montague on the other hand is not a believer in absolute points and instants as Mr. Russell had been, but maintains, like Alexander, that 'all time is in each spatial point or all space in each temporal instant'⁴

It is too late in the day to hold the absolute theory of space-time as it was first enunciated by Newton. If a thinker like Russell has seen reasons to doubt its validity it is impossible now to revive it It would be presumptuous on the part of a student of philosophy who cannot lay claim to special mathematical equipment to decide the issue between the absolute theory and the relative theory of space-time Our only concern is to see what conclusions follow if particulars are in space and in time because they are particulars

It is obvious that if particulars are mutually exclusive and thus numerically different, because there are absolute points and absolute instants, then motion would be impossible and particulars would cease to be continuants We saw the difficulty in the Cartesian philosophy where God's help was sought to explain the facts of experience Hence if particulars are continuants it is impossible to hold at the same time that space and time are absolute To this Russell might answer that it is not necessary for motion that points and instants should cease to be absolute,

1 "Principles of Mathematics", ch. LI, pp. 445-55.

2 "This view (absolute theory of space and time), however, though advocated by Newton, has long been regarded by mathematicians as merely a convenient fiction There is, so far as I can see, no conceivable evidence either for or against it."—"Our Knowledge of External World," p. 146

3 "Principles of Mathematics", 2nd, ed., p. xi

4 "Ways of Knowing," p. 83 Alexander, "Space, Time and Deity," Vol. I, p. 81 "In total space-time each point is in fact repeated through the whole of time and each instant over the whole Space"

because he believes that the difficulty can be solved by his theory of continuity. He believes that space and time form 'enclosure series,' where one instant will be enclosed by another instant and one point enclosed by another point.¹ Further, duration is an asymmetrical relation and there would be no gap between two points and two instants which could give rise to the paradoxes of Zeno, who proved that motion was impossible. It is difficult, however, to enter into the mathematical notion of continuity, but one point can be immediately raised. We might ask how there can be absolute points and absolute instants if one event is enclosed by another. Continuity always implies that there is something common between two terms between which the relation holds. And if there is something common, then the terms cannot be absolute and therefore the whole theory falls to the ground.²

But if space and time are not absolute in the sense held by Newton, are they ideal in the sense held by Leibniz and more recently by McTaggart? I do not think so. To Leibniz, space and time are ideal. The notion that space and time are real is, according to him, due to the fact that a monad in the process of reflecting the universe has, on account of its matter or passivity, confused perceptions, and it believes that there is something objective in which other monads are placed. But this is false because space is only an 'order or relation' between monads which constitute a plenum. To maintain that there is anything empty would detract from the greatness of God to whom, as Spinoza said, matter was not wanting to create infinite creatures in infinite ways. Hence for Leibniz space and time are not ultimately real. They are real only as *bene fundata*.

But this argument involves a vicious circle. Since space and time are due to the confused perception of the monads

¹ "Our Knowledge of the External World," p. 121.

² Russell is aware of this difficulty as can be seen from the following passage: "This assumption entails the consequence that if one event covers the whole of a stretch of time immediately preceding another event, then it must have at least one instant in common with the other event, i.e., it is impossible for one event to cease just before another begins. I do not know whether this should be regarded as inadmissible." (Op. cit. 120)

and since monads are windowless, the confusion is possible only from the inside and not from outside. But in this case error and confusion are words without any meaning. I shall not raise here the question whether it is not a sign of failure of one's doctrine to appeal to God to establish harmony between monads, but let that point pass. But even if the hypothesis that every monad reflects all other monads be granted, the difficulty still remains as to how the knowledge of confusion is ever possible. The knowledge that there is confusion is possible and is intelligible only on the ground that there is a right order which is not based on one's perception but independent and objective. But in this case every monad will have to transcend its own isolation and will have to know that there are other monads besides itself. But this will mean that a monad is not windowless, and that it is internally, and not externally, as on the theory of pre-established harmony, related to the rest of the universe. Hence, if space and time are confused perceptions, then this means that each monad is internally related to other monads, and if this internal relationship is a fact, then monads cannot be windowless.¹

Space and time, that is to say, cannot be ideal for reasons urged by Leibniz. In recent times McTaggart has put forward a theory parallel to that of Leibniz but much more ingenious.

According to McTaggart "positions in time, as time appears to us *prima facie*, are distinguished in two ways. Each position is Earlier than some and Later than some of the other positions."² This he calls the B series. But "in the second place, each position is either Past, Present or Future. The distinctions of the former class are permanent, while those of the latter are not."³ This he designates as the A series.

1 Compare Russell, "Philosophy of Leibniz," p. 122. "Thus Leibniz had two theories of space, the first subjective and Kantian, the second giving an objective counterpart, i.e., the various points of view of the monads. The difficulty is, that the objective counterpart cannot consist merely in the difference of points of view, unless the subjective space is purely subjective, but if it be purely subjective, the ground for different point of view has disappeared, since there is no reason to believe that phenomena are *bene fundata*."

2 "The Nature of Existence," Vol. II, p. 9.

3 Ibid., p. 10.

But now McTaggart proves that "the B series, however, cannot exist except as temporal, since earlier and later, which are the relations which connect its terms, are clearly time-relations. So it follows that there can be no B series when there is no A series, since without an A series there is no time"¹ But having shown this dependence of the B series on the A series he proves that the latter involves incompatible determinations and is therefore unreal.

"Past, present and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. If I say that any event is past, that implies that it is neither present nor future, and so with the others. And this exclusiveness is essential to change, and therefore to time. For the only change we can get is from future to present, and from present to past."²

Here also one can see the begging of the issue on the part of McTaggart. He settles the issue peremptorily that an event that is past cannot be either present or future. But why not? Because these characteristics are incompatible. What then? Is there no other way of reconciling these incompatibles except by throwing time overboard? McTaggart hardly considers the other possibility, namely, that of including these incompatible characteristics in a unity that contains them rather than in a timeless self that runs away from them. He mistakenly believes that a thing is timeless because it excludes time and does not take account of the fact that there is another type of timelessness that includes time and yet remains timeless. And this is the doctrine that we desire to hold.

According to us space and time are not absolute if by that is meant that they are "the places as well of themselves as all other things."³ Nor are they ideal if by that is meant that they constitute the orders of the perceptions of windowless monads. The theory of universals and their relation to particulars that we have developed so far cuts across both these positions. According to us particulars

1. *Op. cit.* p. 13.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

3. Newton, *Scholium 2*, quoted by Whitehead, "Process and Reality," p. 53.

are not windowless but are parts of an organic unity which is thus universal. Nor is the universal a receptacle, an empty scheme in which particulars are placed "like apples in boxes."¹ An organic unity does not stand abstracted from its parts. It is like the spirit that animates all the organs of the body, the melody that gives harmony to the notes.

Hence to us space and time are both real and "ideal at once. The closest analogue to this theory of space and time that we are urging here is that of Kant, according to whom space and time are empirically real but transcendently ideal.² The difficulty, however, lies in the ambiguity of the 'transcendental' which sometimes Kant understands as 'transcendent'.³ We do not believe in this transcendent reality, the noumenon, that spends its existence in the frigid regions of the spaceless and the timeless. With this possible misunderstanding removed, our theory may be said to be almost identical with that of Kant. Along with him we hold that space and time are forms of intuition, that is to say, the schemata of the realisation of the universal or the continuant. Space and time are appearances, but nevertheless they are appearances of the real.⁴

The attempts to bolster up the numerical difference of particulars on the score that space and time are *fundamenta divisionis* must be deemed to be a failure in virtue of the fact that space and time themselves are ideal in a way and cannot be understood apart from the universal or the qualitative whole. But, further, even if they are taken as standing abstracted from everything and in that sense

1 "And universals are in particulars not as apples are in boxes or small spaces in larger spaces, but as all time is in each spiritual point or all space in each temporal instant." Montague, *Loc. cit.*, p. 83.

2 "Time (and also Space) is therefore a purely subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, that is, so far as we are affected by objects,) and in itself apart from the subject, is nothing. Nevertheless, in respect of all appearances, and the effort of all the things which can enter into our experience, it is necessarily objective."—Critique of Pure Reason, Kemp Smith's trans., pp. 77-78.

3 Vide, "Commentary to Critique of Pure Reason" by N. K. Smith, pp. 75-78.

4 I should have been glad to associate myself with the 'epochal' theory of time as enunciated by Whitehead,—"Science and the Modern World" (ch. 7 pp. 165-198), who urges that "a duration in becoming temporal thereby incurs realisation in respect to some enduring object. Temporalisation is realisation," p. 185. But it is impossible to understand when on the same page we are told that "it is an atomic succession." How the object can endure when succession is atomic (is this not a contradiction?) is very difficult to understand. See also, "Process and Reality," p. 96.

objective, their fictitious character is not thereby concealed. For even then space and time turn out to be qualitative wholes and the distinctions of 'here' and 'there' are possible only within this qualitative whole, space, just as 'now' and 'then' are possible within the qualitative whole, time. Apart from the acceptance of quality there cannot be 'here' or 'there' or 'now' or 'then'. Space and time which were called in aid to establish numerical difference of particulars, themselves turn out to be qualitative¹

It is, however, urged that if the whole universe is an organic unity, then every part will be intrinsically related to the other parts of this unity, or in other words, all particulars will be internally related to one another. It is pointed out that there are external relations besides internal ones and that the universe cannot be an organic unity. It is further urged that if all relations were internal, there would be no contingency in the universe and everything would be determined by the whole. The universe, that is to say, would be a block-universe. If contingency in the universe is a fact, the universe cannot be an organic unity, and if it is not an organic unity, then it is wrong to maintain that particulars are qualitatively identical and that the universal is the ideal unity including particulars as its differences.

The sum and substance of these objections is that two particulars, for instance, are not internally related to each other, in the sense that the absence of one property in one entails a qualitative difference in the other. Similarly it is also urged by the defenders of this theory that from the universal a particular does not as a matter of fact follow, just as equiangularity follows from equilaterality. A particular is numerically different from other particulars as well as different from the whole. As James puts it, the relation 'and' trails behind every fact and thus every fact is externally related to everything else in the universe.

¹ "For space to exist at all there must be an arrangement which is more than spatial. Without qualitative differences there are no distinctions in space at all, there is neither position, nor change of position, neither shape nor bodies, nor motion."—Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed. p. 516.

I join issue on both these counts. I maintain that all relations are internal, and that a particular, as a matter of fact, follows from the universal. In other words, what I desire to prove is, that every fact intrinsically determines every other fact and thus determines the whole, and is also determined by other parts, and, as such, by the whole. One object determines another object to the extent that any change in one introduces change in the other and also in the universe as a whole, and that any change in the whole is also reflected in every object. I shall also further prove that since by the existence of an object we mean only the unity of its content, this content is determined by the whole universe. The fact that the existence of an object is involved in the space-time context will mean that it is the universe as a whole that determines at what time and at what place the object will exist. In this sense, I hold that there is no contingency in the universe. I hold that the universe is perfectly determined whether you call it a block-universe or not. I shall justify these contentions by an examination of the theory of external relations on which the numerical difference of particulars as understood by these philosophers is sought to be justified.

I shall take Prof. Moore's article in his *Philosophical Studies* as the standard formulation of the theory of external relations.¹ It must be noted, however, that Moore does not deny that there are internal relations; but he denies that all relations are internal. For example, he agrees that the relation of entailment, (for instance, "this angle is right-angled" entails the proposition that "it is an angle") is internal. But he is not prepared to hold that the fact that this flower is red entails that another flower is red or blue or yellow. Similarly he is not prepared to admit that from the proposition "All men are mortal" it follows that 'as a matter of fact' Socrates will die. A fact does not entail another fact in the same way as a determinable, to use Johnson's language, determines its determinate, nor does a universal proposition determine the existence of

1 "Philosophical Studies," ch. IX, pp. 276-309.

particulars which might come under it. A universal proposition implies only a relation between properties, and these properties cannot affect the existence of particulars which are substantives. The universal proposition, "All men are mortal," only means 'If man then mortal' or 'humanity entails mortality,' but it does not tell us that any particular individual will be born or that he will die. Universals, as we saw before, are held to be mere conceptual identities which may characterise substantives but do not determine substantives. They are mere logical entities and thus bloodless abstractions. Substantives are more than concepts and cannot be reduced to these.¹ One substantive, therefore, is neither determined by another substantive nor by the universal.

The theory of external relations proposes to prove the following :—

(1) That relational properties do not affect the 'nature' of objects, (2) that one particular does not 'entail' another particular; (3) that a fact cannot 'follow' from a universal.

Let A and B be two particulars, say red flowers. And let one of these, A, be to the right of the other, B. The first point requires us to hold that "being to the right of B" does not, in any way, affect the 'nature' of A. That is to say, the red of A is not in any way affected by the relational property that it is either to the right or to the left of anything. The red of the flower is its 'nature' but this 'nature' is not the same as the relational properties, which are external to the nature of the object as such.² What the nature of the objects is, is ex-

1 It is this divorce of thought from reality that is responsible for the fantastic statement of logical positivists that logic deals, only with tautologies and that the real world is beyond its ken. In this connection the following passage from Joseph, 'Introduction to Logic,' is worth quoting: "Though these are called laws of thought, and in fact we cannot think, except in accordance with them, yet they are really statements which we cannot but hold true about things. We cannot think contradictory propositions, because we see that a thing cannot have at once and not have the same character, and the so-called necessity of thought is really the apprehension of the necessity in the being of things. This we may see if we ask what would follow, were it a necessity of thought only, for then, while, e.g., I could not think at once that this page is and is not white, the page itself might, at once be white and not be white. But to admit this, is to admit that I can think the page to have and not have the same character, in the very act of saying that I cannot think it; and this is self-contradictory. The Law of Contradiction then is metaphysical or ontological." p. 13.

2 A similar distinction is drawn in terms of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' properties by Prof. Montague. "We must recognise that any object of thought possesses two fundamentally distinct sets of properties, which we will call 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic.' By 'intrinsic' properties we mean those which do not involve in their meaning other objects; by 'extrinsic' properties we mean those which do involve other objects. To illustrate

plained by Moore as follows "For my part," says Moore, "it seems to me that by a term's nature is meant, not the term itself, but what may roughly be called all its qualities as distinguished from its relational properties"¹ He further explains that the relation of the nature of the object to the object is that the 'nature' is 'grounded' in the object in the sense that it follows from the object itself For example, from the proposition 'this flower is red' it will follow that it has colour, while it would not follow that it is blooming in my garden The flower might have bloomed in my garden or my neighbour's The blooming in my garden or on the roadside is a relational property and it has nothing to do with the nature of the flower The nature is internal to or grounded in the object, but the relational properties are not internal but external

I must confess, I cannot easily follow Moore in his distinction between the nature of an object and its relational properties Let us therefore see where the exact difference between the nature of an object and its relational properties lies According to Moore, the red of the flower is its quality, and therefore describes its nature But why 'being to the right of B' is not a quality of A and why it should not describe A's nature is not clear What is the precise point where the 'nature' ends and the relational properties begin is not intelligible at all² If 'being to the right of B' does not belong to A, to what does it belong? But if it belongs to A, since it is its relational property, what is the relation between this property and the nature of A? Let X be the nature of A, and P the relational property, and let R be the relation between the two. R is a relation because it relates both X and P But how can the relation relate if both X and P remain unaffected by each other? If X is

In the judgement "This object is black and smooth", black and smooth could be parts of the connotation of this object without being parts of the connotation of any other object But if I say "This object is the favourite possession of John Smith" then I am ascribing 'to this object' a property which would be without meaning unless there were another object, John Smith, in whom the relational property also 'inhered'—*Ways of Knowing*, p. 70

1 "Philosophical Studies," p. 303.

2 Contrast: "For it cannot be denied that any person who should assert that the table was not a prime number would be asserting something that was true The assertion may be unimportant, foolish, a waste of time But it is not false, and it must be true. And it can't be true unless it is made true by the nature of that thing about which the assertion is made —McTigart, *The Nature of Existence*, pp. 29-30.

related to P, then after the relation, X will be changed to $X^1 R^1 P^1$ and not merely remain $X R P$. And if this is the case, then it is not quite clear how it can be maintained that X is 'grounded' in the object and P is not 'grounded.' The flower to the right of B will not be exactly similar to the flower to the left of B. It is true that for all practical purposes common-sense does not take into account relational properties. But there is no sufficient reason why what common-sense says must be taken to be valid. The distinction between the nature of an object and its relational properties will be only relative. And so long as cogent reasons are not given, the distinction cannot be ultimate, and the theory of external relations must be taken to be false.

It might be argued that the distinction between the nature of an object and its relational properties lies in the fact that the nature of an object is 'formally implied' in the object while the relational properties are 'materially implied,'¹ in it. This distinction roughly corresponds to that between the 'truths of reason' and 'contingent truths' of Leibniz, or the 'necessary' and 'problematic' propositions of Kant, or what Johnson calls 'certified' and 'uncertified' propositions, though these distinctions are not all to be taken as meaning exactly the same thing. The distinction may be indicated by these two propositions "This book is red," therefore "this book is coloured," where the relation is that of formal implication, whilst in "this book is coloured" implies "this book is red," it is that of material implication. In the first case the relation between "coloured" and "red" is "necessary" while in the latter case it is "contingent." From the mere fact that anything is coloured, it does not follow that it is red. It could be yellow or blue instead. That it is red is certified by actual experience, by the fact that it is red, and this could not be deduced from the fact that it is coloured. And this distinction is, according to Moore, sufficient to justify the distinction between 'the

¹ These expressions are not used in the same sense as Russell uses them. They correspond to the distinction drawn by Moore between 'logically follows' and 'follow as a matter of fact'—*Op. cit.*, pp. 284-85.

nature' of any object and its 'relational' properties. The latter are external while the former are internal.

I do not believe that this argument can support the theory of external relations. I shall not raise here the very important issue as to what is meant by a 'fact' Moore presumably believes that a 'fact' is something which is self-explanatory and is thus easily intelligible.¹ But if it is suggested that the nature of any object is formally implied in that object while the relational properties are only materially implied the consequences become disastrous.

Now red is the nature of red flower because red is formally implied in the object 'red flower.' But if instead of "this red flower is red" we say, "this object is a flower," the red which was a quality in the former proposition will be a property rather than a quality. And, further, if we say that 'the flower to the right of B has been placed on the table,' will not the same reasoning entitle us to maintain that 'being placed on the table' is a quality of 'the flower to the right of B' inasmuch as the quality of 'being placed on the table' necessarily follows from 'being that flower on the table'? I do not know where we should draw the exact line between what we call qualities and what we call properties. What in one context will be a quality, describing the nature of an object, will in another context be a property. What will be formally implied in one case will be materially implied in another case. And unless we are definitely told what is the 'matter of fact' and what is not, the distinction between qualities and properties must be considered to be very obscure.

I do not, therefore, believe that Moore has succeeded in distinguishing between the nature of an object and its properties. Moore does not mean by the nature of an

¹ That this presumption is false is illustrated by Bosanquet in the following remarkable passage: "Facts, as we call them, are stable to a certain point and will, so to speak, answer certain questions and meet certain needs, but when we transcend their several limits of stability, by bringing them into connection with more of the real world, we become aware that none of them are sufficiently stubborn things to stand as finally coherent. To take an example, if we trust to man's living by bread alone—by bodily comfort—we shall find he cannot, and that though bodily nutrition is actual, we shall fall into contradiction—find that nourishment is not nourishment—if we take it as the exclusive mode in which human beings are kept alive. We shall find other needs asserted, what we took for our system of 'fact' will not give room for them. Our fact has broken down, and all our facts break down in some such way, and at some such point"—"Principle of Individuality and Value," pp. 26-27.

object mere existence as distinguished from content. But there is no other way in which this distinction can be made intelligible.¹ We have already seen what serious difficulties occurred when Leibniz attempted to establish the simplicity of monads on the mere ground that they were simple existents as distinguished from their content. Mere existence abstracted from "content" is an Unknowable, with which philosophy has nothing to do. But without in any way holding such a distinction it is absolutely impossible to maintain that an object has a nature distinct from its relational properties. Moore talks about "the matter of fact," "thing," as if these phrases were intelligible by themselves. But it must be noted that when Moore attempts to give an explanation of these phrases, he seriously begs the question by invoking the help of common-sense. His argument comes to this: There are external relations because there are 'matters-of-fact' and there are 'matters-of-fact' because there are external relations. "It seems quite obvious," says Moore, "that in the case of many relational properties which things have, the fact that they have them is a mere matter-of-fact."² He further adds "whereas if the property in question is 'external' then the fact in question will be mere 'matter-of-fact'."³ But he does not throw any clear light on what is exactly meant by "a fact". The only help given is "that in the case of every such property the term in question has some quality without which it could not have had the property. In other words that the relational property entails some quality in the term, though no quality in the term entails the relational property."⁴

1. This doubt is reinforced by his denial of the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, "If the dogma of internal relations is true it will follow that if X is other than Y, X is always qualitatively different from Y, which is the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I think that the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is not true." Op cit 307. But if so, then it means that there is something, say, X, which is not qualitative since the principle in question demands that an individual is a unity of content only.

2. Op cit, p. 289.

3. Ibid, p. 303.

4. I say this in the Pickwickian sense, in view of the following passage: "If A is father of B then what you assert of A when you say that he is so is a relational property—namely, the property of being father of B—and it is quite clear that this property is not itself a relation in the same fundamental sense in which the relation of fatherhood is so," (p. 281). These passages taken together throw the whole theory into confusion. What is the status of 'relation' as contrasted with that of 'quality' on the one hand and the 'relational property' on the other? Are relations grounded in the nature of the thing? I believe not. And if relations are not grounded in the nature of the thing can the Bradleian infinite regress be avoided?

If, therefore, we succeed in proving that all relations are necessary and that there are no contingent relations, we shall have proved that all relations are internal and that there are no external relations. The question that we are now going to raise is,—Are there any contingent relations ?

That some relations are contingent and others necessary is admitted by everyone. The very fact of the finitude of the human mind, for instance, implies that a finite mind cannot know the whole universe and in that respect there are facts that are contingent. If the doctrine of contingency was based on the mere fact that there are facts that are not known to any finite mind, we would not have been anxious to refute the thesis that there are contingent relations. In this sense, however, contingency is rooted in the very nature of finitude. But what is maintained when relations between matters-of-fact, and between a universal proposition and an instance under it, are said to be contingent is that the existence of matters-of-fact is contingent and not the mere knowledge of it. The defenders of the theory of external relations argue not only for epistemological contingency but for ontological contingency. What they argue is that one matter-of-fact cannot be deduced from a universal proposition, just as a determinate can be deduced from a determinable. As we said above, what they argue is, that from the mere fact that "All men are mortal" in the sense that "humanity implies mortality," it cannot be deduced that Socrates existed and that he died. That Socrates existed could not be deduced from the universal proposition. The universal proposition gives you the relation of properties, while the existence of Socrates is something distinct from this relation. The fact that Socrates existed is 'given' and could not have been inferred from the mere relation of properties. It is what Johnson calls 'certified.' It is upon this factor of 'givenness' that the theory of external relations is held to be conclusively based.

This therefore would mean that the existence of a fact is distinct from its content. After all that we have said on this subject, it is not necessary now to prove that it is untenable to

separate existence from content. But if what we have said is true, the theory of the externality of relations loses its plausibility. Either Moore has to identify the existence of a fact with its nature or not. If the latter, then the fact as existing becomes distinct from its content and is reduced to a thing-in-itself. But if the former, then it is not true that the nature of a fact remains unaffected by other facts.

It might be argued that when two facts are said to be contingent on each other, what is suggested is that they are contingent before they are actually related. When A is actually the cause of B, and B is the actual effect of A, the relation after this event is necessary. But it was not necessary before the actual event. When A happened, B might not have happened at all, or when B happened, the cause of B might have been something other than A. Similarly when you know that 'Socrates is a man,' then with the help of the major that 'All men are mortal' the conclusion 'Socrates is mortal' can be drawn. The conclusion here is necessary, but the minor premiss is not necessary, but contingent. If all the relations were necessary, then one would have to prove that a fact is not undetermined in relation to another fact but that every fact is determined by all else and that the existence of particulars like Socrates is determined by the universal.¹ What it would amount to is that one fact determines another fact and therefore the whole universe, and secondly that the universal determines the actual particulars. In other words, what we should have to prove is that the fact that this object exists determines that another object should exist, and similarly all other facts in the universe. Secondly, redness, for instance, as a universal would determine the actual existence of red objects. Unless this much is proved, it is not possible to hold that all relations are necessary and that there are no contingent relations.

I shall clinch the matter by putting it in the same symbolism as Moore does. That there are external relations

¹ The theory of 'internal relations' "implies that it is just as necessary that anything which is in fact a part of a particular whole should be a part of that whole, as that any whole which has a particular thing for a part should have that thing for a part" — Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, p. 288

because one fact does not determine other facts nor does that universal determine its particulars is put by Moore in the following symbolism. According to him, p entails $(q^* r)$, does not imply $p^* (q \text{ entails } r)$, where p stands for "all the books on this shelf are blue," q for "my copy of the Principles of Mathematics is a book on this shelf," and r for a "my copy of the Principles of Mathematics is blue."¹ Further 'entails' here denotes the relation of formal implication while the symbol $*$ denotes material implication. What Moore seeks to prove is that between q and r , the relation is that of material implication and not formal. In other words, what he seeks to prove is that "My copy of the Principles of Mathematics is blue" follows, if "My copy is on the shelf where all the books are blue," but that because "my book is the Principles of Mathematics" it does not follow that "it should be blue." The conclusion follows necessarily if the minor is subsumed under it, but it does not follow if we take the minor independently of the major. The conclusion is not determined by the minor alone nor by the major alone. The conclusion follows only when the minor as a fact is subsumed under the major, which is not a fact. The major which is a universal does not determine either the minor or the conclusion by itself. Neither do the minor and the conclusion by themselves determine each other and the universal-major. If all the relations were necessary and therefore all the relations were internal, then what we would have to prove is that the major, minor and the conclusion determine each other. In other words, from the universal proposition that "all men are mortal" the fact that "Socrates was a man" should necessarily follow, and so also the conclusion, and, conversely, from the fact that "Socrates is a man" and that "he is mortal" should follow that "all men are mortal." The proof that all relations are necessary can be understood only when the particular determines the universal and the universal determines the particular, and particulars determine each other.

Now there is no reason why if "my book is a copy of the Principles of Mathematics" it should not entail that "it is

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 300-301

blue." The objection would be that it could as well have been red. Before the book actually had any colour, there was the possibility of the book having any colour, red, or green, or yellow, etc. There was no necessary relation between the book and any colour in particular. The realm of possibility is wider than the realm of actuality. Before anything was actual, it was possible and therefore contingent. How can it be said that all the relations are necessary and therefore internal?

This objection has a *prima facie* plausibility. But on a close scrutiny, it will appear that the fact that anything is possible does not mean that it is contingent, and therefore external. If the theory of external relations is valid, what the defenders of the theory have to prove is that possibility is unrelated to actuality, or 'concrete reality',¹ that the realm of possibility is distinct from the realm of 'concrete reality' and that the actual is what remains after the possible is eliminated. We are reminded here of Whitehead according to whom the eternal objects are mere possibilities related to the actual occasions only through the mediation of God.

It is, however, very difficult to know exactly what is meant by the possible if it is unrelated to the actual. The future, from the point of view of the present, is possible, but can it be maintained that the future is unconnected with the present? Broad has put forward a very curious theory that every moment is a slice of the future which is added to the present and that, as possible, the future is unconnected with the present and therefore the future does not exist.² This seems a very strange theory. If the future is unconnected with the present and the past, then it is idle to talk of final causes, indeed, the very notion of 'cause' would be meaningless. But if there are final causes, then the possible is existent because real and is connected with the actual. But if connected with the actual, then it cannot be contingent

1. I follow Stout here in using the phrase 'concrete reality' as equivalent to 'actuality'—*Mind*, 1932, p. 800.

2. "The sum total of existence does not contain future events"—'Scientific Thought' p. 76. Also, "But the universe of actual fact is continually increasing through the becoming of fresh events"—*Loc. cit.*, p. 83.

but must be necessarily determined. In that case the realm of possibility and actuality will not be mutually exclusive but they will imply each other. In other words, what is possible will be so because it is in some way related to the actual and *vice-versa*.¹

When, therefore, it is asked whether the colour of the book in question was possible or not, the answer is that it was possible but not that it was external to the nature of the book. The nature of the cover of the book demanded that it should have some colour. It is only when this much is admitted that whether the colour was to be blue or green or red offers a problem. But if the nature of the cover of the book did not imply any colour, it would be senseless to maintain that it was contingent that it should have blue colour. It is only within the universal 'colour' that the possibility of the colour being either blue or red can be discussed. The possible is therefore intelligible within the universal. Without the admission of the universal the possible is impossible.²

But is it not true that even with the admission of the universal 'colour' the fact that the colour was going to be blue is contingent and therefore external to the nature of the book? It could have been yellow instead. We do grant that there is contingency within the universal. What we have maintained so far is that such contingency is fully determined by the universal and can be understood in relation to it, and is not such as to justify the theory of external relations. This theory demands that the possible

1 Compare, Bradley, "Principles of Logic", Vol I, p. 187, where he discusses 'real possibility'. Also Bosanquet: "A real possibility, speaking generally, is a consequent whose conditions are in part known to be real and none of them known to contradict reality."—"Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy," p. 42.

2 Even Stout with his insight into the nature of 'possibility' fails to understand this, cf. "The objective being of possibility stands or falls with the objective being of universals. If anyone thinks that we make a whale a whale rather than a hedgehog by thinking of it as such, I have nothing to say to him. The intended reality has a general nature which just because it is general and not because of our ignorance, is capable of being specified in different ways and must be specified in one of them to the exclusion of the others. The others enter into the constitution of the concrete reality as mere possibilities and not as realised possibilities."—Mind, 1932, p. 301. It is very difficult to know what Stout exactly means by 'mere possibility'. Obviously he must mean by mere possibility that it is not related to the 'general nature' of reality. But is this conceivable? In this connection what Bosanquet, for example, says strikes as very true: cf. "absolutely pure hypothetical judgement, an assertion of implications following upon a supposition which is in no way attached to an underlying real system, I do not believe to have any meaning."—Logic, II, p. 41. Also: "Meeting of Extremes," where the same point is made: "Possibility is within the real and not the real within the possible. It rests on a positive foundation and indicates a determinate conception." p. 180.

should be undetermined by anything. We have found that this is untenable. But even then it might further be added 'that such a contingency within the universal is only epistemological and not ontological.' It is true that until the last moment it could not be known what colour the book was going to have. But is it not a fact that this contingency is based on our ignorance rather than anything else? If I had had all the relevant facts before me, would it not have been possible for me to say exactly what colour the book would have had? I believe that such a contingency only argues in favour of the thesis that a finite mind cannot know all the facts in the universe. It does not prove that the universe has facts that are external to each other and that therefore the relation between them is external. If I knew all the facts I could also know that the book in question would have precisely the same colour as it actually had. There is nothing mysterious in this kind of contingency, on the contrary, we urged that such contingency is grounded in the very nature of the finite mind. If the theory of external relations were true, it would imply that all the facts are atomic and that the universe is a mere collection of such atomic facts. I do not believe that scientists ever proceed with their investigations with such a view of the universe. If every fact was contingent on others then inference would be impossible and there would be no knowledge. The nature of inference implies that one fact is related to other facts and to the universe as a whole.¹ The contingency in the universe proves only the limitation of the human mind and does not countenance the theory of external relations, which, carried to its conclusion, would reduce the universe to a heap of unconnected facts.

Hence if I know that this object is red, I can also know that another object will be red or yellow, and many other facts, provided my mind can transcend its limitations. In this sense the poet was right when he declared that if he only knew the flower in the crannied wall, he would know

¹ "When conditions are specified and conclusions drawn from them, the resulting affirmation presupposes all conditions, known or unknown, indispensable to its truth, and therefore claims a support from the real universe which cannot be measured or limited"—Bosanquet, *'Implication and Linear Inference'*, p. 169.

the universe¹ The poet could know the universe as a whole because the universe is organically related to the flower in the crannied wall The fact that he did not know it, was due to the finitude of his mind But to an infinite mind there would be no contingency and the whole universe would be fully determined. Facts are not contingent, what is contingent is the apprehension of these facts. The theory of external relations does not succeed in proving what it attempted to prove, namely, that particulars are numerically different and therefore never qualitatively identical The theory under discussion is plausible only when the internality of relations is admitted to be the basis of such an externality

The upshot of our argument is that when facts are said to be externally related, it only means that the externality of the relation between them is based on ignorance of their relation to the universe. In this sense externality of relations only bespeaks the limitations of the human mind. To an infinite mind all relations would be internal because all the facts would be fully known to such a mind² Secondly, even with the limitations of the human mind, the externality of relations has meaning within the universal which internally determines the particulars between which such a relation has any plausibility. If the particulars were not qualitatively identical with each other and thus determined by the universal, the theory under discussion would itself be an untenable one

Every fact, therefore, determines all other facts and the universe as a whole, and the universe determines all parti-

¹ Here a misunderstanding should be guarded against. I believe it was against taking an object 'by itself' and deducting the rest from it that Spinoza urged that the essence of finite thing does not determine its existence. If a finite thing is taken in isolation then its essence does not determine existence because it has no essence by itself. See Ethics, I, IX and XI

² Cf. Bradley, "If you could have a perfect relational knowledge of the world, you could go from the nature of red-hairedness to these other characters which qualify it, and you could from the nature of red-hairedness reconstruct all the red-haired men. In such perfect knowledge you could start internally from any one character in the universe, and you could from that pass to the rest. You would go in each case more or less directly or indirectly, and with unimportant characters the amount of indirectness would be enormous, but no passage would be external. Such knowledge is out of our reach, and it is perhaps out of the reach of any mind that has to think relationally. But if in the Absolute knowledge is perfected, as we conclude it is, then in a higher form the end of such knowledge is actually realised and with ignorance and chance the last show of externality has vanished."—"Appearance and Reality," p. 520

culars. In this case, every universal also determines the particulars because for us every universal is a universe. Redness as a universal determines all the actual and possible reds. Redness as a universal is rooted in the universe as a whole and therefore determines the particulars and the universe as a whole. A universal is not an abstraction but it is a universe within the all-embracing universe. Redness is in the universe and does not have a separate home apart from the universe. Humanity determines whether Socrates shall be born or not. The fact that it is contingent to other human beings does not mean that it is a contingent fact. Epistemological contingency should not be confused with ontological contingency. The theory of external relations is based on a confusion between these two types of contingency.

Hence the universal-major, representing the universal, determines the minor as well as the conclusion. Similarly the minor as a fact determines the major, since every fact determines the universe as a whole. The minor premise is not categorical because it is a fact, and the major only a relation between properties and therefore hypothetical. Abstracted from each other both are hypothetical. A particular without the universal is an abstraction; a universal without particulars is another abstraction. To maintain that universals do not determine matters of fact is to reduce them to mere symbolic devices. We have already proved that universals are not symbolic devices but that they also exist, and that their nature is that of continuants of which particulars are occurrents. Every universal as a continuant is rooted in Reality, which is the all-inclusive continent, and thus determines the time and place of the emergence of particulars. It is thus a concrete universal.¹

It might, however, be argued that if every particular relates to the whole universe and thus determines it intrinsically, then every fact will be a cause of every other fact and there will be no distinction between one fact as a cause

¹ "Rose in the abstract does not exist. But it is concrete universal which has power, in the context of the real world to which we refer it, to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment"—Bosanquet, *Logic*, p. 227

and another as not a cause. If some facts are causes and others are not causes it means that every fact does not determine every other fact, as our argument seeks to show. If A intrinsically determines B but not C in terms of cause and effect, it is natural to suppose that A's relation to C is not the same as that of B's to C. And if this is correct, it is not true to say that every particular determines every other particular and the universe as a whole. If the category of cause and effect is valid, it means that there are some particulars that determine some others and not all. Those that determine each other and are determined by each other are either causes or effects, while those that have no such relation are external to each other, and therefore cannot be parts of an organic whole.

We admit that the category of cause and effect is valid. We say that A is the cause of C and B is not the cause of C, but does it follow that A and B therefore are numerically different and are thus external to each other? Against this, it can be retorted that if facts were external to each other, causation itself would be impossible. When therefore we say that A is the cause of C and B is not the cause of C, we do not mean that there is no intrinsic determination between A and B, but merely that such determination which in principle exists, is not easily apprehended by us. There is no reason why the fall of a stone should not cause deflection of the path traversed by a planet.¹ We say that the fall of a stone is not the cause of such deflection because for us such an intrinsic determination as is ordinarily required for anything to be the cause of anything else is not completely known. If such a relation were completely known, there is no reason to believe that the fall of a stone might not be taken to be the cause of the deflection of the path of a heavenly body. We have no right to urge that what is not known to us is non-existent. The ordinary notion of cause and effect serves only pragmatic needs. When we say that A is the cause of C, we take A and C to be things and thus

¹ Compare, Jeans: "Every body pulls every other toward it, no matter how distant it may be. Newton's apple not only exerted its pull on the earth, but every star in the sky, and the motion of every star was affected by its fall. We cannot move a finger without disturbing all the stars."—*The Stars in their Courses*, p. 74.

numerically different from each other. Being interested in their numerical differences we lose sight of their qualitative identity and thus declare that the one is the cause of the other. But if we take into account their qualitative identity and treat them as parts of the same organic whole, then they lose their independent nature and cease to be either causes or effects in the ordinary sense of the terms. The cause becomes a cause only because it implies the effect, and the effect becomes an effect because it implies the cause. There is no reason why poison should be taken to be the cause, and death the effect. Death also may be taken to be the cause of poison in the sense that poison is poison because it causes death. It is the event called death that makes any substance poison. If the substance did not kill, the substance would not be called poison at all.

The reason why we take poison to be cause and death effect is only because it serves our pragmatic considerations. We have control over the past and not over the future, and therefore whatever determines the future is considered to be a cause. But there is no reason why the future should not be the cause of the past,¹ just as the past is generally taken to be the cause of the future.

This is further obvious from the fact that space and time are, as we have already seen, mere appearance of reality, that is spaceless and timeless in the sense explained by us above. Space and time are in the Absolute and not the Absolute in them. Hence though the category of causation in a sense involves time, mere succession in time does not tell the whole story of causation. The failure of Mill to define the law of causation in terms of succession is mainly due to his failure to understand that causal determination is ultimately based on logical determination. It is the organicity of the universe that lends significance to the category of cause and effect. The universe is the major, the cause the minor, and the effect is the conclusion. It is only

1 Aristotle's notion of formal cause, it need be hardly repeated, is of this type,

when the universe is thought of as immanent that the notion of transeunt causation is in any way intelligible.¹

Hence everything is the cause as well as the effect of everything else in the universe simultaneously.² The universe is the cause of particulars, and particulars in turn are the causes of each other and of the universe as a whole. This is the creativity of the universe, which allows the particulars to partake of the freedom of its own creativity. Since particulars are in a sense numerically different, transeunt causation is in a sense valid. But since they are also qualitatively identical, such causation is only part of their nature and they must be said to cause and be caused immanently. Scientists and plain men are interested only in transeunt causation, but that does not mean that immanent causation is not operative. To maintain that transeunt causation is the only kind of causation, and on that basis to urge that relations are external, is to forget that such a theory is the very negation of the category of cause and effect. It is true that if facts are atomic, immanent causation is untenable. But in that case the very idea of causation becomes meaningless. Transeunt causation, understood as mere conjunction of events in temporal succession, is the very negation of the category of causation.

The thesis that all the facts in the universe are determined by the universe as a whole and that the universe is determined by each and every fact, or in other words, that the universe is an organic unity, does not, however, imply that every fact in the universe reflects and is reflected in the same manner. That the universe is immanent in every fact does not mean that it is immanent in the same sense. This would be the case if the universe were a bare unity taken in abstraction from all differences. An organic, self-reflective unity, is reflected in every part in a unique way and does not repeat itself. Every part in the organic unity has a specific function which is different from the functions

1 "Taken together, the analogies thus declare that all appearances lie and must lie in one nature, because without this *a priori* unity no unity of experience, and therefore no determination of objects in it, would be possible."—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Smith's trans. 237

2 "It is therefore necessary that all substances in the field of appearances, so far as they co-exist, should stand in thorough-going community of mutual interaction."—*Ibid.*, p. 235

of other members. It is the unique functioning of every part, which conditions the functioning of the whole, and is in turn conditioned by the whole that makes the category of organic unity the most fundamental category. That A is the cause of B and not C follows from the fact that A functions differently from C, and not that A and C are externally related to each other. The relevance of A to B and the lack of such relevance between C and B does not prove what the neo-realists try to prove, that facts are numerically different from each other, and that between them there is no relation of intrinsic determination. On the contrary if we look carefully at the facts, it only proves that facts are numerically different because they are qualitatively identical. All relations are internal. There are no relations that are external, and, as such, there are no facts that are atomic.

The essence of the above argument may be stated as follows. Every universal is an organic unity which determines its parts and in turn is determined by them. There are no facts that are external to each other but every fact is a determinate of the universe which is the common determinable of all facts. By a 'determinable' we mean much more than what Johnson means by the term. He distinguishes a 'determinable' from a 'determinant'. A determinable according to him includes the whole nature of determinates, but a determinant, being an adjective, does not include the whole nature of the substantive.

As against this what we urge is that a 'determinable' is also a 'determinant.' There is nothing in the substantive over and above its adjectives of which it is only an ideal unity. A substantive is not existence plus content. Existence is not the privilege of some facts but is the privilege of all. What exists is real and what is real is the content. The difference between the adjective and the substantive is only relative and not ultimate. The universal therefore is the determinable and the determinant at once. It determines the content and existence of particulars because there is no existence apart from content and no content apart from existence. It is the concrete universal. ➤

CHAPTER IX

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL AND ITS CRITICS

OUR examination of the problem of universals has led us to the formulation of the theory that the universal is concrete. By calling the universal concrete, we desire to contrast it with the abstract universal with which we are already familiar in the theories of some modern thinkers. The concreteness of the universal lies in the fact that it is, as suggested in the last chapter, both a determinant and a determinable. A universal is a determinant when it determines the existence or differentiation of particulars, and it is a determinable when it includes the content of particulars, or, in other words, includes the whole nature of particulars.¹ If we take 'humanity' as a concrete universal, what we mean to suggest is that it determines the particularisation of the particular, say, Socrates in the sense that the existence of Socrates is determined by this universal. Whether the individual Socrates will be born or not cannot be decided unless we have an insight, which in virtue of our finitude is impossible, into the nature of the universal, 'humanity'. Similarly, 'humanity' also includes the content of Socrates in the sense that what we call his individuality cannot be understood without reference to the universal.²

It is true that to many this conclusion appears almost startling because ordinarily we take humanity to mean very much less than what we mean by a particular human being. But this is due to the fact that we ordinarily do not understand the concrete nature of the universal but make it more or less abstract, standing for some of the qualities by which

1 "The nature of the individual is nothing but what belongs to the universal itself. Particularisation is of it and in it as much as differentiation."—Cook Wilson, *Statement and Inference*, p. 336

2 "The individuality of the content dictates its own time, place and measure of existence. It is characteristic of the rose to exist in a certain epoch of evolution and within certain limits on the earth's surface."—Bosanquet, *Logic*, I. 226

the class of men is denoted. We confine our attention to the common characteristics by which all human beings are generally classed together. This device of noting down the common characteristics serves our practical interests. But it leads to the belief that this is the type of universal that is fundamental and that all other types are merely derivative. We are already aware of the confusion that this kind of reasoning created in logic, where the universal was treated as a 'class,' a closed circle, including other classes, or being included by more extensive ones. The effect of this sort of reasoning was so devastating that even Kant with his boast of a Copernican revolution, could not absolutely free himself from its deadening effects. But once we turn away from this abstract universal and understand the real nature of the concrete universal, we find that there is nothing startling in the fact that the universal determines the existence of particulars. The concrete universal is the universe. And being a universe it determines not only the existence of the actual but also the existence of the possible particulars. Humanity, as the concrete universal, determines the existence not only of actual human beings but also of future human beings.

This determination of the existence of the actual as well as the possible particulars is easily explicable when we remember that what exists is the content, and there is nothing over and above the content that may be designated as existence. Much of the confusion in modern philosophy in the discussion of the problem of universals is due to the dogmatic reverence for the existence of particulars as distinct from their content. The theory of external relations had its root in this tacit assumption that a particular was a substance and that a substance could not be reduced to its attributes without remainder. We have already exposed this dogma and have pointed out the absurd conclusions that follow from an undue reverence for it. What we call a substance is only an organic unity of the content. A particular, we urged, is not substance plus content, but content organized into a unity. It is in this sense that the universal

is a determinable. An organic unity includes all the parts in the sense that the unity is reflected in all these. It is a self-reflective unity. The unity does not stand above or below or behind the parts. Further, it is also creative. And being creative it determines the existence of particulars by including the whole of their nature. By the existence of particulars we only mean that the universal is differentiated into particular wholes of content.¹ The universal, therefore, is an organic unity because it is thus self-reflective as well as creative.

Hence the concrete universal is both creative and inclusive. It is thus *natura naturata* and *natura naturans*. As *natura naturans* it functions as a determinant determining the existence of particulars; as *natura naturata* it functions as a determinable including the whole nature of particulars. A particular or a mode can be understood only with reference to the universal by which it is created and sustained. In the language of Spinoza, a particular cannot exist by itself nor can it be conceived through itself. A particular is the particularisation of the universal. The universal therefore is both a determinant and a determinable, and the particular is both a determinandum and a determinate of the universal.

Our conclusion that the universal as concrete determines the existence and includes the content of particulars, or, in other words, is a universe which is both a determinable and a determinant, is not accepted by many contemporary thinkers. Stout and Johnson do not find great difficulty in admitting that the universal is a determinable, but they do not agree that it can be a determinant. Moore, Russell and McTaggart do not admit that it is either. We have already

1 I cannot exaggerate the importance of this point, which is generally denied even by competent, and otherwise, clear writers. Montague, in his "Ways of Knowing," seems to throw the whole of his discussion on this point into a mass of confusion, e.g., he says that "the additional something that differentiates the particular from the universal is position in space and time, and as whatever has position in space and time has the capacity for interaction and change we could have defined the world of particulars as a dynamic and changing system standing out in sharp contrast to the vast enveloping realm of changeless Ideals and eternal truths." To put the matter in other words, existence is not a new quality, which when added to the other qualities of a possible object makes it actual. It is rather the thing's relation of interaction or spatio-temporal connection with the totality of other objects," pp 110-111. But on the page 298 we are told that "space and time of conceptual inference is one and the same with space and time of perceptual experience, and all the objects of the former are continuous and homogenous with all the objects of the latter."

noted that the main reason why all these thinkers are prevented from admitting that the universal is concrete is that 'they take every particular to be numerically different from other particulars and deny that they can ever be qualitatively identical. They urge that the universal and the particular 'stand in sharp contrast' with each other. As such they maintain that the universal cannot be a universe, if by that term it is suggested that it includes the content of every particular and also determines their existence or particularisation.

By this denial they urge that every universal is abstract. By calling the universal abstract they suggest that it is an otiose 'something' that characterises particulars, but that it is impotent either to determine the existence of the particular or to include the whole of the content of the particular. In more recent times a spirited attack on the concrete universal has been levelled by Prof N. K. Smith, and a band of other writers who mainly follow him,¹ and who contend that the notion of the concrete universal is fallacious. Prof Smith being the guide goes to the extreme and maintains that all universals are abstract. It is therefore essential that I should substantiate my claim that all universals are concrete by repelling some of these attacks, if my thesis is to carry conviction.

According to Prof Smith the theory of the 'concrete universal' is very ambiguous because it uses the term 'concrete' in at least three senses in contrast to the 'abstract' universal. In the first sense the 'concrete' is used to denote what is 'individual,' like Caesar, and contrasted with the "identity of character as found recurring in numerically distinct particulars."² The second use of 'concrete' is made when it is also contrasted with the 'abstract' i.e., when the distinction between the unity of particulars in a 'class' and the unity of a system is insisted upon. "The common character on the strength of which

1 Cf M B Foster *Mind*, 1931, pp 1-22. Steadman R. F. *Mind*, 1931, pp 161-170 and 297-309. H. B. Acton, *Mind*, 1936, 417-431. 1937, pp 1-14.

2 "The Nature of Universals," *Mind*, 1927, p 266.

things are classified together, in spite of differences, is the abstract universal; the system in which each element has its peculiar function, and in which the parts reciprocally imply one another and thus 'belong together' in virtue of their differences is the concrete universal" But there is also a third use of the term. In this case the universal is declared to be 'concrete' in proportion as its content is complex, and is contrasted with the 'abstract' which is poor in content and therefore less comprehensive.

To Professor Smith therefore these different uses of the term 'concrete,' indicating different contexts, is sufficient to condemn the theory of the 'concrete universal' without even a formal discussion of the problem. With reference to Bosanquet, with whose doctrine ours is largely in agreement. Prof Smith complains "We find him constantly contrasting what he entitles the "merely abstract" with what though covered by the phrase "concrete universal," is really the genuinely abstract"¹ Thus Prof Smith believes that the concrete universal is really speaking abstract and therefore the phrase "concrete universal" is patently meaningless. Further, he adds that "Bosanquet's twofold attitude alternately rejecting and accepting the 'merely abstract' is so patently inconsistent that I may be suspected of having given an unfair presentation of his procedure. But as a matter of fact, at least so it seems to me—all that I have done is to set side by side, statements which do not occur together, but always in different connections, in his logical and metaphysical writings"² Mr Foster endorses this and impatiently asks,—“Is it possible to elicit any consistent doctrine from this mass of seeming confusion?” Mr. Foster, however, believes that it can be done only “by following the clue provided by dates of composition (a clue neglected by Prof Kemp Smith) to understand Bosanquet's teaching, not indeed as a consistent body of doctrine but as a development of its main outlines both intelligible and instructive.”⁴ Mr. Stedman is no less forward. “After con-

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 270

² *Ibid.* p. 155

³ *Ibid.*, 1931, p. 8

⁴ *Ibid.*

siderable study," he urges, "I fully agree with the observation of Prof Kemp Smith that these two veins—of more or less grudging admission of recurrent identity, or the 'abstract' universal, and the repudiation of it—may each be traced through the writings of Bosanquet, but no serious attempt at their reconciliation can be found."¹ Mr. Acton opens his article with the blunt statement that "it is very hard to discover what is meant by those philosophers who speak about concrete universals,"² and is quite sure that Bradley and Bosanquet "do not know whether to deny flatly that there are such things (abstract universals), or to admit that there are such things but to minimise their importance. Proofs of their vacillation in this respect have been supplied by Prof Kemp Smith".³

Now, what does all this complaint about the ambiguity and inconsistency in the notion of the 'concrete universal' come to? If the theory under discussion is made plausible only by taking advantage of ambiguity, then certainly it must be condemned outright. Is the theory really covering itself under an ambiguity? Let us see.

I shall take the first use of the term 'concrete' as pointed out by Prof Smith. According to him and others that follow him, a particular like Caesar is not a universal at all. Humanity may properly be called a universal, but an historical individual cannot be called a universal by any stretch of imagination. But why an historical individual cannot be described as a universal is not at all clear. We on the contrary have urged that a particular like Caesar or this rose is as much a universal as humanity or rosiness. The reason is that a particular individual is as much an organic unity as humanity is. If by a universal we mean an organic unity or identity in difference, then an individual like Caesar is as much an identity in difference as humanity

1. *Mind*, 1931, p. 299

2. *Mind*, 1936, p. 417

3. *Mind*, 1937, p. 6. Mr. Acton esteems the criticism of Prof Kemp Smith so highly that he wonders "what answer an idealist could make to his arguments." *Op. cit.*, p. 6, note. My arguments, though not exactly an 'answer' to Prof Kemp Smith, may indicate the lines on which such an answer is possible.

is.¹ That Caesar is not a universal can be urged on two grounds. Firstly, because there is something in a particular over and above its qualities or attributes. In this case Caesar will have his own 'substance' apart from his content, and it will be this substance that will keep Caesar utterly particular and never make him a universal. Secondly, because what is recognised to be a universal, say humanity, is an abstraction from particulars either through resemblance or by some other means. In this case humanity will be considered to mean less, have less content, than a particular human being, because it is a common quality that is found in all particulars and nothing else.

But we have already seen that both these arguments are false. We have discovered that a particular has no substance over and above its attributes and that a particular is not a particular because it is substance plus attributes. On the contrary, what we have been urging all along is that by 'substance' is meant only an identity that determines its attributes and includes them. A particular has substance not because it remains apart from its attributes but because it is a continuant and as such is both a determinant and a determinable of its occurrents. The nature of substance is that of a continuant and it is absurd to ascribe to substance "a false character of self-existence,"² which is impervious to change and adventure, which are its life. And secondly, we have also seen that a universal is not derived by a process of abstraction from particulars but it is the very ground and the nexus of particulars. In this connection we have also discussed the notorious logical law of inverse proportion between intension and extension on which the

1. In discussing the nature of the doctrine of "the identity in difference" p. 431 *Mind*, 1937 Mr. Acton brings forward an argument which when analysed appears to be absurd. He says "it should be noted, however, that it is one thing that is identical and others that are different." The obvious conclusion drawn is that identity is identity and difference is difference and that "it is not the same thing that is both identical and different." This is intelligible only if "identical and different" are qualities like red and green. It is true that red is red and green is green. But this does not hold, because "others" are also "identical" with themselves just as "one thing" was identical with itself. "Others," therefore, are different because they are thus identical with themselves. This is identity and difference on Acton's own grounds. Similarly, Acton is unjust to idealists when he says that they repudiate the identity of the continuant. They do not. Idealists believe that nothing can be identical with itself unless it is different from itself only because they believe in the identity of the continuant.

2. Posanquet—Value and Destiny p. 14.

abstractness of universals and the concreteness of particulars were sought to be based

Prof. Smith and others attempt to prove the abstractness of universals and to deny that universals are concrete on the grounds we have already criticised and found wanting. According to them, a particular 'exists' whilst a universal cannot. But in view of the distinction between the universal and the particular one would have expected clear light to be thrown on this difficult notion. Prof. Smith does not appear to believe that a particular has existence over its content, a thing-in-itself, popularly called substance. On the contrary, a particular to him is a continuant, and he would certainly agree to identify his notion of 'events' with occurments. But with all this, he is not prepared to call the universal a continuant. Universals, he believes, are different from both continuants and events. They are recurrents. "The universal," he says, "in other words will be a name for the recurrent."¹ Thus, he further adds, "now by general admission, what recurs cannot either be continuant or event. It cannot be a continuant because though a continuant can come back into our experience, it does so not as recurrent but simply as continuant. It is the experience of it—that is, as I should argue, the type or kind of experiences—which alone recur, not itself as experienced. Nor can the recurrent be an event. An event being a one-time occurrence also, as such, does not allow repetition."²

I must confess that to me this whole passage is meaningless. First of all, I fail to understand how any such distinction between a 'recurrent' and a 'continuant' can be intelligible. Is not a continuant also a recurrent? How can a thing continue unless in some way or other the thing remains identical i.e. recurs? Is the identity of the continuant different from the identity of the type?³ Or, does

1. Loc. cit., p. 408

2. Ibid.

3. Prof. Jonehm, *Mind* 1931, p. 538, has substantially raised the same issue as against Mr. Stedman who, following Prof. Kemp Smith, had endorsed the 'popular attitude'. He asks, "Is the identity of the 'continuant, qua identity, the same (in any sense or respect whatsoever) as 'the identity of the type'?" If so, in what respect or in what sense? What is this single character—this common or generic or universal identity of which the two special identities are 'types'? What is this 'identity' which being itself neither 'concrete' nor 'abstract' is divided or differentiated into the two 'types'?"

Prof Smith desire us to understand that the continuant never maintains its identity? Since the event is a 'one-time occurrence' and since, further, the continuant is distinct from the event, the continuant must spread over a period of time. Can this spreading over a stretch of time be possible without the continuant continuing to be identical? And if the continuant is thus identical through a period of time, what is the exact difference between the identity of the recurrent and the identity of the continuant? Unless it is tacitly assumed that the recurrent is in some way different from the continuant like the supposed Platonic Ideas in heaven, it is very difficult to understand how such a rigid distinction between the continuant and recurrent can ever be sustained. But the next sentence confirms this suspicion. The only distinction that he can point out is between "experiences of it" and "not itself as experienced." But how anything can be "experienced" or have "experiences of it" when "not itself as experienced," passes my understanding. What this comes to is that a universal, being a recurrent, is not experienced, but one has experience of it. But apart from the formal fallacy of self-contradiction, how this feat is possible requires further explanation, which Prof Smith is not inclined to proffer. On a plain rendering of the fact, this amounts to the admission that universals as 'patterns' or 'types' are located in some cave, and that only their reflections are cast on the wall of human experience. But in this case Prof Smith should plainly tell us that his universals are indistinguishable from the supposed Platonic ideas with a heaven where they lie undisturbed by the clatter of our world. But this is not what he does.¹

Further, he argues that an event is not the same as a universal, an event being defined as 'one time' occurrent. Further we are told that an event is "one of the factors in experience."² This would mean that universals

1 "Universals belong to the reflective sphere but they are *bene fundata* in the nature of things." Further, "The difference between being a 'character' and 'being a type' may then be taken as difference between a mode of existence and that mode of existence as reflected upon." Mind, 1927, 411.

2 *Ioc. cit.*, p. 408.

do not exist and that they are timeless, not in our sense of the term, not 'transcendentially ideal,' but 'transcendentially real.' This is the old Russelian position again, which we have found reason to dismiss. We have already proved that universals also exist and that, if they are taken to be timeless entities in the latter sense of the term, the old problem of characterisation becomes insoluble.

The attempt of Prof Smith to prove that universals as recurrent are mere types or patterns and not continuants must be taken to have failed. That particulars are continuants, and, as such, groups of events, while universals not being events are not continuants, introduces a sharp dualism in his theory closely parallel to that of Whitehead's according to whom also universals are eternal objects while particulars are occasions or groups of occasions. The refusal to hold that universals are also continuants is due to the fact that these thinkers are, as we said above, haunted by the idea of 'substance' or 'matter' which, they believe, particulars have, while universals do not have it. Though Prof Smith does not show signs of this underlying motive, his follower, Mr Foster, has the merit of revealing this motive in all its nakedness. An examination of Mr Foster's doctrine may succeed in throwing light on the prejudices that have been responsible for his throwing out a challenge to the concrete universal.

According to Mr Foster all those who believe in the 'Concrete Universal' are bound to deny that particulars have substance. Mr Foster has Cook Wilson in mind, who, in spite of his realistic leanings, had, rather inconsistently, held that the universal is both a determinable and a determinant. According to Cook Wilson, a particular is "the particularisation of the universal"¹ and the universal "covers the whole nature of particulars"². Mr Foster however urges that if the universal were to cover the whole nature of the particular the particular would cease to be a particular. "It is the nature of the particular substance,"

1. *Statement and Inference*, Vol. I p. 376

2. *Ibid.*

says Mr. Foster, "to be more than its qualities, to be that which has qualities, and this substantial being, this existence, it is utterly impossible to regard as 'covered' by the universal of which 'hyacinthness' is an example."¹ This therefore means that a particular has 'substance' which cannot be included in the universal, and that therefore the universal cannot be a determinable.

But neither is the universal a determinant of the particular. By calling the universal determinant we had maintained that it acts as *natura naturans*, determining the existence of particulars or their emergence in space and time. Mr Foster repudiates this claim. "We may allow (because it is not worth while disputing) that the precise shade of colour and length of leaf which this hyacinth possesses, it possesses in virtue of its being a particularisation of 'hyacinthness,' but that this universal is capable of determining similarly the place and time of its temporal existence, is a claim which has only to be stated in order to be rejected as grotesque."²

It is, however, very curious to note that what is grotesque in the case of a particular is not grotesque in the case of qualities of the particular. In this Mr Foster appears to follow Mr Johnson very closely. According to Mr Johnson 'colour' is the determinable of red which is its determinate, but he denied that 'human' is the determinable of 'Plato'. In saying that 'this point is not worth while disputing,' Mr Foster seems to show a little generosity to the concrete universal. But though it is not quite relevant to the argument that we are examining, it may, in passing, be pointed out to Mr Foster that Prof Smith, whom he has to a very great extent taken as his guide, has found reason to dispute this. As against Mr Johnson Prof. Smith argues that there is no cogent reason why, if 'colour' is the determinable of 'red', 'human' should not, likewise, be the determinable of 'Plato.' What is true of 'colour' must, *mutatis mutandis*, be true of

¹ Mind, 1931, p. 5

² Ibid. p. 5

'human' His conclusion however, is that neither is 'colour' the determinable of 'red' nor is 'human' the determinable of 'Plato' "But does 'colour' generate the specific colours, or 'number' the specific numbers, or 'shape' triangularity or conic sections?" Are they (i.e., specific colours, numbers, etc.) not generated by the system, natural or conceptual, by which each 'determinable' is conditioned, and from which it gains whatever meaning it may initially have?"¹ asks Prof Smith

I believe that this reasoning of Prof Smith is quite valid. If a hyacinth is not a determinate of the universal hyacinthness, red also cannot be a determinate of the universal colour. There is no reasonable distinction between these two cases unless a hyacinth, as a substance, is more than its qualities. We have seen that Mr Johnson believes that substance is more than its qualities but he does not tell us anything more about it except that it is the distinct 'presentation of reality' through which alone the nature of causation is intelligible. We have already seen that Mr Johnson's treatment of the problem is far from satisfactory. Mr Foster, however, is more definite than Mr Johnson in this regard, though one doubts whether the following passage is quite clear in its meaning

"Because the nature of a particular 'red' can be conceived as exhausted in being an instance of redness, it is assumed without further enquiry that the nature of 'this hyacinth' is similarly exhausted in being an instance of hyacinthness. But the cases are by no means identical. The conception 'particular attribute' is formed by abstraction from that in which it inheres, since its whole being is by definition quality, there is no difficulty in regarding it as exhausted in exemplification of a universal quality. By calling it attribute we mean simply that, although it is particular, it has no being beyond its being a particularisation of such and such a quality. But we mean by substance that which has qualities and therefore is not itself a quality; we mean precisely that, in an individual object, which is determined to be what it is, not by the character that it bears, but by the alien principle of mechanical causation."²

1. Loc. cit., note, 1 p. 490

2. Op. cit., p. 6

But what is this 'alien principle' that 'has attributes' without being an attribute? It cannot be the 'matter' of the materialist nor, do I believe, is it the self of McTaggart. However, Mr Foster believes that 'this alien principle' can be compared to the 'matter' of Plato on which the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* impressed his forms. According to Mr Foster, it was unfortunate that Aristotle should have made the sensible world "penetrable by thought," while for Plato it was "inaccessible to thought." There is thus, Mr Foster believes, dualism of matter and form, differing in kind, in Plato, while in Aristotle this dualism is absent, matter differing from form only in degree, being the potentiality of which the form is the actuality. Matter is thus the alien principle impenetrable to thought, a thing-in-itself, form is that which is accessible to thought, which somehow 'mingles itself' with this alien matter. And 'this alien principle', 'this residual element' is, Mr Foster argues, fatal to the doctrine of the concrete universal.¹

First of all, it is questionable whether Plato ever held that matter was so alien to thought as to be inaccessible to thought. This is openly contradicted by Plato himself when in the *Republic* he urged that the Idea of the Good is not only "the author of knowledge to all things known but of their being, and essence" and that it "far exceeds essence in dignity and power." It is true that Plato talks of 'matter' as an alien principle in the *Timaeus* but he cannot be said to mean there what Mr Foster would like him to mean. Mr Foster it is to be feared, is misled by the metaphorical language in the *Timaeus* and is thus mistakenly led to assume that there is an irreconcilable dualism in Plato like that sometimes evident in Kant. If

¹ "Unless Form can be conceived as determining, not merely the kinds in which it is differentiated, but the concrete individuality of instances in which these kinds are particularised, this particularisation must be ascribed to the mingling of Form with an alien principle and, here, the intelligibility extends no further than the activity of the universal, must remain inaccessible to thought." Whilst Plato acquiesced in this conclusion, Aristotle must undertake the stupendous task of exhibiting Form as active in determining not merely specific differentiations, but the particular being of the separate instances of the species." Op. cit., p. 2. Mr Foster further adds that "nearly everything of any value contained in this sketch is derived from Jaeger's book" i.e. "Aristotle." But it is curious to note that in that very book, p. 200, Jaeger makes the statement that books ZH of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* "give the impression of being written simply, in order to refute Plato's exaggerated immaterialism with a plea that matter and substratum have a positive significance for our conception of reality."

matter was impenetrable to thought, it should have been not only unknown but also unknowable, which, Mr. Foster would agree, is a contradiction in terms. By 'Matter,' there is reason to believe, Plato only emphasised the 'given,' the 'that' which as given is in a way impenetrable to thought. But this fact of givenness does not prove that it is 'the principle alien to thought.' The fact of givenness is a sign of the limitations of the human mind. But because a thing is not completely accessible to thought, it does not follow that there is an alien element in the universe which is never intelligible. Matter is the limitation of the mind and not its negation. It is worth while quoting the interpretation of Prof Taylor on this point in the *Timaeus*

"In the real world there is always, over and above 'law,' a factor of the 'simply given' or 'brute fact,' not accounted for and to be accepted simply as given. It is the business of science never to acquiesce in the merely given, to seek to 'explain' it as the consequence in virtue of rational law of some simpler initial 'given.' But, however far science may carry this procedure, it is always forced to retain some element of brute fact, the merely given, in its account of things."¹

The question is not whether there is an element of the 'given' which sets the scientist on his investigation, but whether this given is inaccessible to thought. According to Prof Taylor the scientist never "acquiesces" in this givenness. If so, then it is not 'inaccessible to thought,' but thought can penetrate into it. It is, therefore, questionable whether Plato can stand as a witness to Mr Foster in his attempt to demolish the doctrine of the concrete universal on the assumption that every particular has 'matter' which cannot be covered by the universal either as a determinable or as a determinant. This will have to be proved on other grounds.

Mr. Foster, however, believes that this can be proved in virtue of mechanical causation. According to him the notion of mechanical causation is unintelligible unless

1 "Plato, *The Man and His Work*, ' p 455

every particular has substance or 'matter' which cannot be explained in terms of conceptual categories. We have already explained the nature of causation, and we have there proved that it is intelligible only when the universal is assumed to be the determining nexus within which the cause and the effect are included. Mechanical causation is based on the notion of logical determination. Unless the universal is the nexus or the ground which determines the cause and the effect, mechanical causation has no significance. Mechanical causation does not prove that every particular has its own 'matter' inaccessible to thought, but that it is shot through and through by thought. It is the belief of the scientist that nature is not a dark house where mysteries are jealously guarded against reason that actuates him in his investigations, it is the belief that there is nothing that cannot be understood by the human mind that stimulates him in his adventure. If every particular had its own matter causation would have been mysterious and scientific explanation would have been infected with hazards¹

It will, therefore, be quite obvious that Mr. Foster's reliance on 'matter' has not enabled him to prove that the universal cannot cover 'the whole nature' of the particular, nor has it enabled him to deny that the universal is a determinant. He has already admitted that the whole nature of the attribute can be covered by the corresponding universal, since, he believes, its whole being is covered by its quality. The reason why the whole being of the particular cannot be covered by the universal is that the particular is substance that 'has' attributes without itself being an attribute. But apart from this, one should have expected to be informed further about the exact nature of this substance or matter that owns qualities without being a quality. And so long as Mr. Foster does not tell

1 It will be interesting to note that Prof Stout who like Mr. Foster denies the notion of the concrete universal, and precisely for this reason has put forward his theory of 'distributive units' draws the conclusion, on the premise of mechanical causation, that the universe must be mental if causation is to be intelligible. "My action is and is experienced as being only a partial stage in a wider process which expands continuously into the world process. The world process in general, then, must be so far akin to what I myself experience in being active as to make this continuity possible."—*Pro Arist Soc Sup Vol XIV*, p 59. See also his attempt "to find mind in Nature generally" which he calls "Common-sense Animism," in his 'Mind and Matter'.

us what this 'nature' is which is impervious to the influence of the universal, his attempts to deny the doctrine of the concrete universal must be deemed to be a failure. He does not, like Prof. Smith maintain that all universals are abstract. He holds that the notion of the concrete universal cannot be dismissed. But he holds that universals are determinable of qualities and not of particulars as such, and certainly not determinants. But apart from these verbal protestations it is very difficult to know in what the alienness of the substance lies. Plainly put, it amounts to I-know-not-what, a thing-in-itself. But it would be too uncharitable to believe that Mr. Foster would cling to this notion after all that Kant did to sustain it and after its final demolition by Hegel. But, on the other hand, if his substance is not this, it is very difficult to know what else it could be.

Mr. Foster's confidence in 'matter' as the means of bolstering up the particularity of the particular is too naive to disturb the notion of the concrete universal. There is a sense in which it is not untrue to say that anything has matter. It is also true that in mechanical causation the past seems to push the effect out of itself. But all these are imaginative interpretations of the phenomena that admit of solutions of a fundamental nature. The fact that science makes use of the notion of 'matter' does not mean that in philosophy this notion should be accepted without criticism. When, therefore, Mr. Foster urges that if the particular has no 'matter,' and if its whole being is covered by the universal, one must deny efficient causation and the possibility of physical science,¹ he gives up his case. Philosophy need not be the handmaid of physical science, and scientific explanations need not be taken to be final.

The true consummation of the nature of the particular, I insist, is to be included in and fully determined by the

1 "Nor is any solution to be found by following Berkeley and Hume in denying 'material substance' and asserting that a thing is no more than its qualities. He who does this is involved in a denial of efficient causation and is totally unable to account for the physical sciences of nature." *Op cit*, p. 21

universal.¹ The final end of the particular is to be an individual by negating the matter that keeps it alien and numerically different from others. This individuality can be attained only when the particular is related to the universe as a whole, which is the highest universal, in the language of Aristotle, the *summum genus*. The universe, as the most concrete universal, is the organic unity of the less concrete universals. Individuality is the highest reach of the particularity. The less the alien element or matter and the more the whole nature is given up to be included in and determined by the universal, the more is the particular individual.² Individuality has degrees just as truth and reality have degrees. A particular is more or less an individual. The highest individual is the whole universe, where there is no externality, no distinction of matter and form, and where the content and the existence are merged into one, where the one is in all and the all is in the one.

Thus the fundamental relation that subsists between the particular and the universal is that of the lower individual and the higher individual. A particular is, as a matter of fact, a part of the whole, and it is in this respect that it is called a particular. The particular is a part of the concrete universal, or to put it otherwise, the particular stands midway between the complete individual and utter non-being. And since individuality admits of degrees, the relation of a particular to a universal also varies according to the attainment of individuality. There is no magic line drawn beyond which a particular cannot go. The aim of particularity is to transcend such lines. If not, then the 'logical spirit' will drive it on. Hence it is quite intelligible to talk of different types of particularity or the same particular attaining different degrees of individuality. One of the main reasons why these thinkers are inclined to attack the

¹ "The logical spirit, the tendency of parts to self-transcendence and absorption in wholes is the life-blood of stable existence"—Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 24.

² "It (the particular) goes out into a world which is beyond its own being, and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding it ceases to be self-contained and repelling unit"—Bosanquet, *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 32.

concrete universal is that they have ignored this aspect of particularity. They have confused particularity with exclusiveness, while the essence of the particular lies in transcending this exclusiveness and partaking of the life of the whole, that is, of the concrete universal¹

That the notion of the concrete universal does not commit any of the inconsistencies pointed out by Prof Smith and later endorsed by Mr. Foster can be easily explained once the notion of particularity is made clear. The real particular is one that progressively tends to absorb the element of alienness and shares the common life of the true individual. Mr Foster and others are, therefore, wrong when they understand particularity as lying in the element of alienness rather than in the elimination of this element.

I shall attempt to make my point clear by an illustration. Let us take two individuals, say, Socrates and Plato as two particular human beings, and ask how much the common character 'human' describes their true particularity or their true individuality. It is quite obvious that to describe them as two 'human beings' is not to explain their true individuality. The character, 'human,' in this case, stands for a label which does not offer any insight into the true nature of their individuality. Socrates and Plato are individuals because they have unique purposes in life. It is their respective purposes that determine all their actions and thus render them concrete individuals. Socrates and Plato are particulars not because they have their 'matters,' but because they have purposes that actuate them to make their lives as complete and inclusive as they can. It is thus that they are particulars, rather than as grammatical subjects in propositions, in which in modern philosophy their true individuality is said to consist. Hence it is not absurd to say that to describe Socrates and Plato as mere

1. See the following remarkable passage by Bosanquet: "The finite-infinite creature is always in a condition of self-transcendence. This is the same as saying that he is always endeavouring to pass beyond himself in achievement. That there is always scope for this, his membership of the universe guarantees. He is always a fragmentary being, inspired by an infinite whole, which he is ever trying to express in terms of his limited range of externality. In this *ex hypothesi*, he can never succeed. But this effort of his is never wasted or futile. It is a factor of the self-maintenance of the Universe, and so far is a real achievement, and it constitutes an element in the Absolute." — *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 104.

bearers of the character 'humanity,' is less concrete than to describe them as persons with definite functions in the world. And this is the first contrast which Bosanquet draws, and which Prof Smith and Mr Foster complain of.

Once we admit that the principle on which individuality works is the progressive elimination of the alien element which is called matter, the second contrast is also easy of explanation. Let us continue the same illustration. We have said that Socrates and Plato are individuals because they have purposes in life. But even so, it may be a long way before their purposes attain that degree of individuality where all that is alien will be fully absorbed. Alienness still may persist inspite of emancipation from the abstractness of the first kind. For example, both these individuals may have belonged to a political party of the time, and, though participating in the programme of the party, yet failed to attain that full individuality which is the life-blood of their lives. So long as membership of their party does not fully explain their individuality and leaves 'matter' still persisting, it only serves to mark off their common quality and reduces them to members of a class and not members of a creative whole. The class is not the system. The difference between a class and a system is that in the former the identity that pervades the differences does not go far enough, that is to say, does not win over the element of alienness that still persists and sets a limit to the identity. But in the system this alienness is fully overcome, and the identity and differences are seen as fully determining each other. It is this lack of full determination between the identity and differences that reduces the class to a mere extensional whole, while in the system mere extension, mere quantity, does not matter and it is clearly informed with quality. It is the complete subduing of 'matter' that distinguishes 'system' from 'class'. It is true that the class-concept is more concrete than a mere predicate that characterises the grammatical subject which does not give any insight into the nature of the subject. The class-concept as generic identity is more

revelatory of the nature of the particular, but it is heavily restricted by the fact that numerical difference based on exclusiveness preponderates over qualitative identity. Class occupies a mid-way position between a mere attachment of the predicate to the subject and the full knowledge of the articulation of the purpose that is the individual. This is the second contrast which is perfectly true and intelligible.

The third contrast is between systems themselves. We have already said that in a 'system' the identity informs differences and imposes itself on the recalcitrant element of alienness. Let us suppose that an individual has succeeded in systematising his purposes in life and that there is nothing that reacts against his attempt to make it as complete as he can. But mere internal systematisation, even if it is possible, by itself does not involve true individuality. A thief may systematise his purposes in life just as a saint. There may be a uniqueness in the purposes of a thief and the same sort of uniqueness may be discovered in those of a saint. So far as the uniqueness is concerned both these purposes may be said to be systematic. But in one case the system is bought by eliminating as far as possible other purposes, while in the other it is realised by including other purposes also. An atom may be unique because it includes so little while the universe is unique because it includes so much. The purpose of a thief is systematic because it is so poor, whilst that of the saint is systematic because it is so rich. Every great historical personality is unique because there we find great systematisation of purpose. History, as Carlyle said, is the biography of great men. Napoleon had systematised his purposes to the extent that he was always guided by his desire to become the conqueror of the world. On the other hand Christ had His purposes systematised with a view to delivering the message of peace to humanity. In the one case, the uniqueness and system were internally relatively perfect in so far as the alien element was subdued, yet it differed from the other very widely. The system in Napoleon's purpose in spite of its great internal articulate-

ness was abstract compared with that of Christ, because while in the former so much was left out which formed an alien element, in the latter so much was included as to leave no alien element outside at all. It is not merely the character of the system internally secured that distinguishes one purpose from another, but also the extent of such systematisation. Carlyle's statement about historical persons is a half-truth. Mere internal articulatedness is not the real criterion of true individuality. Mathematics is a highly articulated system of a department of knowledge. But it is obvious to everyone that this internal systematisation is bought at the cost of great abstraction. True individuality must be seen in the nature of the articulatedness involved. The criterion, again, is whether any 'matter' is left out of account. Real individuality lies in the complete subjugation of this element, not only internally but also externally. Two systems therefore may differ widely even though there is internal articulatedness, because there might exist matter that repels from outside. The systematic purposes of a thief and a saint differ widely from each other on account of this external repelling element, though internally both the systems may be unique and perfect. This is the third contrast that Bosanquet draws, and one that is certainly worth insisting upon.

It will, therefore, be obvious that there is nothing mysterious, as Prof Kemp Smith and Mr Foster and others would have us believe, in the doctrine of the concrete universal. The difficulty is due to the dogmatic insistence that the universal and the particular are mutually exclusive, the one being a concept, a mental entity, derived by abstraction from particulars, while the other is a substance, concrete and material. It is forgotten that a universal and a particular differ from each other not because they are mutually exclusive, the one timeless and the other temporal, but on the basis of the elimination of the alien element, called substance or matter. Everywhere the principle is the imposition of order upon chaos. A particular is a particular not because it has the priceless gift

called 'substance,' but because it has the misfortune of having something in it that cannot be perfectly ordered. It is an irony that what should have been considered a misfortune should have been taken as matter for glory. Instead of finding the consummation of particularity in the final renunciation of this alien matter, Mr. Foster believes that it is this matter that confers upon the particular the title of particularity and makes it unmanageable by the concrete universal. The goal of particularity is understood to be in exclusion rather than in inclusion. Individuality is interpreted as atomicity mere running away from adventures that are the world.

Mr Foster, however, is quite clear on this point. "The first step," he says, "is the discovery that a particular thing cannot be regarded as the particularisation of the universal because there is 'something' in a thing, (the same 'something' which makes it susceptible of casual interaction) which is not exhausted in its being the particularisation of any universal, or of any number of universals"¹. But this 'something' that is supposed to be the reservoir of particularity is hardly explained at all except that it is the basis of the working of mechanical causation. Moreover, unlike Prof. Smith, Mr Foster agrees that the attributes of substance may be 'particularisations' of the universal. He also does not agree with Prof. Smith that all universals are abstract. The notion of the concrete universal is intelligible to him as it is not to Prof. Smith. But he is so much obsessed with the 'substance' that a particular has, that he finds it to be a conclusive argument against the validity of the doctrine of the concrete universal. We had thought that after its demolition by Berkeley, Kant and Hegel, this notion *ie* 'substance', in this form would not raise its head. But not only does it raise its head but it seeks to overthrow all that modern philosophy has gained through the labours of its thinkers.

Once we accept the idea that the true nature of individuality lies in the elimination of the alien element, there

1. *L&C. cit.*, p. 21.

is no difficulty in understanding how the particular is a universal also. What we call the process of particularisation is nothing more nor less than what we have elsewhere called differentiation of the universal¹ and therefore a particular is not something that stands over against the universal. It is particular because it is a less perfect universal. As such, it is not the perfect universe or the individual. The only perfect individual is the universe or the Absolute where there is nothing alien and where everything is fully systematic.

Thus, the doctrine of the concrete universal does full justice to the relation between the particular and the universal. The concrete universal is the unity of the contents of particulars and the principle of particularisation. Particularisation, it cannot be insisted too often, is differentiation. These processes are not two but one and the same. And this inevitably follows, inasmuch as the particular itself is a universal which does not hide within its womb the monster of 'substance' or 'matter'. If every particular had this monster in its deep recess, self-differentiation would be impossible. It is this self-differentiation that entitles us to call the universal, determinant. The universe is a creative unity; it is, as Spinoza called it, a free cause, that is to say, the cause that expresses itself in infinite modes in infinite ways through infinite attributes.

This character of self-differentiation which, in other words, we have called the character of determining the existence of particulars in space and in time is denied by Mr. Foster and all those who deny the validity of the notion of the concrete universal. Since the universal is an ideal unity, Mr. Foster calls it a 'ghost.'² Mr. Foster presumably believes that what is ideal is not real, and since the concrete universal is the ideal unity of particulars, it is incapable of

¹ This is the crux of the difficulty in Cook Wilson and also in Foster, as well as in Stout and Johnson, who otherwise have some sympathy for the concrete universal.

² "He (i.e., Bosanquet) ought to have seen that the 'ideal system' is, since Darwin is right, there is no such thing as the activity of the universal in determining its own specific determinations, there is only the development of the species through actual generations"—Loc. cit. p. 17.

determining the emergence of particulars. He dichotomises the universe into the ideal and the real, as if the real were not ideal and the ideal not real. He obviously believes in "floating ideas" which he is mistakenly led to regard as ideal. But such floating ideas do not exist and cannot exist because every idea to be an idea must refer to ultimate reality. But Mr Foster is very emphatic on this point.

"When Bosanquet says, *e.g.*, 'Rose in the abstract does not exist. But it is the concrete universal that has the power, in the context of the real world to which we refer it to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment,' we must ask more narrowly what existence is 'dictated.' If the existence of the rosean order as a whole, that is indeed determinate, but it is in no sense dictated by the universal Rose. The genus rose is not universal in relation to itself. In relation to particular roses, on the other hand, the genus rose is universal but it is unable, except within very wide limits, to dictate the place and time of their individual embodiment. Thus the two 'aspects' of concreteness and universality which must coincide in the concrete universal, tend in the individual system to fall apart. It is not quite concrete qua universal and not quite universal qua concrete"¹

I believe that the reason why Mr. Foster is not prepared to allow the universal to dictate the existence of particulars is because according to him, a particular implies space and time, as *fundamenta divisionis*, and secondly, because particulars are in dynamic relation with each other. Universals are impotent to dictate existence because they are 'bloodless categories'. Universals are merely ideal and, as such, cannot influence the course of events in the actual world. The actual world is the world where events involve causation; the ideal world is a mere logical concatenation. "There is no guarantee that what is ideal will correspond to the real. To identify the ideal with the real is to accept the validity of the ontological argument which Mr. Foster

1. *Loc. cit.*, p. 19.

thinks is 'a rickety bridge' built by muddle-headed philosophers to negotiate the passage from deality to reality¹

Hence the reason why the universal cannot act as determinant is that the particular implies spatio-temporal relationship and causal determination, while universals do not. But with all this, Mr. Foster is prepared to allow such a determination in regard to qualities whose existence is dictated by generic concepts. But how the qualities that are owned by particulars can be exempt from spatio-temporal and casual determination when they are owned by particulars is very mysterious. However, this is what he says:

"Just as the 'generic concept' would be conceived as determining only the specific qualities of the particular, so the race that develops determines, in fact, only the specific qualities of its individual members, and, further, although regarded as a whole, the individual system is precisely determined as to its own existence in space and time regarded as a universal, i.e., in relation to any particular member of itself, it is impotent to determine the space and time of its particularisation save in so far as that must fall somewhere within the wide spatial and temporal area occupied by the genus as a whole; at what time and at what place within these limits, that lies outside the determination of the universal and in the domain of causality."²

It is needless to examine this passage, apart from its mysterious separation of qualities from the 'particular, in view of the fact that we have already denied that space and time are *fundamenta divisionis*' and have proved that mechanical causation is unintelligible without logical determination. We have allowed the ontological argument to be

1 "If we have no guarantee even of the correspondence of an ideal system with reality, what warrant have we to speak of the 'active determination' of the latter by the former?" The "generic concept" is precisely such an ideal system: we see now that it can neither, as ideal, exercise any determining influence over a particular reality, nor itself pass into the sphere of reality over the rickety bridge of the ontological argument"—Loc. cit., p. 16. See also Montague, "Ways of Knowing," pp. 110-111 for similar views quoted above.

2 Op. cit., p. 18.

3 "We must get rid of the erroneous notion (if we have it) that space and time are 'principles of individuation' in the sense that a temporal or a spatial exclusion will confer uniqueness upon any content. It is an illusion to suppose that, by speaking of 'events' we get down to real and solid particulars and leave the airy region of universal adjectives. What space and time to we mean? It is clear that exclusion within a given series does not carry with it an absolute uniqueness. Such particularity in space and time, such an exclusive nature, after all, is only a general character. It falls in the content and does not give existence. It marks the sort, but it muzzes the thing"—Bradley, *Logic*, pp. 63-66.

fully legitimate, however 'rickety' it may be. Nor do we find any reason to believe that the universal and the genus are different from each other, the first concerned with the differentiation of qualities, the second busy with the particularisation of particulars. This distinction is invalid to us because we have agreed that particularisation is differentiation. When Bosanquet declared that "the rose in the abstract does not exist" and that "it is the universal which has the power, in the real world, to which we refer it, to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment," he did not mean by the universal an entity in heaven but a genus that has, as Mr Foster agrees, the power to determine the existence of species. It is true that the notion of the concrete universal goes much beyond the notion of the 'genus' of Aristotle, which was much vitiated by his insistence on the substantiality of particulars, (like these modern philosophers, who also believe in the substance of their particulars) which in turn gave rise to his notion of 'kind'. To this we shall return later. But that the universal belongs to this real world none can deny. And if this is admitted, it is impossible to deny that the concrete universal can determine the spatial and temporal existence of particulars, which notion, Mr Foster has already, though with difficulty, assented to in the sphere of qualities.

It is therefore not very difficult to understand where the difference between Mr Foster and others on the one hand, and us who believe in the concrete universals on the other, exactly lies. The difference between us and him does not appear to be very great in view of the fact that he does not agree with Prof. Smith in holding that all universals are abstract. "If once we claim any degree of concreteness to the universal," says Mr. Foster, "there is no stopping along that path, short of the historical individual. But can we repudiate the whole movement as Prof. Kemp Smith does? Can we follow him in declaring that all universals both are and ought to be abstract? No, we cannot."¹

In this alternation between the acceptance and rejection of the concrete universal, Mr Foster impales himself on the horns of a dilemma. He cannot declare that all universals are abstract because that would mean "falling a victim to the contradiction contained in the conception of 'material substance'."¹ Nor can he, as is abundantly clear, follow the lead of the concrete universal because in that case he would be "involved in the denial of efficient causation, and be totally unable to account for the physical science of nature."

The course that he follows certainly excites our admiration not unmingled with a certain amount of pathos. It is that,

"the true particular of universals must be conceived, therefore, not as particular things but as particular qualities, whose nature can be conceived as exhausted entirely in their being the particularisation of the universal. But then there springs up beside this intelligible relation of universal to particular, the wholly unintelligible relation of attribute to substantive. We are unable on the one hand to conceive these particular qualities except as attributes, and we are unable on the other hand to conceive without inconsistency the substance of which they are attributes."²

It is the course that involves the conclusion that the universal is a determinable and a determinant of qualities or attributes but not of substance. He holds that the relation between substance and attributes is ultimate. "That which should take place as the universal must be a new conception including both Essence and Substance within itself."³ There is thus a dualism in the universe which cannot be explained, but must be admitted. This is the old Leibnizian position again where existence and content were 'cut with a hatchet'. Such a dualism within the unity of a thing is, to Mr. Foster, the only solution of the problem of universals. "The idea of the concrete universal," he writes "is nothing else than the redintegration of this unity."⁴ But where Leibniz failed to persuade us can Mr. Foster succeed?

1 Loc cit, p 21

2 Ibid

3 Loc cit, p 22.

4 Ibid

CHAPTER X

CONCLUDING REMARKS

WE are now at the end of our journey and it will not be without profit if we cast a glance over the ground that we have covered in the preceding pages. However inadequate it may be, the examination of the problem that we undertook to discuss in these pages, has given us a valuable clue to the solution of the problem of universals, and also as to why the problem was found insoluble by many competent thinkers who had to improvise novel methods to achieve what turned out to be impossible. We discovered that the problem of universals springs directly from the problem of the 'one and the many,' in other words, it is an attempt to understand how unity can be reconciled with plurality. That plurals are somehow united is a fact which cannot be denied. But it was not quite clear, firstly, how this unity was possible and secondly, what was the nature of this unity. We saw that there are some thinkers who deny the existence of this unity except in name. There are others who accept the existence of this unity but fail to throw any light on its nature and resort to fantastic theories. There are yet others who draw a distinction between the particular and the universal in terms of entities in the existential sphere and in the epistemological sphere, and come dangerously near to making the universal a mental abstraction. Whatever be the methods applied to the solution of the problem, one fact that emerges clearly from all these attempts is that these thinkers accept without any critical analysis the dogma that the particular and the universal are mutually exclusive and that, as such, their natures are different. They believe the particular to be a substance while the universal is treated as an insubstantial entity. It is, therefore, quite obvious that if the particular and the

universal are thus mutually exclusive and radically different in their natures, it is *a priori* impossible that any relationship can be established between them. Any relation implies community of nature between the terms related. If this community is absent, then any attempt to establish this relationship is bound to prove a failure. The reason why all these attempts, which we have examined in the preceding pages, failed in their objective is that these thinkers started from an untenable presupposition which could hardly support their doctrines in spite of their resourcefulness and ingenuity. That they failed to throw light on the problem is not surprising, for, if you start from wrong premises, the conclusion is bound to be wrong.

The doctrine of universals that we have developed so far, denies this presupposition and insists that the particular and the universal are mutually inclusive in the sense that the particular itself is the universal or, in other words, the particular is the universal particularised. We further urged that every universal is concrete in the sense that it is not an abstraction from particulars but a continuant that determines the differentiation of particulars and includes them. In this sense every universal is individual because individuality is the concrete unity of abstract existence and abstract essence, abstract particularity and abstract universality. We also urged that every particular, because universal, is also an individual, and that its individuality does not lie in having 'substance' or 'matter'. The individuality of the particular lies in being an indivisible fragment of the whole, the concrete universal or the individual. Its individuality is illustrated in its attempt to reflect the whole which is the highest Individual. The particular is individual because it is universal. But its individuality lies in its being a draught of the whole, a *partialitas*, as Spinoza would say, and not because it has rights absolute. Its individuality is always in the process of becoming and is never complete. Every particular is therefore more or less individual. Individuality has degrees just as truth and reality have degrees.

It is this failure to grasp the fact that every particular is more or less individual and that its individuality lies in its transcendence, to be determined by the whole, that has prevented these philosophers from seeing the truth about the problem of universals. This failure is due to the fact that they were dominated by the abstract universal, that is, the identity that is merely repetitive, a mere fossil, which does not grow, because from it all life has departed. They failed to realise that the universal is a self-developing identity whose very life lies in its dynamicity, in self-differentiation. It is a creative unity. Every particular is a differentiation of this creative unity and, as such, its creature. But it is also self-determinative. A particular is not merely a creature but also a creator. And this paradox is intelligible because the concrete universal is the fountain of free creative life. The concrete universal is not distinct from particulars, its differentiations, but it is a participant in these differentiations. It is because the particular is a draught of the fountain of freedom that the concrete universal is creative and self-determinative at once, creating the particular and being determined by the particular. Similarly, it is not difficult to understand how the particular is not a mere idle entity, a castaway, but is the functioning of the universal and is thus a participator in the process of creation. Both the particular and the universal determine each other in the process of creativity. It is determination, but the determination of the eternal life, it is necessity, but the necessity of the eternal unfolding of the 'infinite love wherewith God loves Himself.' It is impossible to understand the relation between the universal and the particular in terms of categories that are at best aids to imagination. All our categories involve time-determination, which fails to give us an insight into the life of eternity. The eternal is the whole, while time is necessarily fragmentary. It is true that we meet the whole only through time, but there is a danger that in such meeting with the whole we forget the true nature of the whole. Temporalisation is realisation. But at the same time it is fragmentation. Unless

the nature of time is fully realised and unless we see the eternal life, as a whole, through this fragmentation, we may fail to understand the true relation of the whole to the part, the universal to the particular.

It is the failure to realise the nature of this paradox of self-determination, wherein the part determines the whole and the whole the part, but in the very process of determination both enjoy the freedom of creation, that has been the source of all the difficulties. It is this failure that is responsible for much of the confusion in Logic and Ethics, to take only two provinces of speculation, from Aristotle to modern times. A brief reference to these topics will throw a clear light on the nature of this paradox and convince us, if further conviction is needed, that the only way to remove the confusion is to accept the doctrine of the concrete universal.

The great contribution to Logic that was made by Aristotle is his doctrine of the syllogism. The value of the traditional syllogism is admirably summed up by Johnson when he says that "the syllogism is practically important because it represents the form in which persons unschooled in logical technique are continually arguing. It is theoretically important because it exhibits in its simplest guise the fundamental principles that underlie all demonstration whether deductive or inductive. It is educationally important because the establishment of its valid moods and the systematisation and co-ordination of its rules afford an exercise to thought not inferior and, in some respects, superior to that afforded by elementary mathematics."¹ But it cannot be denied that whatever be the merits of the Aristotelian syllogism, it has been mainly responsible for the lead it gave to logic in following the barren road of formalism based on linear inference supported by the abstract universal.

It is idle to charge the syllogism with being incapable of helping induction or to complain that it is mainly based

¹ *Logic*, Vol II, p 102

on the subject-predicate relation Aristotle at least was clear about the function that the syllogism was expected to fulfil. He knew that the syllogism was concerned with rules rather than with scientific discovery. The syllogism according to him was "an argument in which, certain things having been assumed, something other than these follows of necessity from their truth, without needing any term from outside."¹ The syllogism, therefore, only "assumes" the truth of the premises and does not enquire into their truth or falsehood. Whether the premises are true or false must be proved on independent grounds, say, by inductive generalisation.

Hence the syllogism is concerned with the demonstration of the necessity of the conclusion following from the premises rather than with discovery. The interesting point, however, is that according to Aristotle demonstration is possible only in the sphere of universals, and that the individual cannot be demonstrated. He was quite clear that inference from the beginning is concerned with universals and not with individual particulars.² It is only in so far as Socrates is 'man' that his morality can be demonstrated. But if Socrates were to be fully individual then no proof that he was mortal could be given, because proof is possible only when he loses his individuality.

This is the weakness of the Aristotelian syllogism and the cause of the havoc it has played in Logic. That all knowledge and inference is only within the realm of universals can easily be granted because, as we have urged in the preceding pages, every particular is a universal and there are no particulars qua particulars. If Aristotle had suggested this then we should not have found any reason to differ from him, but, on the contrary, would have gladly accepted the doctrine, for it is exactly the doctrine of the concrete universal, where the universal-major stands for the wider whole, a higher universal, within which both

1 An. Pr. 24b18-22

2. "There is neither definition of nor demonstration about sensible individual substances, because they have matter whose nature is such that they are capable both of being and not being"—Met. 1029b 28-30

the minor and the conclusion are included as lesser wholes, and are determined by it. But Aristotle would then have forfeited his right to distinguish the universal from the individual substance, as he actually does. He would also have forfeited his right to distinguish essence from accidents, the latter belonging to the particular, in virtue of which the particular or the individual cannot be demonstrated. Demonstration is of the universal, of the essence, and not of the accidents. Individuals cannot be demonstrated because they have accidental qualities which distinguish them from universals.

The distinction between essence and accidents reduces the syllogism to a parody of inference. If all the accidents of Socrates are removed, what remains of Socrates is merely an empty shell and not the living individual. The syllogism reduces itself to, "All men are mortal," "Man is man, therefore "Man is mortal," which is not inference but dead repetition. The futility of syllogism as a rule of inference can nowhere be more clearly demonstrated than in this *reductio ad absurdum*. The Aristotelian syllogism is thus on the horns of a dilemma. If all matter is removed from the premises and they are reduced to mere forms the syllogism ceases to be inference because there is nothing to infer. But if on the other hand 'matter' is allowed to enter the domain and influence the syllogistic process, then the very process never starts, because it requires that the premises shall be both universals and thus be shorn of 'matter'. That is to say, if matter is allowed, accidents will also have to be given entrance, and the syllogism cannot deal with them and it commits suicide. If accidents are denied admission and if only universals are allowed, then the syllogism dies of inanition.

It is the abstract universal, a mere repetitive identity, that is mainly responsible for the distinction between essence and accidents, which has been the cause of the defeat of the syllogism. If the universal is treated as an empty schema, mere form, then accidents which vary, and thus are differentiations must be rigorously extruded from

this schema. But in this case there is neither knowledge nor syllogism which is supposed to supply rules for demonstration.

But where can the accidents be located? Is it not true that if Socrates has a snub nose, this truly and eternally belongs to him? Is not the individuality of Socrates irrevocably connected with the snub nose just as other qualities, for example, his being a great philosopher, are? What is left of the philosopher if you ignore his body, and is not the body the plan that differentiates itself into his having a snub nose? The realisation of the plan demands even the least detail, without which the plan cannot be perfect. The life of Socrates as a plan is a unity that includes all the qualities, because as the concrete universal it participates in everything wherever the realisation of the plan is possible. It is true that snub-nosedness is not quite relevant if we look at Socrates as a philosopher. But to have less relevance is not to be non-significant. Essences and accidents cannot be divided with a sharp knife. They differ from each other but this difference cannot amount to a sharp division. Accidents as well as essences belong to the individual substance because the concrete universal as the plan of realisation determines both, wherever the possibility of realisation is open. The universal is not a line, mere length without breath. It is a circle. It includes all that comes within its radius whether essences or accidents. In the realisation of the universal or the universe nothing is superfluous. The universe realises itself in man as well as in a blade of grass. There are no accidents in reality, everything belongs to reality by right, and reality belong to everything in greater or less degree.¹

This distinction between essence and accidents led to serious controversies in the middle ages, Porphyry reducing all universals to particulars and thus parts of the individual

1. Compare, "Hodge drives a plough but it is not of him that driving the plough is predicated as an accident. But a man drives a plough. That is an accident, for the subject now is not Hodge wholly, but a man, and it is not in his nature as a man that the ground or reason of his driving a plough lies, else should we all be plough-tail. And yet no animal but man can drive the plough the relation between the subject and predicate seems not completely accidental."—Joseph, *Logic*, pp 79-80.

substance, and Ockham reducing universals to mental abstractions. And both Porphyry and Ockham could claim that they were following Aristotle in their analysis of the Aristotelian logic. Since for Aristotle the individual was the primary substance and thus distinct from other individuals, all that belongs to it must also essentially belong to it and thus be essential. Porphyry's inclusion of "species," as the fifth predicable, follows logically if all universals are individual essences that inhere necessarily in the individual. On the other hand Ockham followed Aristotle in turning universals into signs of second intention, that is, mental fabrications, because it was Aristotle that had disallowed the individual to participate in the syllogistic process and had reduced the individual to an abstract universal. Porphyry reduced the individual to something indeterminate and thus to an abstract particular. Ockham reduced the universal to an abstraction, something that has no existential import. The one reduced individuals to atomic universals, the other reduced universals to mere mental fabrications. To the one, the individual was unknown because it was forever indeterminate, to the other the individual was unknown because it eluded the grasp of thought. But to both the universal was an abstraction that was incapable of determining particulars and incapable of including their content.

It is the same abstract universal that was responsible for the confusion in Mill, who could not understand how the major premise could determine the minor and the conclusion, and declared that the syllogism committed *petitio principii*. To Mill also the process of inference was a linear process, and he understood the necessity of the conclusion as bringing out something that was already contained in the premises. He failed to realise that the conclusion is contained in the premises, not as the small Chinese box is contained in the bigger one, but as a plan contains its variations. Like Aristotle he understood demonstration to be mere linear concatenation, and could not see that real demonstration is possible only within the concrete univer-

sal which imposes necessity upon the conclusion. But the difference between him and Aristotle lay in the fact that while Aristotle, in the interests of demonstration, reduced the individual to an abstract universal, Mill reduced the universal to an abstract particular. According to Mill the only universal is enumerative, and he thus denied what Aristotle had admitted, namely, generic universals. It is true that, for Aristotle generic universals never amounted to demonstration because he believed that induction was never concerned with proof. But since for him the particular, so far as known, was already a universal, the inductive process according to him was only concerned with making the indeterminate universal, first apprehended in the particular, more determinate, by extruding all the accidental accretions. Moreover, Aristotle was quite clear that the epistemic validity of the syllogism never depended upon the constitutive validity of induction, because he distinguished syllogism as a process of demonstration, it being concerned with universals from beginning to end, from induction which was concerned with particulars, though with particulars that were universals from the beginning. Whether generic universals were only probable or whether they were indubitable, this fact did not affect the validity of the syllogism, which was a process distinct from that of induction. It is true that these generic universals were as much abstract as the major premise which repeated identically in both the minor and the conclusion. But he was careful to note that the validity of the syllogism in no way depended upon the constitutive validity of the inductive process.

Mill, on the other hand, urged that the epistemic validity of the syllogism depended upon the constitutive validity of induction.¹ And this was why he charged the syllogism with fallacy, because he confounded the nature of demonstration as understood by Aristotle with scientific proof. It is true that it was a serious breach in the

¹ "Now the charge of circularity or *petitio principii* is epistemic and the whole of Mill's argument may therefore be summed up in the statement that the epistemic validity of syllogism and constitutive validity of induction both of which had been disputed by earlier logicians, stand or fall together." — Johnson, *Logic*, Vol. II, p. xix

Aristotelian logic to have allowed two parallel processes to stand face to face without any prospect of reconciliation. Such a reconciliation would have meant discarding the abstract universal mere repetitive identity, and substituting in its place the concrete universal, which was the source both of essence and existence. Aristotle had, on account of his attachment to the individual, primary substance, divorced essence from existence, and had denied that existence, prime matter, could in any way be determined by the universal. Thought was concerned with essence while being was concerned with existence. Being, the urged, was concerned with the individual whilst essence was concerned with the universal. It is not suggested, however, that Aristotle divided the universe into the existent and the subsistent. On the contrary he insisted that the particular was from the very beginning universal. But the point is that Aristotle was so much overwhelmed by the abstract universal identically repeating in every particular, that he failed to realise that such atomic universals, capsuled into every particular, were the Parmenidian entities, which negated motion, and which could hardly take part in the fulness of the life of particulars, and, therefore, were as good as non-existent. If he had seen that the universal was the nexus or the system that differentiated itself into particulars, which from the very beginning were particularised universals, he would have seen that the distinction between essence and accident was untenable. He also would have seen that syllogistic demonstration was possible with the universal, which was not abstractly ideal but concretely real, because from the beginning it was concerned with existence. Logic does not deal merely with thought, ignoring existence, as if thought and existence did not imply each other. The major premise is the generic universal, the discovery of which is the business of induction. It is not the case that the syllogism is concerned with proof, and induction with discovery. The discovery of the generic universal at the same time supplies proof of the particulars which are included in this nexus. Induction from the very beginning

is syllogistic, because thought is the content which always refers to reality as a whole. The epistemic validity of the syllogism is thus based on the constitutive validity of induction, because essence determines existence and existence determines essence. They are the two aspects of reality, and reality expresses itself equally through them.¹

It was, therefore, a great advance when Mill suggested that the epistemic validity of the universal-major and the constitutive validity of induction stand or fall together. If Mill had followed the clue that was thus discovered by him, he would have seen the real nature of the syllogism, how from the very beginning it is concerned with the concrete universal, which, as the major, functions as the nexus determining the minor and the conclusion. But this could hardly be expected from Mill. Instead of seeing that the universal is always concretely real, he denied the validity of the universal and reduced it to mere abstraction. The universal proposition is an aggregate, but, according to Mill, it is at the same time the basis of inference.² It is very difficult to know how the aggregate, mere quantity, can support any inference. This means that necessity is based upon quantity and is not a qualitative determination.³

If necessity is, a quantitative notion, the basis of induction should have been simple enumeration. But Mill was quite sure that simple enumeration was not a 'potent instrument' for the purpose of scientific investigation.⁴ If so,

1 "Truth is reality taken as *ide* it, and that must mean reality taken as an intelligible system, and every judgment and inference therefore must be understood as directed and aimed at such reality"—Bradley, *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 620

2 "Now all which men can observe are individual cases. From these all general truths must be drawn, and into these they may again be resolved. For a general truth is but an aggregate of particular truths, a comprehensive expression, by which indefinite number of individual facts are affirmed or denied at once. But a general proposition is not merely a compendium form for recording and preserving in the memory a number of particular facts, all of which have been observed. Generalisation is not a process of mere naming. It is also a process of inference"—*Logic*, Bk. II, Chap. III.

3 Compare, "A proposition is more or less necessary according as the class of propositions for which it is a premise is greater or smaller"—Russell, "Principles of Mathematics," 2nd ed., p. 454

4 "Popular notions are usually founded on induction by simple enumeration; in science it carries us but a little way. We are forced to begin with it: we must often rely on it provisionally, in the absence of means of a more searching investigation. But for the accurate study of nature, we require a surer and a more potent instrument."—*Logic*, Bk. II, Ch. p. III

it is very difficult to know what exactly the nature of scientific induction, is and on what fundamental principles it is based. This confusion on the part of Mill was due to the fact that he never accepted the notion of the generic universal which differentiated itself into species, the notion that was clearly accepted by Aristotle, and thought that the only universal was enumerative. He failed to realise that induction was never from particular to particular, but that it was from universal to universal, a fact that was clearly recognised by Aristotle also. Both, however, failed to realise that the universal, whether in induction or syllogism, was concretely real and not merely abstractly ideal. He differed from Aristotle in that he urged that the particular was never universal but that it was particular only. The antithesis between the particular and the universal that was mitigated by Aristotle, in thought at least, was glaring for Mill and he could not see how the particular could also be a universal.

So in the interests of consistency he denied the validity of the universal in inference, just as Aristotle denied the validity of the individual. While for Aristotle, an individual qua individual cannot be demonstrated, because demonstration is concerned only with universals, for Mill, demonstration is possible only with individuals. While Aristotle urged that thought can only deal with the universal, Mill maintained that thought can deal only with individuals. The abstract universal of Aristotle is thus faced with the abstract particular of Mill, two shadows fighting with each other, to the utter neglect of the concrete universal which reconciles both in a concrete unity. If form without matter is empty, matter without form is blind.¹

1 "Is there any man of science who in his daily work, and apart from philosophic controversy, will accept a bare conjunction as conceivably ultimate truth?"—Bosanquet, "Distinction between Mind and its Objects," pp. 59-60. Also in the following remarkable passage he brings out the concrete universality of the major premise in the syllogistic process: "If you say, 'oxygenated blood is bright, the blood in the arteries is oxygenated blood: therefore the blood in the arteries is bright,' you have brought together your terms in the conception of the circulation of the blood, and your conclusion, although it exemplifies a rule, shows also a system in which the terms are factors, their union is rationally explained, and their meaning developed. But a rule that is aimed like that of the syllogism, at excluding in principle all modification, would really destroy the vital essence of reasoning."—"Implication and Inference," 27.

This divorce of matter from form that was initiated by Aristotle and carried forward by Mill saw its culmination in the theories of the modern successors of Mill, the Logical Positivists. The neglect of the concrete universal which created such confusion in Aristotle and Mill, was carried forward to a logical absurdity by these champions of formal logic, who reduced logic to a mere tautology. Logical propositions, declares Mr. Ayer, "tell us only what we may be said to know already"¹ so that "to find that a proposition is necessarily to be asserted only means to find that it has already been asserted."² Hence the necessity that was supposed to lie in logical inference has nothing to do with the realm of facts, matter, but only with form, that is, the conventional use of language.³ Mill, however unsatisfactory his notion of 'necessity' may have been, had at least accepted the validity of the notion in the matter of inference. It is true that he denied that the major premise was necessary in drawing the conclusion, but he at least accepted its psychological necessity as a "collateral security for the correctness of the generalisation itself."⁴ His struggle with the law of causation and his frantic efforts to derive necessity from atomic facts, though an instance of logical perversity, at least indicates that for Mill, the notion of 'necessity' was not merely conventional but had ontological status. It is true that the notion of 'necessity' cannot be reconciled with the strict pluralism that Mill accepted. But the fact that he struggled to reconcile the irreconcilables indicates his opposition to the logical positivists.

Now this reduction of universal propositions to mere tautologies, and the attempts to eviscerate meaning of all 'necessity,' should have reduced logic to merely accidental conjunctions of empirical facts. All talk about 'inference' and deduction should have been banished from logic because

1. *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 105

2. *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

3. "The principles of logic and mathematics are true universally simply because we never allow them to be anything else. And the reason for this is that we cannot abandon them without contradicting ourselves, without sinning against the rules which govern our use of language, and so making our utterances self-stultifying." —*Ibid.*, p. 114.

4. *Logic*, Bk II, Chap. III

inference involves, however disguised, the notion of 'necessity.' But it appears that the logical positivists, in spite of their denial of necessity, do talk of deduction and inference. Thus Russell says, "in order that one proposition may be inferred from another, it is necessary that the two should have that relation which makes the one a consequence of the other. When a proposition 'q' is consequence of the proposition 'p' we say that 'p' implies 'q' Thus, deduction depends upon the relation of implication"¹

Russell recognises two kinds of implication, material and formal. A definition of 'material implication' according to Russell is impossible² However, he adds that "of any two propositions, there must be one which implies the other that false propositions imply all propositions, and true propositions are implied by all propositions."³ About formal implication Russell adds, "it is the affirmation of every material implication of a certain class, and the class of material implications involved is, in many simple cases, the class of all propositions in which a given fixed assertion made, concerning a certain fixed assertion concerning the same object or subjects, is affirmed to imply another given fixed assertion concerning the same subject or subjects"⁴ Thus formal implication is a class, an extensional notion To the question whether formal implication determines material implication, Russell answers that "where a formal implication holds, we agreed to regard it, wherever possible, as due to some relation between the assertions concerned"⁵ In other words, the fundamental relation is that of 'material implication,' as for the 'formal implication,' though it is involved in the former, yet "to perceive immediately the implication in question is to perceive that it is implied by one or more rules of inference."⁶ Moreover, formal implication is "a class of material implications;

¹ *Principia Mathematica*, Vol. I, p. 90

² *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 14

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 14

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 41

it asserts that in every case of a certain set of cases material implication holds"¹ Hence, "it is the relation of material implication," says Prof Stebbing, "that Russell regards as the sole relation in virtue of which deduction is possible."²

But is 'material implication' implication at all or a mere parody of it? Let us take these two propositions: 'cheese is soft' and 'chalk is white' According to Russell there must be material implication between these two, and, therefore, the second must be the consequence of the first. But is there any sense in calling the second "consequence," when both these are independent of each other and atomic? There must be a ground for passage from the one to the other before the relation of implication can be advertised. But these writers declare that there is nothing common between the antecedent and the consequent, except the fact that the one is true and the other is true, or that the first is false and the second true or false But in this case has the word "follows," in which one proposition is said to 'follow' from another, any meaning? The relation 'follows' has meaning only when both the antecedent and the consequent are related to each other The conclusion 'follows' from the premises only when the premises are related to the conclusion within one determinate whole To maintain that propositions are atomic, and yet to urge that the one 'follows' from the other is either to understand the relation 'follows' in a way entirely different from what is generally understood by logicians or to contradict one's doctrine The fact that inference can never be possible with atomic propositions was seen long ago by Plato in the dilemma of 'Meno' and also by Aristotle when he urged that inference depended upon 'pre-existent knowledge' But these modern logicians seek to explain this dilemma away by resorting to these radical methods, and no less clearly fall into a more serious dilemma which they hardly recognise.³ If implication, as

¹ Stebbing, 'A Modern Introduction to Logic,' p 224

² Ibid

³ Compare "Empiricism breaks down over the validity of inference, if it allows that, it gives away its case, if it disallows it it cannot argue" — Joseph Logic, p 194

understood by these logicians, means anything follows from anything else, it exactly means that nothing follows from anything. Material implication is the stark denial of any implication and also of any reasoning.

Secondly, can any proposition be true or false by itself? Is truth or falsehood a quality that belongs to propositions like red and green? Is it not true that "truth is the degree in which the character of reality is present within a proposition or set of propositions"¹ and that "every judgment is relative to the whole of knowledge, and no judgment entirely escapes modification as this whole is modified?"² Is it not a fact that "The growth of knowledge consists in a widening and in an increase of systematic mediation? The more the conditions of the judgment are, or can be, included in the judgment, the truer and more real, the less conditional and the more conditioned does that judgment become. And the judgment that seeks to be at once true, and at the same time a mere simple and unconditioned assertion of fact, implies the worship and the pursuit of an illusory abstraction. It involves the assumption of a false and perverted ideal of knowledge. Such a judgment, the more it attempts to assert itself as absolute, succeeds only the more in emphasising itself as dependent on and subject to the unknown."³

If we leave Logic to its own fate and turn our attention to Ethics, the consequences following upon the neglect of the concrete universal are no less serious. Here also we have a new cry of deliverance similar to that of Logical Positivism, which reduces ethics to a personal idiosyncrasy. I refer to the doctrine called 'deontology,' so ably formulated by Mr. Ross⁴ and Mr. Prichard⁵ and their followers.

The main problem that ethics deals with is that of the 'good' and its relation to the 'right.' If we enquire why any act is right we can only answer that it is good, and

1 Bosanquet, "Implication and Linear Inference," p 102

2 Bosanquet, "Logic," Vol II p 230

3 Bradley, "Logic," II 639

4 "The Right and the Good" and later "Foundations of Ethics"

5 In his Inaugural "Duty and Interest"

good in its turn can only be understood when we refer to the right act. The paradox here is similar to the one we discovered in logic, where the conclusion determines the premises and the premises determine the conclusion, or in the sphere of knowledge, where the idea determines the object and the object determines the idea. These are the specific problems of the more general problem of the universal and the particular, where, as we said, the universal determines the particular and in this process determines itself and *vice versa*. It is impossible to go behind the paradox and seek to take the one and derive the other from it. The result is either the abstract particular or the abstract universal, which as abstractions leave the paradox where it is and only succeed in bringing confusion in its trail.

Plato, no less than Aristotle, was fully aware of this paradox. Plato's answer is that 'virtue consists in knowledge,' and by knowledge he means the knowledge of the Good or the Universe. Any action is determined as right only within the reality in virtue of which the act acquires its rightness. Abstracted from the whole of reality, the act is neither right nor wrong. It is true that we do not wait for the ultimate knowledge of reality to do any act, but this criticism, Plato would argue, does not prove that any act has *prima facie* rightness, without any reference to the whole of reality.¹ The case is parallel to the truth or falsity of judgment. A judgment is true or false only with reference to reality. It is ridiculous to suggest that any judgment can be deduced from knowledge of reality as a whole. It means that a judgment is more or less true and further that its truth depends upon its relation to reality. An atomic judgment, even if it were possible, is neither true nor false. We have no implicit knowledge of reality, the fact described by Plato, by his

1 Contrast Ross, 'Foundations of Ethics,' p. 84. "Any possible act has many sides to it which are relevant to its rightness or wrongness. We are quite incapable of pronouncing straight off on its rightness or wrongness in the totality of these aspects. It is only by recognising these different features, one by one, that we can approach the forming of the judgment of the totality of its nature. Our first look reveals these features in isolation, one by one, they are what appears *prima facie*."

doctrine of reminiscence, and it is this standard that helps us to determine whether any judgment is true or false.

When Plato urged that 'knowledge is virtue,' he did not suggest that mere academic equipment makes a man virtuous, nor did he suggest that one has to wait for absolute knowledge before one ventures to do any moral act. All our acts are more or less right, and, therefore, realise goodness in a greater or less degree. And further it is the implicit presence of the Good in every moral act that determines whether any act is right or wrong. Without the implicit presence of the good the concrete universal, no act is right or wrong.

It is remarkable that in the sphere of ethics Aristotle follows the concrete universal and has left the abstract universal miles behind. He admits that the degree of exactness in any science is proportionate to the subject-matter, and does not insist, as he did in the syllogism, that the premises should be only formal¹. Not only this, he even goes further and declares that such exactitude can never be possible, and yet, he urges, it does not make ethics a 'conventional' study. By calling the right act a 'mean state,' he admits that no act can be exactly identical with another. Every act admits of variation, just as every detail of a plan is a variation of the plan, and no two details are exactly similar.

But if every moral act is a variation of the plan, the idea of the good, and, as such more or less right, Aristotle is no less ready with an answer to moral nihilism. He declares that, "viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, virtue is a mean state, but in reference to the chief good it is the highest state possible²". The case is similar to the one dealt with by Bradley, who was called upon to clarify his position, with reference to his famous doctrine that no judgment is absolutely true, a doctrine which according to his critics either led to scepticism or infinite regress. Bradley's answer was that every judgment

¹ *Ethics*, Bk I, 8
² *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1107a

is absolutely true at the time of making it, and in actually judging anything no doubt is possible. Thus, every judgment is intuitive when it is actually made, and this renders every judgment absolute. But this absoluteness does no less render it relative, when reviewing it with reference to the whole of reality. Analogously, it might be said that every moral act when actually done is absolute, and in this state achieves the 'highest good possible,' but when viewed with reference to the idea of the good, 'it is a mean state' and is good more or less. Every moral act, like every judgment, is absolute and relative at once¹

It is the failure to understand this paradox that has led many thinkers to deny the validity of the concrete universal, both in logic and ethics². The concrete universal is absolute because it determines every differentiation through which it is realised. The absoluteness of the standard and the consequent relativity that attaches to every judgment and moral act does not abolish the absoluteness of these acts. But their absoluteness is derived from the fact that they are related to the concrete universal, the good, which serves as their criterion, and with reference to which absoluteness in the matter of rightness and wrongness has to be judged. Thus the good, as the moral criterion, imposes obligation upon every moral act and renders it absolute as an act of duty. The sense of duty is the sense of obligation, but this is impossible unless the moral act is determined by the nexus, the system, within which alone this obligatoriness has any significance. A moral act, by itself, is not an act of duty. It becomes an act of duty when it is determined by the whole, which gives rise to the moral act and at the same time renders it an act of duty. It is determinant and determinable at once.

Mr. Ross, however, ignores all this. He cannot under-

¹ "Essays on Truth and Reality" Chap. XIII. Besides this psychological absoluteness, Bradley also accepts another type of absoluteness when he says that "the world of mathematics, that is, I understand to rest upon certain conditions, and under these conditions there is within mathematics pure truth and utter error"—*Op. cit.* p. 286.

² Even Prof. Joachim fails to understand this when he says, "assuming that coherence-notion of truth is sound, no theory of truth as coherent can be completely true, but is at most possessed of a truth which we may believe but have not proved, to be 'symptomatic' of perfect truth"—*Nature of Truth* p. 175. See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* Chap. XIII on the absoluteness of criterion.

stand how the moral act can be absolute and at the same time be relative to the good, the concrete universal, with reference to which alone it can acquire any moral value. What is particular according to him is particular and not universal. He fails to realise what Cook Wilson saw, namely, that every particular is a particularised universal and never utterly particular. An utter particular is non-being and as such non-existent.

It is surely not suggested that Ross derives the good as a resultant from particular goods whether ideal or psychological. Ross's deontology is aware of the fact that a universal is not an aggregate of particulars and that the notion of good is not derivative but ultimate, and therefore has to be intuitively grasped. His doctrine thus stands in sharp contrast with utilitarianism, which could be made consistent, as was seen by Sidgwick, only when allied with some kind of intuitionism.

But though to Ross the good as the universal is not an aggregate, it is also not a system determining the particular goodness of every moral act. Here he follows Cook Wilson according to whom particular was a particularisation of the universal. Ross's position is exactly this. Like Cook Wilson he believes that every particular is 'determinate being of the universal,' which is only apprehended as universal but not itself universal. In the sphere of ethics Ross urges that every moral act implies *prima facie* duty and thus it is 'prima facie obligatory'. Just as this 'red' is particular, because it is a 'part of' this flower, but universal in virtue of being an 'instance of' redness and thus, according to Cook Wilson, a particularised universal, similarly Ross urges that any moral act, qua an act, is particular but not merely a particular. It is also universal because it is an act involving *prima facie* duty which is not derived but intuitively grasped.¹

1. "What I suggest is that both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that we can know about the nature of numbers and nature of duty. We do not read off our knowledge of particular branches of duty from a single idea of good life, but build up our ideal of good life from intuitions from particular branches of duty. In the course of thinking we come to know more, but we should never come to know more if we did not know what to start with."—Op. cit. pp. 144-45.

So according to Ross every act of duty is particular, and independent of the good motive and thus undetermined by it. The rightness or wrongness of an act is distinct from the goodness of the motive, which does not make any act right or wrong. "To count the being under the influence of certain motive," says Mr Ross, "which is the condition of the choice, as part of the object of choice, is to commit an error, which is, in a very distant way, analogous to the error of treating the principles upon which we reason as additional premises from which we reason. What we choose is to do the act to which the already existing predominant motive points, and it is easy to fall into the error of supposing that what we choose is to act from that motive. What is our duty is to do the act to which the sense of duty points, and it is easy to fall into the error of supposing that what is our duty is to act from the sense of duty."¹

It is not my purpose here to discuss the notion of 'right' and 'good' except to point out why Mr Ross has been led to believe that the right act is independent of good motive, or that one discovers *prima facie* duties without any notion of 'good,' with reference to which, as I have suggested above, the act may be called right or wrong. That has been very ably done by Mr. Pickard-Cambridge, and I do not believe that his criticisms have been met by Mr. Ross in his later work.²

According to Mr. Ross an act cannot be demonstrated as one's duty by the process of demonstrative syllogism. Every duty is to be grasped intuitively and cannot be deduced by any principle like Kant's categorical imperative. From a formal major a concrete conclusion cannot be deduced. It is evident that this position of Mr Ross is sound and one that was clearly insisted on by Aristotle when he contrasted 'knowledge' with 'practical wisdom'.³ The defect of

1. "Foundations of Ethics", pp 120-21

2. Mind, 1932, pp 161-163. Mr Pickard-Cambridge's criticism was directed against Mr Ross's earlier book, "The Right and the Good". Mr Ross in his Gifford Lectures, "Foundations of Ethics", has tried to meet this and other criticisms, but I believe the charge that the choice of 'prima facie duty' is merely blind or that its certainty is due to ideal utilitarianism is substantially correct. Whether the latter theory is valid or otherwise is another question.

3. Nichomachean Ethics, especially, Bk vi

Kantian ethical theory is due to his belief that such demonstration is possible.¹ But having denounced the efficacy of the abstract universal in determining actual duty, Mr. Ross does not revise his notion of the universal but compromises it all the more by resorting to ingenuity. And his ingenuity lies in his belief that he has given up the abstract universal while in reality he has devoutly clung to it

How true this criticism is can be seen from his criticism of the position held by Aristotle. We have already hunted above that Aristotle in his *Ethics* holds the doctrine of the concrete universal while in the *Posterior Analytics* and even in his *Metaphysics* he was dominated by the abstract universal. For example he says, "Good Counsel in general then is that which goes right towards that which is the end in a general way of consideration; in particular, that which does so towards some particular End"² This is what he calls practical wisdom. The point to be noted is that here Aristotle does not oppose the universal to the particular nor does he reduce the particular to the abstract universal by removing all its accidents, but insists that practical wisdom lies in the particular being determined by the universal. This is reinforced by his statement that "practical wisdom does not consist in a knowledge of general principles only, but it is necessary that one should know also the particular details, because it is apt to act and action is concerned with details"³ Here it is obvious that accidents that were ruthlessly extruded from demonstrative reasoning are allowed full right, and the distinction between "essence" and "accidents" that was the basis of the abstract universal is no more

This position of Aristotle Mr. Ross finds full of confusion, and he believes that this confusion is due to the fact that Aristotle failed to distinguish the function of the minor from that of the conclusion, even though they are both particular. Without undertaking to disprove the confusion

¹ In this I am following the general consensus of opinion of Kantian scholars. However, I believe that Kant's doctrine is not so simple as this

² Richardson, *Ethics*, 1112b

³ *Op. cit.*, 1141b

in Aristotle,¹ it may fairly be said that Ross falls into another confusion of similar type. As against Aristotle he urges that "the knowledge of particular minor premises cannot lead to the knowledge of general principles or the minor premise is a mere statement of fact, 'such and such an act has such and such a quality,' the predicate not being a mere predicate at all"². But yet he argues that "it is the rightness of particular acts that (at the pre-reflective stage) is apprehended and from this we pass to formulating general principles of the form 'such and such a kind of action is good,' from which we later deduce the rightness of further particulars of the same type. This would be analogous to what happens in the purely intellectual sphere, where universals are reached by induction from particulars, and fresh particulars are then deduced from the universals"³.

It is doubtful whether this account of induction is quite valid and still more doubtful whether it is Aristotelian. Aristotle would have replied that in induction the universal is not an aggregate but an identity that becomes more determinate, while in the particular this identity is less determinate, and he would have further added that the particular is, from the very beginning, a universal. But Mr. Ross's deduction of general principles appears to be similar to that of Mill in view of the following "it is only by recognising these different features one by one, that we can approach the forming of a judgment on the totality of its nature; our first look reveals these features in isolation, one by one; they are what appears *prima facie*"⁴. It appears that his 'totality' is only an aggregate, but Mr. Ross would urge that since the notion of '*prima facie* duty' is intuitive and not derived by abstraction, it is not so. On the one hand he says that all acts are *prima facie* duties and are *prima facie* obligations.⁵ But immediately we are told that "while an act may

1 That there is a certain amount of confusion appears to be clear from the two following passages, though the cause may not be as suggested by Mr. Ross. "Rightness is in respect to what conduces to good end, of which practical wisdom is the true conception" (1142b) and "minor premises are the source of the final cause, universals being made up of particulars" (1142b).

2 "Aristotle," p. 220

3. *Op cit.*, pp 219-20

4 *Op cit.*, p 84

5 *Foundations of Ethics*, p 84

be *prima facie* obligatory in respect of one character, and *prima facie* forbidden in virtue of another, it becomes obligatory and forbidden only in virtue of the totality of its ethically relevant characteristics'¹ In the face of these contradictory statements, it is very difficult to know what exactly the nature of the obligatory act is On the one hand, obligatoriness lies in the intuitive grasp of the character of *prima facie* duty, on the other, it appears to consist in the greatest number of the *prima facie* duties, and obligatoriness figures as a positive quality and forbiddenness as the minus quantity, corresponding to pleasure and pain Ross's deontology appears to be intuitive and utilitarian at once. It has to be intuitive for fear of losing itself in hedonism of one type or another But it has to be utilitarian for fear of being blind and irrational In the very act of denouncing the enemy it has to shake hands with it.²

It is obvious that Ross is following the lead given by Cook Wilson in his doctrine of universals It may be recalled that according to Cook Wilson the universal is a totality but not a system and yet it is not a class Similarly in perception he maintained that we apprehend a particularised universal, and never a mere particular, and therefore he urged that it need not be apprehended either as particular or universal³ Ross also does the same An act is particular but, according to him, it need not be apprehended as particular but as a *prima facie* duty, and therefore universal, and neither universal nor particular But the question still remains unanswered, how the sense of obligatoriness can be generated without any reference to the universal, the good, that determines it, and further how its intuitive character can be reconciled with its nature as a totality. If every moral act is grasped as *prima facie* obligatory by a kind of intuition, then ethics as science ceases to exist, and becomes a mere subjective affair and might easily become a support for Thrasymachus. But if its obligatoriness depends upon

1 Op cit., p 66

2 It is this inconsistency that has evoked the following question from Mr Pickard-Cambridge: "Before leaving the question how we arrive at the conviction of *prima facie* duty, I would ask whether the Provost is not, like Cudworth and Kant and every intuitionist I have ever met himself at times (at any rate) a utilitarian *malgré lui*?"—Mind, 1932, pp 171-72.

3 Statement and Inference, p 314.

the totality then it might gratify Bentham. But if it does not do either, which appears to be the case, then it might remain true to its name and become non-existent

In view of this fundamental inconsistency in this novel doctrine, it is very difficult to be persuaded that the right is not related to the good and determined by it.¹ Obligatoriness is not only a character of actions. It is also at the same time the criterion and the source of obligation.² We have already urged that an adjective is particular and universal at once. If my act is right, its rightness as character is determined by the goodness which is the universal. Ross takes rightness as only a character, a mere predicate, and forgets that a predicate also stands for the universal. He believes like Moore that good is undefinable and cannot be analysed further. Mr Moore forgets that the proposition "x is good" is different from the proposition "x is sweet," because in the former case there is the implicit sense of obligation, which is absent in a certain degree from the latter proposition, though it is not completely absent even there.³ Good is the unity which pervades its difference and cannot be understood as a totality. Its function lies in its being a nexus, a system which as the source of right acts, imposes its criterion and gives rise to obligatoriness. The good is the source of the right as well as the criterion of the right. It is the concrete universal, the source of value and criterion of value.

Hence the good cannot be abstracted from the right nor the right from the good. Deontology, where such an abstraction is made, is based on the abstract universal which contradicts itself by allying itself with cheap and blind intuitionism or utilitarianism. It is forgotten that the right

1 Compare, 'a right act, some say, is not to be defined as one causally related to what is good, and it may have no value itself, nevertheless I ought to do it. In spite of the arguments by which this opinion has been defended it seems to me absurd.'—Joseph, *Some Problems in Ethics*, p. 26. Mr Joseph has Mr. Prichard in mind.

2 Mr. Joseph, *op cit*, p. 61, says, "Obligatoriness is not a character of actions. To say that an act is obligatory means that the doing of it is obligatory on me." This is somewhat unhelpful. If "obligatoriness" is not a character, how am I to know that it is obligatory? Is not the universal present in every particular? I should think so.

3 This must be insisted upon because for me there is no fact which at the same time is not a value. Mr Joseph seems to overlook this, much as I believe, Kant did. There are not mere propositions of fact. Every proposition of fact, I should urge, is a proposition of

act is possible within the whole universe which expresses itself in the social ethos, within which the rightness of any act acquires any obligatoriness. This is what Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Bradley insisted on continuously. Unless the universe is the source of values and thus imposes obligation upon moral beings, obligation has no meaning and duty is a word without any significance. This is what Kant appears to have suggested in his famous dictum "ought implies can". These values are objective and not the creations of any human mind. They are there in reality, because reality is spiritual and, as such, is the source of values. The universe as the concrete universal determines the moral act and at the same time passes judgment on it. This is the paradox of self-determination again, the paradox where the individual is both the creature and the creator, is determined by the universe and determines the universe, performs his duty and in the performance enjoys the freedom of creativeness. It is the same paradox that gives rise to the problem of universals. This paradox cannot be solved by any novel doctrines. The only possible way of solving it is to admit that the universe is the concrete universal, which, as the source of all values, determines the existence of moral agents, and at the same time includes their moral contribution. Thus,

"You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?"

Certainly

In like manner good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence but far exceeds essence in dignity and power!"

* * *

I have said at the beginning of this essay that the problem of universals is ultimately the problem that gives rise to philosophy. It is the business of philosophy to throw light on the nature of the universe and determine the place of individuals in this universe. Philosophy is the knowledge

of Man's place in the Cosmos Contemporary philosophy has been too busy with atomic propositions and logical simples and has forgotten its main function, *viz.* to make every individual apprehend the wholeness of the universe and his place in it. Its function is to bring to every individual the sense of solidarity with the universe, how his very being is rooted in the universe. It must bring him the sense of exaltation by pointing out that he is integral with reality, and a feeling of pious chastisement that his individuality is only a fragment of the whole. He is the creator and the creature at once. It is for him to make the universe nasty, brutish and ugly, or to make it more true, more good and more beautiful. Herein lies his worth ; this way lies his destiny.

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